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
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SPECTRUM

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INSURGENCY: *The author analyzes the events which led to the American involvement in Vietnam, in which he sees American concern for security in Europe as having been an important factor. He points to some of the basic errors made in combating insurgency in Vietnam, while at the same time making cross-references to other counter-insurgency campaigns, both "unsuccessful" and "successful".*

Insurgency, NATO, and Vietnam

George K. Tanham

THE US desire for a strong NATO was one of the important reasons, if not the most important, for the initial American assistance to the French in the Vietnam insurgency. Communist insurgency in Greece drew the US into a more active role in Europe after World War II, and the insurgency in Vietnam drew the US into an active involvement in Asia, initially in order to strengthen Europe but later as part of an effort to contain Communism around the world.

Since World War II the Communists have used insurgency as one method for trying to obtain power in non-Communist areas and countries. This technique has posed and continues to pose serious problems for the Free World as it has inherent strengths which lie in the fact that the Communists tend to take over nationalist or reform movements, train the native leadership, and covertly assist in attempts to overthrow non-Communist regimes. It also is hard to "prove" any outside interference in the insurgency and embarrassing to be opposed to what appear to be independence movements or movements against dictatorial, colonial, or corrupt regimes. The method is relatively cheap and of low risk, as outside Communist participation can be easily camouflaged and denied. However, "successful" counter-insurgency efforts in Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia suggest that good leadership, efficient organization, and the proper assessment of the situation can halt the Communists, at least for a time. However, success is a relative word as insurgents are again operating in Malaysia and the Philippines, and insurgencies can be partially successful by just being a continuous cancerous sore and a drain on the resources of governments, as in the case of Thailand today.

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THESE Communist-led or inspired insurgencies have at times been a significant factor in US foreign policy, their repercussions have often reached far beyond the territorial confines of a given insurgency, and they have had an importance greater than the event itself. This article cannot touch on the ramifications of all these issues, but will devote itself primarily to one major theme: that the initial US involvement in insurgency in Indo-China had as its priority objective a strong France and thus a strong Western Europe. A corollary of this theme is that American pre-occupation with Europe consciously and unconsciously had an influence on its policies and actions in subsequent insurgencies, particularly in Vietnam. Insurgency has thus been an important factor in the Cold War.

It became evident to many Americans immediately after World War II that the Soviets not only had no intention of loosening their reins on the parts of Eastern Europe they occupied but indeed were intent on tightening them and might even be getting ready for further expansion. Churchill's famous speech at Fulton, Missouri in 1946 popularized the phrase "Iron Curtain", a reference to the tight control exercised by the Soviets East of the Baltic-Trieste line, and highlighted that aspect of Soviet policy to the American public. Also in 1946 the limited use of Soviet troops to support dissidents against the pro-Western Government of Iran gave a hint of possible Soviet moves at least to enlarge its sphere of influence, if not its own territory. An American policy of containment of the Soviets in Europe began to emerge as the counter to these perceived threats(1). The Cold War was clearly underway.

In Asia war was also underway in a hot way between Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek in China; in South-east Asia where a protracted revolutionary war officially began between the Vietminh and the French in December 1946; and the Huks continued to fight against the new independent

Government of the Philippines. Though the latter two were independence movements — the Huks claiming the new Philippine Government was a US puppet, and Ho Chi Minh stating that he was fighting for Vietnamese independence —, the Communists played a dominant role in their efforts and saw independence as just the first step toward Communist regimes. It should be remembered that during World War II President Roosevelt had favoured an end to the colonial empires in South-east Asia and the US had provided some, but very limited, support to the South-east Asia resistance or anti-Japanese movements, which later became the cadres for these post-war independence insurgencies in almost every colony in the area. This policy continued briefly after the war as the US had historically, but not always, favoured freedom and independence efforts, having in mind its own revolution against the British. Following this policy, the US gave the Philippines their independence in 1946 and was somewhat sympathetic to the continuation of these World War II resistance movements, now waged against the European colonial powers who had returned and replaced the Japanese, even though most were heavily influenced, if not dominated by the Communists.

It was not these far-off Asian insurgencies which first attracted American attention, however, but rather the Communist-led guerrilla warfare in Greece. In February 1947 the British announced that they could no longer support the incumbent Greek Government in its fight against the Communist-led guerrilla forces attempting to overthrow it, and a Communist take-over seemed likely unless some other source of outside support was forthcoming. The critical situation in Greece deeply stirred the American Government's fear of Communist expansion by force, and indicated clearly that the US would have to adopt a more active role in world affairs if it were to be halted. President Truman was not slow to act and in March told the Congress that "it must be the policy of the US to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures". On 15 May 1947 the Congress approved the special aid which President Truman had requested for Greece. Military advisers followed the aid, and the US began its first counter-insurgency assistance effort — in Europe.

While this is not the place to go into the details of the Greek insurgency or civil war, it is important to recall the major "lessons learned" by the US Government from that early conflict. The Truman Doctrine had a twofold approach: economic aid to help moderate the economic and social problems deemed to be at the roots of the rebellion; and military aid, along with US military advisers, to strengthen the Government troops against the military or para-military Communist forces. It was and still is difficult to measure or evaluate the effects of economic aid on the course of insurgency as they are complex, indirect and hardly quantifiable(2). The military aid can to an extent be gauged, as battle is a fairly rigid test, much more so than advice, and weapons are involved. In any case, in a final pitched battle the Communists lost in Greece and military aid was deemed a success. However, one other element not connected with US aid, was also considered a most significant factor by some observers, namely the closing of the Yugoslav border and the stoppage of all or most supplies in 1949 to the Communist forces in Greece. Thus, a successful formula *seemed* to have been worked out which avoided the use of American troops but did involve US aid and advisers, and emphasized the closing of borders so as to halt the influx of supplies from outside.

However, success in Greece by the end of 1949 did not in any way reduce the Cold War which was then well underway. The Soviets had refused to participate in the Marshall Plan and their fierce opposition to it had indicated that the lines were being even more tightly drawn. Not suprisingly the Cominform was formed in September 1947 to stop the "imperialists and especially the Americans". In 1948 Czechoslovakia was taken over by Soviet-dominated Communists and Tito's independent stance led to the ejection of Yugoslavia from the Cominform. The Berlin Blockade of 1948 brought about the first direct confrontation between East and West. All of these factors led to a heightening of tension and to greater US concern about the security of Europe, and indeed aroused European worries also. These attitudes led to the North Atlantic Conference and Treaty in April 1949 and the first session of its signators in September 1949. France, partially because of its geographical location but also because of its traditional position in Europe, became the focal point for European defence. France's objection to German re-armament and participation in European defence at this time made French participation and strength even more important. While France was prepared, even anxious at this time, to play a key role in Europe, it was increasingly bogged down in the protracted struggle to regain its colonies in Indo-China. This drain on French manpower and resources became worse as time went on, and thus if it was to play a critical role in the defence of Europe, France must be given some help with its far-off struggle in Indo-China and that could only come from the US.

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HOWEVER, the US did not pay much attention to South-east Asia in the first years of the Cold War, even though Communism was on the move there. The continuation of the Huk movement after Philippine independence and its intensification in 1948 led to some American aid and a few advisers but nothing on the scale of the assistance to Greece. The early French efforts against the Communist Vietminh elicited little sympathy, and in fact some opposition

from America immediately after World War II. The Communist decision, apparently made or re-emphasized in Calcutta in early 1948, to follow the path of revolution and to intensify insurgencies in various countries of South-east Asia evoked little US response at all. Indeed, the Truman Administration seemed definitely opposed to involvement in Asia, except to help the French in Vietnam. After the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek in China in 1949 and his flight to Formosa, he tried continuously, and with powerful help from the China lobby in the US, to obtain aid from America, but failed. US troops, which had been stationed in South Korea after World War II were withdrawn in 1949, as that country was not considered important to the US. President Quirino of the Philippines, worried about Communists' activities in South-east Asia, and with support from New Zealand and Australia, pleaded in 1950 for a Pacific pact, but his call fell on deaf ears in Washington. This difference in reaction to Communists' actions in Asia and Europe suggests that America's primary concern at the time was the Cold War in Europe and that its efforts were concentrated in that theatre.

However, as the US sought the co-operation of the European Powers, especially France as it seemed increasingly the key to a strong European military posture, so the French were able to exert pressure on Washington for aid against the Communist-led revolt in Indo-China(3). The French efforts were successful and, after discussions in 1949, the US slowly began economic and military aid in support of the French efforts to suppress the Vietminh led by Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China in 1950. However, the French, in spite of their need, were on the horns of a dilemma; most Frenchmen wanted to get out of the draining war but also wanted Indo-China to remain a part of the French Union. In order to accomplish this, the French needed help from the US, but they did not want the US to deal directly with the Vietnamese, thus interfering with the French position. The French agreement with Bao Dai in 1949 appeared to give Indo-China a certain amount of independence, but in reality the French continued to hold the key reins and the agreement really resolved none of the problems. It did have the effect of lessening the US dilemma, which was a desire to help France in Indo-China so as to make it stronger in Europe versus a reluctance to become involved in a colonial war. While the US wanted to assist the Vietnamese directly, the French insisted that at least military aid be channelled through them. These arrangements, nevertheless, allowed the US to proceed with an aid programme and ultimate involvement in Vietnam. As an aside, it is interesting to note that during this period of just five years the US shifted from a policy of helping, admittedly in a rather small way, Ho Chi Minh and his guerrillas, to indifference, and finally to active support of his enemy, the French. This latter trend continued and in another five years, at the time of the siege of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the US actively debated sending American forces to support the French. While the situation had been desperate in Indo-China for some time, the primary reason for this considered action lay in America's European interest, though admittedly by this time the worldwide aspects of the Cold War seem to have become clear as events in Korea unfolded.

The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 suggested that the Communists might have switched from guerrilla warfare and subversion to overt aggression in their worldwide expansion drive, and this view was widely held in the American Government. But one could also wonder whether, if there had been no Cold War and fear of Communist domination of Europe, the US would have been so quick to help Korea, a small nation which most Americans had never heard of and which the Secretary of State, Acheson, said was not within the "defensive perimeter" for which the US would fight. The accepted interpretation, however, had significant repercussions on US policy in Asia and Europe. Thus, the US, besides fighting the Korean War, increased its aid and number of advisers in Vietnam from 70 in 1950 to 342 in 1954 and its aid from US$118 million in 1950 to US$815 million in 1954. By 1954 the US was paying for approximately 80% of the French war effort in Indo-China and had spent a total of US$2.6 billion on it. The US was also contemplating the direct military intervention mentioned previously. But in spite of great American aid to the French in Indo-China they were defeated and signed a cease-fire at Geneva in 1954 and withdrew from Indo-China. Thus, while American aid in Vietnam did not fulfil the American desire for a strong France in Europe, the Vietminh did so, in a fashion, by driving the French out of South-east Asia, thus giving them the opportunity to develop their military capabilities in Europe (admittedly with a few years delay due to problems in Algeria), the original objective of the American aid.

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IN trying to put the events of the first decade after World War II in Asia and Europe side-by-side, several interesting points emerge. First, the Cold War was initially seen as a European affair: the Soviet Union continued to hold Eastern Europe in a tight grasp, formed the Cominform in 1947 in opposition to the Marshall Plan, and initiated the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade in 1948. US and Western European concern increased. No action was taken in the case of Czechoslovakia but opposition and action were taken in the case of the blockade. In Europe the threat was quickly and clearly recognized and specific actions taken. In Asia the outbreak or intensification of insurgencies in several countries — following the Mao line rather than the Soviet, however — was less clearly seen or recognized and certainly of less interest to the West

except for those nations directly involved. Western collective reaction came reasonably quickly in Europe in the case of the Berlin Blockade and more permanently at the North Atlantic Conference in 1949. But in Asia, the less binding South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was not formed until after the Manila Conference in 1954. And it was this early concern about the security of Europe which led to the beginning of US aid to the French in Indo-China in 1950, about the same time as the formation of NATO.

Second, while the concern of the West was directed mainly to Europe, most of the anti-Communist fighting took place in Asia, which, in principle, was not the priority theatre. War in China, insurgencies in Indo-China, the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma and limited war in Korea, increasingly occupied the Western nations and absorbed abnormal amounts of attention and resources, whereas, after the end of hostilities in Greece, there was no fighting in Europe(4). Was this because of Communist fear of the consequence of direct action in Europe and, therefore, the adoption of a strategy to divert resources to the less important theatre and distract Western attention from its primary concern? Or was it because the Mao doctrine of insurgency advocated violence, but of low intensity, as a less dangerous means of confrontation. Or was it historical accident that the Communists tried to gain or gained control of the South-east Asian independence movements whose time had come? Before the Soviet-Chinese split it was easier to envisage a unified Communist world strategy of indirect attack on Europe through its colonies. After all, had not Lenin suggested that the route to a Communist take-over of Europe lay through Asia? Many Americans believed that Korea was in fact a feint or a diversionary effort. The Maoist doctrine provided a tool for Asian revolt and, after its success in China in 1949, it had even greater appeal as Maoists fought to gain control of all the Communist Parties in Asia. Low-level insurgencies do not attract attention ordinarily, as today's view of the existing ones suggests. Finally, nationalism which had seemed a sleeping, if not dying, factor before World War II, seemed to come into its own with great vigour after World War II, especially in Asia and Africa, and the Communists harnessed it. Thus, all three factors contributed to involving the West in fighting in far-off areas where they were least prepared. Europe, the ultimate objective of American policy, continued to remain relatively untouched and seemingly forgotten, largely due to increasing concern with Asian problems.

Though the French defeat in Indo-China, highlighted by the loss at Dien Bien Phu, seemed to dominate the scene, the score in counter-insurgency efforts against Communist insurgents by the middle of the fifties did not seem so bad. There was the early Communist defeat in Greece in 1949, then the Huk defeat in the Philippines in 1954, the almost complete crushing of the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) in Malaya, a lack of Communist victory in Laos, and little progress by the Communists in other areas of South-east Asia, i.e., Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia(5). Overt Communist aggression in Korea had also been checked, and this was the basic US objective, not the occupation or destruction of North Korea. But the costs had been high, the victories not entirely satisfying, and, in general, the type of struggle — protracted, unconventional, and unseemly — had not been to the American liking. Consequently, American concern with Asia and insurgencies which had been strong in the early fifties and had led to the formation of SEATO, new or increased aid programmes to Thailand and other Asian nations and general US support for all anti-Communist efforts, waned in the late fifties. In the Pentagon a group of officers frustrated by the Korea experience and dubbed "the never again club" (those opposed to ever sending US troops to the Asian mainland again) was in the ascendancy, and many Americans seemed frustrated by and tired of their Asian experiences.

Despite the frustration, the "never again club" and rather strong public opinion against further Asian involvement, the US Government began what was to become its bitterest and most frustrating experience in Asia — direct support of the new regime in South Vietnam headed by Ngo Dinh Diem. In 1955 the US Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) took over the training of the Vietnamese from the French. The MAAG had begun in 1950 with a strength of 70 men and by May 1960 had grown slowly to 685. President Eisenhower expressed public support of President Diem in a letter to him which was carried by Vice-President Nixon to Vietnam in 1956. Slowly but surely America became tied to the future of Vietnam for its own sake. There are several reasons why the US replaced the French in the struggle against the Communists. First, the American Government took some responsibility for the new fledgling Government of South Vietnam even though it did not sign the Geneva Accords of 1954, because it wanted to demonstrate its support of this ex-colony as a new independent country and to show its general anti-colonial posture, rather than recognize a French suppression campaign. Also Europe seemed on its way to being able to take care of itself so the US could seemingly afford a wider-ranging opposition to Communism.

However, more important than these reasons was a change in US government administration which brought about a different government view of the world and a new leadership which stepped up the intensity of the Cold War. Whereas the Truman Administration, when fighting the Cold War, followed a Europe-oriented foreign policy, and paid less attention to Asia, the Eisenhower Administration dominated by John Foster Dulles, took up an almost religious crusade against Communism in all corners of the world. Urged on by the China Lobby and

McCarthyism, Dulles saw himself as defender of the capitalistic and democratic faith and tried to mobilize all American efforts to thwart the Communists at every turn. He enthusiastically endorsed SEATO, pledged US defence of Formosa, and urged strong support for Diem in South Vietnam while also trying to build up European defences and a pact, the Baghdad Pact, in the Middle East. The Kennedy Administration, while mitigating some of the fervour of Dulles's anti-Communist zeal, nevertheless took an even more active interest in stopping the Communists in Indo-China. The momentum built up early in the Kennedy years, grew under Johnson, and soon neither bureaucrats nor policy makers would, or perhaps could, halt the increasing involvement in Vietnam, which by the mid-sixties was also becoming very unpopular in the US.

The irony and contradiction that arose as America became more deeply involved and finally engaged in large-scale military operations with US troops in Vietnam, is that what started as a relief operation for France took on an end of its own and involved an almost total commitment of US resources. The final irony was that France, which had been so strongly courted for its role in Europe, withdrew its own armed forces from NATO in 1966 at a time when the US found itself fully engaged in Vietnam. The situation now found France essentially out of NATO, thus reducing European defences, and the US weakened in Europe because of the severe drain on military manpower for the Vietnam war — the same position France had been in fifteen years before.

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IT HAS not been the purpose of this article to re-examine the Vietnam experience as such but to demonstrate why and how we got there, and to argue that it was because of our concern over the security of Europe and our efforts to strengthen European defences. A corollary is to suggest that our priority concerns with Europe and the "lessons learned" in our first experiences there had a profound and, in my view, unfortunate influence on what we were to do in the Vietnam conflict. The following section deals with this corollary.

The success of the Marshall Plan in helping to rebuild Europe after World War II made a great impression on the American Government, as it should. But its success also had the serious disadvantage of making economic development, easily confused with the reconstruction of reasonably well-developed countries, seem simple — just vote money and work out a plan with the recipient. It also seemed a panacea for all societal ills. In the European case, the cultural gap was minimal, the basic skills were in place, and the whole concept of "modern" societies at least accepted, if not fully comprehended. On the military side, in World War II, American troops had fought alongside European armies and had worked together with reasonable harmony. World War II had been won largely, though by no means exclusively, on the basis of superior firepower. The post-war US army followed the strategy that had proved successful in Europe in World War II, and all plans for the future envisaged another conventional war in Europe — that is short of the strategic war fought largely by the Air Force. It is important to note that economically and militarily the US experience was with developed countries in Europe, but this general approach also seemed to work in Greece, one of the less developed countries of Europe. In the case of Greece, as we have seen, it seemed to many officials that there had been three main pillars for success: first, economic aid to lessen the economic and social problems contributing to the success of the Communists; second, military aid and advisers to the Greek military to train and equip them to defeat the Communist armed forces; and third, the closing of the borders so that outside aid could not reach the enemy forces. This description is, of course, an over-simplification of the complex struggle in Greece, but it does, I believe, capture the essence of the major lessons learned. It is too simplistic, and yet I believe this simplistic explanation was accepted and subsequently applied to Vietnam.

Given the other counter-insurgency efforts in South-east Asia, why did Americans seem to adopt the one that worked well in Europe and not at least investigate and perhaps learn from these other Asian experiences to determine whether in fact the lessons learned from the Greek experience were immutable principles of counter-insurgency or whether different approaches had to be worked out for each individual situation, such as in Malaya and the Philippines? It is also possible to learn from failures, but the general American military view was that nothing could be learned from the French because they lost in Indo-China. I recall urging American officers in 1961 to try to learn from the French experience, but their answer was that the French had not only lost in Indo-China but had themselves not won a war since the time of Napoleon. Historical experience seems to suggest an opposite view — that losers often learn more than victors — is more valid in many cases. There was also a strong reluctance to learn anything from the British experience in Malaya, as that was considered "different", but there were enough similarities to other Asian situations to learn quite a bit from it. The Philippine effort, which one would suspect to be of greater interest, was also generally ignored; why this was so is unclear. It also appeared that the Asian situations supported the concepts developed as a result of the Greek guerrilla war. For example, the Malayan and Philippine cases at first glance seemed to reinforce the idea that if borders are closed (or are nonexistent), the Communists will fail. Indeed the recent French experience also seemed to support this concept as the Chinese Communists began to send supplies to the Vietminh in early 1950 after they reached the border in December 1949, and

this probably speeded their victory which was already well along. However, a closer look at the Malayan and the Philippine cases reveals that, though in neither case did outside supplies reach the insurgents in any significant quantities, they came close to victory without them, and the opening or closing of borders had little or nothing to do with their ultimate defeat. The turning point after near victory for the Communists came as a result of new, dynamic, and thoughtful leadership in these governments. In the Philippines, Magsaysay saw basic problems of corruption and inefficient military and got rid of the corruption in the armed forces, made them friends of the people, and waged imaginative aggressive warfare which in a few years routed the Huks. He also instituted some land reform but Americans, I believe, overemphasized this effort which in fact was quite small. However, this land reform did have important psychological effects on the anti-Huk campaign. In Malaya the problems were different, namely to develop a plan to separate the insurgents from their internal sources of supply. By the time of Templer's arrival a good plan, the Briggs Plan, had already been drawn up and Templer executed it. Good intelligence, well-behaved and trained forces, and a co-ordinated civil/military effort contributed to success. These very brief analyses of these two campaigns are used to illustrate that each situation is different and that, whereas closing the borders can be of great assistance, there are cases of Communists nearly winning in spite of being cut off from outside supplies. Most observers agree that without Magsaysay and Templer and their associated efforts, the Communists would have won even though the borders were "closed", i.e., there were no contiguous Communist countries, from the beginning. This discussion is not intended to suggest that denial of supplies to the enemy, a long-accepted principle of war, should be ignored, but that concentration on one way to do that can be a mistake, especially when even the rugged Yugoslav-Greek border looks simple compared to the long, unknown mountain and jungle "border" of Vietnam and Laos. The gigantic effort to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail in Indo-China followed from this lesson, with only limited success(6).

The other two pillars of success in Greece, military and economic assistance and advice, are of course useful tools for one government trying to help another one in trouble. The success of the Marshall Plan and NATO in helping to alleviate European ills reinforced the aid theory, but assisting in the restoration of developed countries is one thing; starting from a much less developed base is another. The trouble in Vietnam, I believe, was one of adapting the tools to the situation, or trying as the US did to make the situation fit the tools. As indicated earlier the American army was organized and indoctrinated to fight another conventional war, though atomic weapons (the ultimate in firepower) were included for battlefield use if necessary. It had corps and divisions trained to engage in linear warfa with its geographic objectives, hilltops, road junction etc.. Massing of troops and firepower for brea throughs or defence were key elements. Only toke attention was paid to any other form of warfare an this was in keeping with our foreign policy objective When confronted with the problem of trainin Vietnamese troops, the American military qui naturally had the tendency to make them look, ac and fight just like the Americans regardless of the fa that a quite different threat and situation we developing in South-east Asia. For example, I ca recall in 1961 Vietnamese companies engaging i exercises like those developed at Fort Benning fo conventional war in Europe, including attacks c pillboxes — an item unknown to the Viet Cong. I 1961 the head of the MAAG was still solely interest in North Vietnamese divisional attacks across th border and had massive conventional studies, just lik the ones done at Leavenworth Command and Gener Staff School, piled up in his headquarters. Admitted armies must have accepted doctrine, but when the is clearly a new and different situation, adjustmen must be made. They came slowly, painfully, an sometimes never in Vietnam. This description perhaps a bit strong, but it certainly applies to th early phases of the American involvement in Vietna and even after the introduction of American troop Admittedly, the latter stages of the war became mo and more conventional as Hanoi's regular division were equipped with the most modern weapons an engaged in large-scale operations and thus a American-like South Vietnamese army was mo appropriate.

The civil side was really not much different, a American advisers generally taught and advised abou what they knew best, i.e. what they did in America and followed the theme that what was best fo America must also be best for the recipient country Vietnam, even though it was decades "behind" th US, and culturally and in many other ways qui different. Some of the US advisers were unclear as t the difference between federal and unitary govern ments and hence tried to treat the Vietnames provinces, which had no inherent powers, as thoug they were states in the federal US system, while othe could only think of numerous and often advance economic plans, far beyond the Vietnamese capabilit at the time. It is not necessary to dwell on our pas mistakes in detail or single out any group, but th preceding illustrations may have helped make th point.

As bad as some of these mirror image mistake were, they were lost in many respects in th development of the "more money, men, and material philosophy, which in a sense was the basis for Allie success in World War II and to a lesser extent i Greece. Quantity, not quality, leadership, imagina tion, creativity, or innovation, soon appeared to b

the panacea for all problems. If advisers at corps level did not do the trick, then send some to the provinces; if that did not work, send them to the districts, which were usually administered by a Vietnamese captain! If these did not work, double the number of advisers at all levels. The civil side also followed the "more and more" philosophy. If so much money won't stimulate the economy, double or treble the amount; if so much fertilizer won't develop agriculture, do the same, etc.. This is not to suggest that there were not some imaginative and innovative solutions attempted by the Americans in Vietnam, but the major thrust of the effort lay in the "more of everything" concept. It seems to me that this was a fallacious principle in an insurgency struggle, which is probably based more on **people** than conventional wars in more developed areas, where sheer power can have its greatest effect. Cities, modern transportation systems, power plants are all vulnerable to attack, but in less developed countries and in guerrilla warfare the target and vulnerable points are hard to determine and they are difficult to attack. This suggests that there should be a premium on brains, leadership and dedication and less on sheer power, and this is particularly so in the earlier phases of protracted wars at the time one would ideally like to halt them. In addition to the more conventional aspects of the latter phases of the war in Vietnam and hence wider use of firepower, it should be stressed that as the war grew more and more unpopular in the US, so concern for US casualties grew; the intensive use of firepower was an attempt to win the war but limit the casualties. The North never seemed to be concerned about casualties and this difference in attitude towards casualties became one of the most significant factors in the war, as it to a large extent determined staying power or who would fight on the longest.

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THE lessons of Vietnam will be long debated, and this extremely short review of some of the basic errors, at least in my mind, is not the major point. The main idea is that Americans planned and were trained to fight a conventional war in Europe, and the adjustment to Vietnam and guerrilla warfare was most difficult. The same may be said of the US civilian aid programme, though its errors and failures were not as widely publicized as the military side of the war.

As this article goes to press it is interesting to note that history is now making a full circle. America is once again concentrating on European defence, though the Middle East is considerably in the limelight, while little aid and attention is being given to Asia. In late September of this year the member ministers of SEATO agreed that this organization should be phased out over the next few years. Thirty years after the post World War II period America returns to its first priority — Europe — at the expense of Asian areas. Whether this is the right course only time will tell.

Notes and References

1. "X", "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", *Foreign Affairs,* XXV, (July, 1947), pp. 466-582.
2. See George K. Tanham, *Trial In Thailand,* Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., New York, 1974, pp. 101-104, for a brief discussion of evaluating the effect of economic aid on insurgency.
3. This is not the first nor the last time in which the US has seemed to be more concerned about the security of a country than the country itself and thus has reduced American leverage by consequently bringing about reforms or needed changes.
4. Uprisings later took place in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, but were sternly and quickly suppressed by the Soviets.
5. See paragraph two for caveats regarding "success" in insurgencies.
6. Political constraints on the US military for a long time limited some options (closing Haiphong, etc.) but not all.

STUDENTS AND POLITICS: *On the second anniversary of the student uprising which resulted in the overthrow of the Thanom-Prapass military regime, the author examines the origins of the Thai student movement and analyzes the developments which led up to the events of October 1973.*



The Emergence of the Thai Student Movement

Prudhisan Jumbala

THE toppling of the Thanom-Prapass military dictatorship in Thailand in October 1973 was an occurrence which caused considerable surprise in many quarters, not least in the other Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, where the lack of marked political change in recent years contrasts sharply with the Thai experience. Thailand's uprising was spearheaded by students, most of whom were the offspring of members of the elite, and not by a Communist-led "people's" movement as in Indo-China. In the context of such a dual contrast, it was natural enough for political commentators at the time to have identified it as the beginning of political development in the liberal democratic tradition(1). Moreover, in contrast to the 1932 coup d'état which effected the change to constitutional monarchy, this uprising involved a significant amount of mass participation rather than only a small core of the bureaucratic elite. In this sense, it was also thought that, for the first time in Thai history, extra-bureaucratic elements were posing a direct challenge to the bureaucracy which had dominated the Thai polity at least since 1932 and could possibly lead to "the End of the Thai Bureaucratic Polity"(2).

Less speculatively, Thai political scientist, Saneh Chammarik, some one and a half years after the event, called it a "revolution" only in the sense of "a process which did not have people who fought in order to gain power", — thus distinguishing it from a "coup d'état", a familiar occurrence in contemporary Thai political history — "and importantly, it was a revolution which did not show a way-out for the society in terms of changes in the power relations in Thai society", but it could be seen as "a cultural phenomenon of protest against government by nepotism or elitist government which could not bring about peaceful coexistence but only disintegration, hatred and conflict..."(3) — thus distinguishing it from a "revolution" aimed at the destruction of the existing economic and political structure and its replacement by a novel kind of economic, social and political relationship, or a "revolution" in the Marxian sense.

Though Saneh's observations are reasonably accurate about the October uprising, the last two years of student activity have seen attacks on foreign economic and political domination, capitalist interests and bureaucrats' suppression activities. Such protests have been revived by the status-quo minded people in Thai society as a sure sign that students form the vanguard for the sort of changes, which the former see as aiming at the destruction of the present structures; so much so that they have, to say the very least, advanced the contention that these students are being controlled by some outside power, some "third" or hidden hand", seen as alien and fearful.

Two alternative questions therefore arise as to the characteristics of the Thai student movement. One is whether the Thai student movement is a counter-elite force spearheading the country's political development towards liberal democracy, or two, whether the Thai student movement is now becoming the vanguard of Marxist development — that is whether it is "revolutionary" in the Marxian sense. Though these are pertinent questions, it is not within our present ability and scope to give anything like a definitive answer to them. Perhaps, as with most social science enquiries, we will not know until after

the event. We can only very partially contribute knowledge which could lead to the answering of such questions through an analysis of the origin and growth of the student movement before the October uprising. Our evidence shows that the student movement had been incubating and developing little by little for at least five years before the uprising; the promises of democracy on the part of the dictators on the one hand and the actual reversal of the democratic trend on the other, led to the questioning, on the part of the student leaders, of the economic and social systems as well as the political one.

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OUR surprise at the rise and success of the Thai student movement is perhaps correlated with our ignorance about Thai students' involvement in matters of public policy over the years. It is perhaps useful to identify, after Radom Wongsenom, three phases of student political activities up to October 1973 as follows:

- The first phase: after the 1932 coup d'état through the Sarit regime to 1968.

- The second phase: from 1968 to the notorious self-coup d'état of Thanom on 17 November 1971.

- The third phase from November 1971 to October 1973(4).

In the early period of the first phase, there is no evidence of student political activity until October 1940, when students of Chulalongkorn and Thammasat Universities rallied with the people to support Premier Pibun's demand for Thai territory from the French. This first student rally in Thai political history was clearly one motivated by a sense of nationalism and one which served as a backing to the Government's international relations policy. It was not until 1951 that the students showed signs of being an interest group, when they demanded that the Pibun Government should hand over Thammasat University for educational purposes after a period of army occupation during and after Pridi's "Old Palace" coup. From various pieces of evidence(5), it can be said that the students were not politically motivated but simply wished to return to study at their university. Indeed, they employed a traditional technique of praising Pibun rather than confronting him. However, between 1951 and 1957, there would seem to have been increasing interest in politics among the students, for in the February 1957 general elections, they organized a team to observe the elections and unearthed Pibun's dubious tactics. Mounting dissatisfaction among the urban population encouraged the students to stage a demonstration accusing Pibun of destroying democracy. A confrontation with the police at Government House nearly led to violence, but the students were quelled by Pibun and notably by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat who, in September of the same year, rode the tide of oppositional sentiment against Pibun by staging a coup d'état against his own party leader and instituted harsh dictatorial rule in the country(6).

Sarit proved to have been an astute and decisive politician, for as soon as he had succeeded in calming down the potential threat which the students posed, he instituted martial law, while at the same time mollifying the urban population with the fruits of industrial development. In other words, he tried to sap the cause for complaint and simultaneously consolidated his power. His ten years of rule has since been dubbed "the dark era" by one of the October 1973 student leaders, Seksan Prasertkul. Seksan argues that during that period the students, being blocked from political activity outside, turned inwards to organize a series of on-campus entertainments, and immersed themselves in inter-university competition(7).

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IT WAS not until 1968, the beginning of the second phase, after Sarit's death, that the students were able to begin their political activities again and from thereon, as evidenced in their publications and demonstrations, they launched a series of attacks on the Government.

With Sarit's death, Thanom became Prime Minister. He had a much less authoritarian personality than Sarit and promulgated the long-promised constitution, with provisions for a certain amount of civil liberty and a general election within 240 days. The students demanded that the Government lift martial law in order to ensure a fair campaign and election. The Government avoided unpopular confrontation by lifting martial law in Bangkok but retained it in the "threatened areas" of the provinces(8).

This second phase, which was set in a more liberal political climate than had existed during Sarit's rule, saw a profusion, though still largely clandestine, of student writings and seminars with decidedly political themes. They ranged from their own particularist concerns with the inequality and illiberality of the educational system through attacks at the way the bureaucracy dominated Thai politics, the undesirable consequences of military dictatorship, the unjust nature of the economic and legal systems, to more universalistic concerns about the domination of the Third World by the United States (linking this, of course, with the internal domination of the country by military elites)(9). Such publications and seminars came from groups which called themselves "independent groups" as opposed to the formalized student associations in each institution. They aimed at the questioning of the role of students vis-à-vis society at

large, and raising the consciousness of students to public issues and public welfare. They reflected the acquisition of critical faculties on the part of some students, and their search for an alternative society. It is also possible to relate this interest in politics to democratic theory, the forms and procedures of democracy, and the analysis of Thai society in terms of a bureaucratic polity, — in other words, to political science courses in the Western tradition. It would not be too far off the mark to say that, at that particular point in time, the students were mainly impressed by the ideas of liberal democracy coupled with a sense of nationalism directed for the first time against the United States, particularly its involvement in the war in Indo-China.

One particular public demonstration by the students must have gained the approval of the working-class urban public. In February 1969, immediately following the general elections, there was a student demonstration against an increase in Bangkok bus fares. The students' interest in maintaining the bus fare coincided with that of the urban public and they were thus successful in their demand(10). With this success behind them, it was not long before students from various universities began to form the "National Student Center of Thailand" (NSCT).

Before going into the details of the birth of the NSCT, it is important to provide a backdrop of the way in which the students' internal politics operated during the few years preceding it, for it will prove to be important to our understanding of the relationship between national and student politics as well as the later factionalizing within the NSCT.

As has been said earlier, Sarit's dictatorial rule served to nip the students' political activities in the bud. The students withdrew onto the campuses and, quite in accordance with tradition, they aped the methods of government practised by their elders in their own institutions. They began to institutionalize over that period what they called the "seniority system". This was particularly clear in Chulalongkorn University from where it was disseminated. Seniority, order, tradition, unity and "spirit", making up the SOTUS system, were used as an ideology which led to the imposition of a kind of mechanical solidarity among the students, which justified many abuses on the part of the senior students against the junior ones, working strictly upon the foundation of a hierachical structure. It became the students' own method of government to which the university authorities, to say the very least, acquiesced. Indeed, one student observed that it was the way to institute solidarity within a faculty and/or a university against another, as well as serving the wishes of the national leaders who ruled by the principle of "divide and rule". It served to numb the critical faculties of the students, and to immerse them in parties and other extravaganzas, and, most important of all, in internal conflicts(11).

Such a situation of mechanical solidarity could not exist for ever without its own internal contradictions. In the later years, with the greater influx of lecturers educated in Western democracies and the teaching of more academically-oriented social sciences, a minority of students began to question this SOTUS system and in time extended their criticisms to society at large, as is evidenced by the publications mentioned earlier. This germ of the critical spirit caught on in all the universities, where "independent groups" mushroomed, searching for academic explanations with a critical spirit and later attacking the internal student political structure. The "independent groups" were a minority dissent section of students, which established contacts between the various universities in contradistinction to the formal student representative bodies which concentrated on inter-university rivalry.

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AT THE same time, it is ironic that Sarit's own "development" emphasis encouraged a rural development programme, perhaps on the American Peace Corps model, organized by the students and their lecturers, beginning around 1967. The elitist nature of the programme was indicated by its early concentration on providing material development such as roads and buildings, without satisfying other basic human needs. However, later on, it proved itself to be the material basis for the development of the students' social consciousness. They soon came to realize that the foremost problems of the country were in the rural areas. Yet they felt themselves unable to help. Most of them, who thought they were in the vanguard of development, were shocked to find themselves unskilled, unable to think out problems etc.. It is, therefore, possible to argue that the students' rural development projects helped them to question themselves and their role in society(12).

With the increase in student participation in rural development programmes and the mushrooming of the "independent groups", inter-university co-operation was made more and more viable. In the political sphere, the first occasion for inter-university co-operation was provided by the national elections of 1969, when students of all universities organized together to supervise the voting at polling centres in Bangkok. Ostensibly, students were to assure an honest election and prevent the many irregularities which occurred in the previous national election of 1957. After the elections, this kind of co-operation did not cease, but a series of meetings brought forth the idea and the setting up of the NSCT on February 1970(13).

Though the "independent groups" played the most significant role in making possible the setting up of the NSCT through their prior development of inter-university links and increasing students' social awareness and consciousness, they pragmatically com-

promised over the NSCT structure(14). Seeing that the majority of students had always regarded them as "outsiders", they were content with the NSCT's adoption of their sentiments in its objectives, these being: inter-university relations; student welfare; academic freedom; student/people relations, and public service. Structurally, however, it was difficult for the "independent groups" to gain control of the NSCT, for its executive committee was to be made up of *ex-officio* presidents of the formal student associations, and the secretary-general and his deputies had to be elected by the representatives of these associations. For this reason at least, although the objectives were broadly written, the NSCT was not particularly active during its first few years and avoided political involvement. This is quite evident in September 1970. When Chulalongkorn students staged a protest against allegations of corruption on the part of the university's administration, the NSCT was not involved. The demonstration, which gained an assurance of a Government investigation, was however a significant one in its mobilization of hitherto uninterested students and in its focus on the most notorious practices of the Government bureaucracy, and an oblique attack on Deputy Premier Prapass who was then rector of the university.

The second phase, all in all, saw the active development and dissemination of ideas about liberal democracy among the students as well as the laying of the ground work for public sympathy and the definition of lines of conflict within the student community itself. It was also a period of increasing social awareness, both theoretically and experientially swinging towards political activity and organizing to meet the needs of their future role.

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THE end of the second phase and the beginning of the third phase was marked by a backward turn away from democracy on the part of the Government. While hopes among intellectuals and students were for the gradual establishment of democracy through non-violent means, Thanom staged a coup d'état on his own Government in November 1971. The students were, however, not organizationally ready to stage a protest of any consequence. The NSCT, in its first two years and during the terms of office of its first three secretary-generals, only participated in activities of a non-political sort, such as fund-raising for flood victims. There is also some evidence of dissensus between the "independent groups" and the NSCT executive(15), the former accusing the latter of not being progressive enough. However, since the self-coup d'état, student literature voiced the students' wish to attack the ruling dictators. Egged on perhaps by politically self-exiled Dr. Puey Ungphakorn's article warning the Government that, if it did not open up political participation channels, more radical students would appear as a result; and that autocratic rule could never solve the mounting complex of problems with which the country was faced(16). Students wrote articles concerning the need for a legal society, a constitution and a government with public rather than personal interests at heart. Such perhaps were the statements in theoretical terms. More specific to the Thai situation, there were publications attacking the university system as being archaic and under political control, linking the need to unyoke the university with the need to grant freedom to the people at large, even to the extent of using terms with Marxist connotations such as:

> "In front of us there is a great task — the task of unyoking — from being slaves of exploitation, from being useless parasites in the eyes of the feudalists, from the capitalists, both foreign and national, for equality which is the real essence of being human, for freedom derived from the supreme political consciousness of the people..."(17)

Obliquely political, yet penetrating, was the attack on Japanese domination of the Thai economy, for it pointed to the ways in which the Japanese bribed politicians and bureaucrats in order to obtain special privileges, thus linking the economic problems of the people to what they then saw as the cause, namely, autocratic role.

All in all, these publications increased not only in quantity but also in their content of opposition to the dictators, in their penetration of the root causes of economic and social problems and, particularly important, in defining the task of liberation which logically falls to the students. It had the effect of mobilizing more and more students, including girl students, and some school children, the latter being evidenced by the setting up of the National Pupils' Center of Thailand on 17 November 1972, one year after the coup d'état(18).

A year's period of incubation passed before the students launched on a non-stop series of demonstrations which swung the situation towards the eventual clash with the Government in October 1973. This time the NSCT under the secretary-generalship of Thirayuth Boonmee, became the focal point of student activity. Thirayuth began, obliquely perhaps, with an anti-Japanese goods campaign in November 1972. However, in retrospect, it was an astute move on his part for, though it seemingly avoided an internal political issue, indeed a political issue at all, it was a sophisticated attack on one of the economic bases of the Government, while at the same time it served to mobilize nationalistic sentiments on the part of the general public. It was a big campaign involving all the universities with a series of marches demanding an anti-Japanese economic policy on the part of the

Government as well as accosting shoppers buying Japanese goods. More than anything else, it served to train the students in collective activity in the public interest. The economic issue continued into their second campaign which encompassed a far wider range of imports, serving to point out that only the rich can afford to buy imported goods at the expense of the poor. Whether the point got through is uncertain but it was at least a tangential attack on government by the rich.

The third major campaign, in December 1972, was a reaction against the political action of the National Executive Committee (NEC) in proclaiming Decree 299, which expanded the power of the Minister of Justice over the operations of the Judiciary. At first Thammasat law students reacted against it as being an intervention into judicial procedures, but the protest soon gathered momentum, with the NSCT adopting the issue as the ultimate provocation to the idea of justice in society and the latest move of the NEC to centralize all power in the land. The overnight sit-in on 19 December was an unprecedented show of student power resulting in the retraction of Decree 299.

The issue of a just and equitable legal system was to be the theme of student activity from then on. In May 1973, student members of the Nature Conservation group and journalists discovered a scandal about Government officials close to Prapass hunting in a game reserve and using Government vehicles and equipment for this very personal pleasure. The students launched a campaign to disseminate information and photographs about this and it became a public issue of great interest. The students had shown their ability to check Government practices, and yet the Government was slow to move on the matter. In June, the NSCT led the largest demonstration before the October uprising, protesting the expulsion of nine Ramkamhaeng students who had written a satire on the recent decision of the two generals to extend their terms of office for yet another year. This satire alluded to the Tung Yai game reserve scandal, calling the NEC the "Animal Council of Tung Yai". Dr. Sakdi Phasuknirand, Rector of the University, a close associate of Prapass, in an attempt to please his patron, had given the students the greatest proof of the unjust nature of the autocracy. Thirayuth Boonmee seized the opportunity to plunge the NSCT fully into politics when he announced that the students and the people would be gathered at the Democracy Monument again in 6 months' time to demand a constitution, — "we want to show the government that we are not satisfied with the present government and we want a permanent constitution"(19). His declaration was an open attack on the Government and for the first time the students, with the public behind them, had set a time limit for the Government to give the people a measure of democracy. Only four months later, the issue was to come to a head with the arrest of a group of student and ex-students, including Thirayuth, for distributing leaflets demanding the constitution, and resulting in the October uprising.

In sum, the third phase was characterized by an initial state of shock at the reversal of the trend towards liberal government, resulting in more careful articulation of ideas as to why autocratic rule was harmful to society; institutionalization of the NSCT; the definition of the practical task at hand careful planning of campaigns to gain public sympathy and support while educating them; and a cautious step towards full confrontation with the Government after the previous roundabout route to it.

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THUS, it is clear that the students' success in the October uprising depended on some five years of embryonic growth of the student movement. Interestingly, the students' social awareness and later consciousness was made possible at first by a more lax dictatorship (rather than real liberation), a germ of liberalism espoused by some of their lecturers in contrast to the authoritarian nature of the educational system in general. Once that germ had taken root, a contrastive reversal of the general trend towards autocracy could only have nurtured more extreme reactions than would have been possible without it. The main objective of the students was to attack the authoritarian and autocratic nature of the Government and to replace it with a political system with minimum universal ground rules for participation, symbolized by the constitution. But the fact that they had had to dodge the issue had led them, contrary to the dictators' expectations, to discover considerably more to grieve about and attack. The student leaders, at least, have had to acquire an analytical understanding of the social and economic determinants of the system of government with which they were in immediate conflict. Their initial elitist concern about freedom, when blocked by the rulers, shifted towards a concern about the conditions faced by the general public at large. It gradually became clearer to them that their ideals could not be achieved without a considerable measure of public sympathy. In the face of pragmatic necessity, they sought a conceptual model which could link them with the public. The taking up of the economic issue was a natural and logical one; and the link between this and the activities of the bureaucracy doubly involved them with the foremost concerns of the public namely living conditions and hatred for bureaucrats. Furthermore, the issue of Japanese and American economic domination provided the students with a holistic theory as well as an opportunity to bring out the nationalism of the people at large.

It is, therefore, clear from the evidence presented here that, though constitutionalism appeared to be

the focal point of student interest, it was certainly not without a questioning analysis of the non-political factors which were to become the mainstay of student activity since the October uprising. The stage for further self-education about the domination of foreign Powers, whether it be economic or political, and the structural domination of the bureaucracy, was already set. We should, therefore, not be surprised that after the October uprising there should appear campaigns against foreign domination and exploitation, such as the Northrop and Temco issues, campaigns against bureaucratic wrong-doings in remote areas such as Na Srai and Tang Daeng (20), or campaigns in support of labourers against capitalist owners, such as the Dusit Thani hotel case. However, to explain the increase in intensity and the leftward shift in ideology on the part of some sections of the students and not others is a matter which requires further and more complex analysis. This could be usefully done by an approach which takes account of the students' interactional experience with the powers-that-be, as has been the mainstay of our presentation here. This article, though it has only dealt with the early stage of development of the Thai student movement, has, we would contend, touched upon the factors involved in the unfolding of the student movement.

Our main theme is the interaction with the powers-that-be. However, we have tried to connect other themes to it, namely the relationship with the people as a counter-force; the dominant socialization process of students giving birth to a kind of counter-culture, and the conflicts between them; and the structural arrangements which perpetuate this conflict.

It is regretable that we are as yet unable to present an analysis of the changes in the student movement after the October uprising. However, if we were to do so, it would require an analysis in terms of the equation of interaction between the students and the powers-that-be on the one side and the different sections of the general public on the other. We would also have to seek to explain the later factionalizing of students into groups across the ideological spectrum through an analysis of their political socialization processes, both in the institutional setting and in their activist experiences. We do not think that the answer to the question posed earlier, i.e. whether the Thai student movement is counter-elite or revolutionary in character, can be answered in a "yes-no" fashion. Given the ability of ruling elites to reconsolidate their economic and political powers, we would not be surprised to see an eventual splitting up of the student movement; some will of necessity and with their own logic become revolutionaries; others will turn reactionary; yet others will return to apathy and the safety of their classrooms. The choice of course depends on their socio-economic backgrounds as well as their interactional experience with the power centres, while they were student activists. In the last analysis, the economic and political power holders determine the course of development of these various sections of the student movement.

Notes and References

1. Zimmerman identified it as such when he wrote: "In the end the thoughts of Mao Tse Tung appear to have had less impact on Thai students and professors than those of Rousseau and Abraham Lincoln." see R.F. Zimmerman, "Student Revolution in Thailand: The End of the Thai Bureaucratic Polity?", *Asian Survey,* Vol. XIV, no.6 (June 1974), p. 512.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 514 and F.W. Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity,* (East West Center Press, Honolulu, 1966).

3. Saneh Chammarik, *Lak Karn Sitthi Seriphab Lang Patiwat Tula 2516* (The Principles of Human Rights after October 1973 "Revolution"), (Komol Khiemtong Foundation, Bangkok, 1975), pp. 11-12.

4. Radom Wongsenom, "Nakrien, Nisit, Naksuksa Kab Karn Muang Thai" (Pupils and Students and Thai Politics), *Mitr-sampan,* No. 2, Jan.-Feb. 1974, p. 12.

5. See *ibid.*, p. 14 and Ross Prizzia and Narong Sinsawasdi, *Thailand: Student Activism and Political Change,* (Duang Kamol Publishers, Bangkok, 1974), pp. 22-23.

6. *Ibid.*, Prizzia and Sinsawasdi and David A. Wilson, *Politics in Thailand,* (Cornell University Press, New York, 1966), p. 32.

7. Seksan Prasertkul, *Manusyadhamma Kab Karn Tor Su Tang Chon Chan* (Humanism and the Class Struggle) (Saeng Chan Publishers, Bangkok, 1975), pp. 72-74.

8. See Radom Wongsenom, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-18 and, Prizzia and Sinsawasdi, *op. cit.*, p. 25-26.

9. For quotations and source of these publications see Radom Wongsenom, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-28.

10. Prizzia and Sinsawasdi, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

11. Prapass Boonyindee, *Suksa Lae Wikroh Karn Plien Plaeng Pai Nai Kana Ratasat* (A Study and Analysis of Change in the Faculty of Political Science), Seminar Report, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, 1975, p. 4.

12. La-or Plaenamgnam, "Nak Suksa Kab Karn Patana Chonabot" (Students and rural development), in *Tamlai in Sangsan,* Inter-university Women Volunteers Group, 1975.

13. Prizzia and Sinsawasdi, p. 28; Radom Wongsenom, p. 28; Prasarn Marukpitak (*Siam Rath,* Bangkok, 13 July 1973), pp. 8-9.

14. See a similar argument by Seksan Prasertkul, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

15. *Loc. cit.*.

16. Puey Ungphakorn "Buntuk: Prachadham Thai Doh Santi" (Thai Justice through peaceful means) in Bunlur Uchupak, *et. al.* (eds.) *17 November 1971-17 November 1972,* Bangkok, Charoen Witthaya, 1972.

17. *Plod* (unyoke) published by various "independent groups", n.d., p. 1.

18. National Pupils' Centre of Thailand, *Kod, Kod, Kod, Kod* (Press, Press, Press, Press), Bangkok, Charoen Witthaya, 1973, p. 2.

19. *Bangkok Post,* 23 June 1973, p. 1.

20. These incidents allegedly involved the burning of villages and the killing of a number of innocent villagers during the course of Communist suppression operations.

CHINA: *An account of the impact of new foreign policy contradictions, and Peking's new tactics designed to resolve these.*

The PRC and the Liberation Movements in South-East Asia

Leslie R. Marchant

THE Chinese Communist belief that new types of contradictions have recently appeared in the world to influence South-east Asia after the Vietnam War(1), has placed them in the same apparent dilemma, now they are applying policies to resolve them, that they met with in regard to Africa in the early 1960s after the "anti-imperialist" war in the Congo and other territories there; and provide the same opportunities for misunderstanding.

The most important current contradictions are thought to be four involving a complex correlated struggle between expansionist "Soviet socialist" imperialists and American-led "capitalist imperialists"; between independence-minded "Third World" States and invasive imperialist Powers seeking to extend their hegemony at the expense of local rulers; between "correct line" Marxist-Leninists and "revisionist" Marxists who are believed to be heading back towards "capitalism"; and between proletarian forces led by Communist elites seeking to achieve "liberation" and then to secure this by the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat, and their "class enemies" who seek to stifle "liberation movements" and oppress "proletarians" by means of parliamentary and other non-proletarian "dictatorial" forms of government.

These different contradictions are seen to vary in importance in different areas according to local circumstances and pressures, and the different degrees of revolutionary progress made by local "liberators of the proletariat". In some localities, for instance, class conflicts are held to be dominating the contradictions in society. In Cambodia since the Vietnam War, for example, stress has been laid on the need for local social revolution there. In other areas national or imperialist-type contradictions are held to be dominating and are stressed. In Vietnam after the war, for instance, class contradictions and the need to resolve these have been given a relatively low priority. Stress instead is laid on other contradictions, the resolution of which is designed to achieve reconstruction, national unity and other objectives(2) normally regarded as essential pre-requisites for the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat and for the successful conduct of a proletarian cultural revolution.

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PEKING's policy makers are not primarily concerned with microcosms. The task of correctly identifying and resolving local contradictions belongs by definition to "self-reliant" local elites. Chinese Marxist-Leninists have no desire to caste themselves in the role of "socialist-imperialists", for which they condemn the Soviet Union; nor do they subscribe to the theory of limited sovereignty which led them to denounce Moscow over the invasion of Czechoslovakia. They have no inclination to expand physically beyond China's borders. Instead Chinese Communists see their role as advisory, offering correct knowledge to outside revolutionaries about how to resolve contradictions to achieve proletarian victories, and as moral supporters of local causes.

In this regard, as advisers on contradictions and the scientific way to resolve these, Chinese Communists are primarily interested in macrocosms. Their theory of cognition of knowledge is based on extensive analyses of total situations(3). Local struggles and contradictions are consequently viewed as integral parts which add together to form a conglomerate whole. When Chinese Communists make an analysis of a situation, and identify the prevailing contradictions (assessed by means of dialectical materialist analysis), they do so on a world-wide, or region-wide scale. It is this type of analysis which leads them to pronounce about the specific nature of the contradictions which exist in the world in its present "capitalist-imperialist" phase of development, and to

appraise these according to their general degree of importance on a global scale.

The paramount contradiction identified by Chinese Communists at present is the struggle between "correct line" Marxist-Leninists and "revisionist" Marxists, who are expanding their influence while the Soviet Union is expanding its hegemony(4). This contradiction is problematic because it creates real opportunities for domestic struggles to develop in China as well as opportunities for confrontations abroad where Moscow-inclined and other Communists vie with Marxist-Leninist (Peking) Communists to win the minds and attention of revolutionaries. "Capitalism", though still viewed as a threat, does not now offer the same danger of subversion as "revisionism", now that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is considered to have put the People's Republic of China (PRC) irresolutely on the road to socialism. The heresy of "revisionism" is more subtle and complex than capitalism, and is not so easy to identify as is the owning of private property or the desire for this, or the seeking of profit and efforts at self-advancement, which are viewed as basic bourgeois characteristics.

The contradiction between Peking-centred Marxist-Leninists and Marxist "revisionists" has been intensified of late not only because of the growing bitterness between Chinese and Soviet dogmatists, and the tense feelings that ordinarily result from confrontations between those who regard themselves as "rightful believers" and "heretics" who believe differently, but primarily because of the build-up of Soviet power and its expansion on a global scale. In Chinese Communist views, the previous imperialist encirclement and containment of the "correct line" socialist camp (which is an integral part of Chinese Communist dialectical belief about the dual nature of the world and the way progress is made by "progressive forces" conflicting with encircling, subversive enemies), is now being pursued by the Soviet Union which has replaced the US as the major expansionist power seeking hegemony(5). The US is not viewed as dead and inert since Vietnam. But it is viewed as a paper tiger with fewer sharp teeth, and no clear will to use them. The American threat, in Chinese Communist views, has been reduced by the contradictions in American society. The Soviet Union, in contrast, is more a cardboard or a hardboard than a paper tiger. It is totalitarian in views and efforts, as far as Peking is concerned. No Chinese or Vietnamese or other revolutionaries could expect help on the campuses of Soviet universities or in the streets of Moscow, if the Soviet Government did not approve their actions. Dissidents and demonstrators in Russia are dealt with quickly and firmly, with a logic similar to that used by purging cultural revolutionaries in China, i.e. because the Communists have achieved the "liberation of the people", there is no need for any further dissent by "the people". The Soviet Union in this sense presents a united front and is a tough enemy that cannot be easily affected or defeated by playing on internal contradictions such as exist in parliamentary democracies. Moscow, moreover, is less influenced by outside pressures and popular demonstrations abroad, which in any case have seldom been directed against the Soviet Union. It is not a target for demonstrations on an international scale. Demonstrators in the recent period have moved against the parliamentary democracies rather than against the Soviet Union or other Communist totalitarian States and this one-sidedness has served to make the Soviet Union appear to be a tough foe. It is apparently impervious to internal subversion, to pressures by international united fronts and to international guerrilla warfare and diplomacy.

The threat of Soviet revisionism is not theoretical, but real. Soviet expansionists, like earlier "capitalist-imperialist" expansionists, who brought "oppression" and "dependence" and left "sophism" and "errancy", promise to bring "revisionist" heresies with them as they extend their hegemony, and they promise to encourage the multiplication of centres of anti-Marxist-Leninists, such as India is held to be(6) and other areas could become.

The confrontation with expanionist Soviet revisionism is therefore viewed as paramount because it threatens the bases and strongholds of Marxist-Leninism at home and abroad; it threatens the position and standing of Marxist-Leninist leaders; and it could devalue the Marxist-Leninist-led dictatorship of the proletariat in people's democracies such as China, and could cause this influence to be curtailed. If Chinese Communists do not act to resolve this contradiction in a way favourable to the forces of Marxist-Leninism then they could arrive at a situation where they could not readily solve the other latent contradictions which they believe beset the modern world. Most significantly at present, the Soviet Union and its "revisionism" are conceived to pose a threat to South-east Asia(7) which is on the sea route between the Indian Ocean and Vladivostok.

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ALSO of signal importance is the contradiction between the two hegemenous Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States(8). Although the Soviet Union is regarded as the main enemy to the "correct" socialist camp led by Peking, the threat of United States' expansionism is not discounted. Chinese Communists believe that both Powers are expanding because of economic and other necessities, and are confronting each other in the Third World in particular(9), to get energy resources and raw materials for their "imperialist based" industrial enterprises(10). This contradiction between old and new giants is thus seen to be correlative to the first contradiction, and similarly affects South-east Asia and other regions where the Soviet Union and America have interests, and which in any case il

viewed as part of the "Third World of small nations" which cannot save themselves from being crushed between the large grinding millstones.

Another important factor is the correlative contradiction between the small independent States of "the Third World", and the hegemenous Powers seeking to dominate them and their resources(11). This contradiction is believed to be of rising importance. The strengthening of the "Third World" nations is conceived by Chinese Communists to be one sound way to resolve this, and at the same time help resolve other contradictions. The strengthening of the resolution of small nations to be independent and to control their own resources and destinies will not only prevent the further expansion of the imperialist Powers, and even cause them to fall back, but will serve to deny the imperialist Powers access to raw materials and energy supplies that Chinese Communists believe expansionist industrial powers depend upon for wealth and growth, and will therefore intensify their internal contradictions and bring about their economic downfall.

China's recent championing of the "Third World countries" in the United Nations' councils and other forums is an indication of its regard for the importance of this current contradiction, and the values Marxist-Leninist forces give to resolving it. Peking's support of the 200-mile sea limit was designed among other things to limit Soviet sea expansion and the usefulness of its research vessels in the Indian and other oceans(12). And its outspoken support for the OPEC countries(13) is not only a mark of approval for "self-strengthening" efforts valued by Marxist-Leninists, but also a means of resources control that can be used to affect large industrial economies adversely.

In these circumstances class contradictions in the world today are held to be of less immediate significance. Any attempt to encourage, openly incite or stimulate these, in particular in Third World countries, even where revolutionary awareness is regarded by Chinese Communists as being high, could inhibit or adversely affect efforts aimed at resolving major international contradictions. If Peking approved or incited class war in the Third World countries at present, for instance, this could serve to aid the Soviet Union which is not stressing class war abroad, and could embarrass Peking and the Marxist-Leninist forces it speaks for, in their efforts to resolve the contradiction between the two Communisms, and between Moscow and Peking.

This does not mean that the Chinese Communists have forsaken class contradictions, and have discarded their belief that people's democracies and dictatorships of the proletariat will multiply in the Third World and other areas; and that they now accept the idea of co-existence as they did at the Bandung Conference in April 1955. The contradictions in the world after the Korean War impasse were different from those existing after the end of the Vietnam War victory. After the Korean War Peking accepted the idea that the world was no longer in a chaotic state dominated by a revolutionary wave, and it tempered its policies to accord with the new situation and contradictions. From 1956, after the uprisings in Hungary and Poland, the Middle East crises, and the rise of anti-colonial conflicts in Africa and other areas, Chinese Communists concluded that a new situation existed. Their new year messages and other regular pronouncements declared that the world had once more entered a period suited to revolutionary forces, and that class war and efforts to liberate the proletariat and to form a dictatorship on their behalf continued to be viable. Chinese Communists continue to believe and stress this today. Their New Year and other regular reports on the world situation still claim that the world is in a state favourable for the forces of Marxist-Leninism and their progress to victory(14).

It is this view in particular which places Peking officials in their apparent dilemma. They are not apparently clear whether to support "liberation movements" aimed at prosecuting class war and establishing "people's democracies"; or whether to recognize and work with Third World Governments such as that of Malaysia, which are being opposed by "liberation forces", in order to strengthen the front against Soviet "revisionism" in particular and the hegemenous Powers in general. This dilemma is neither openly recognized nor firmly acted upon by the Chinese Communists. It is recognized and stressed in particular by foreign observers who have been using their own dialectical methods of assessment and teleological methods of enquiry. These stress division and conflicts among Chinese Communist leaders, emphasizing the existence of two groups, one of good or acceptable elements, the other of not so good and unacceptable elements, both struggling to dominate and apply their policies(15). The dialectical analysis of the present situation by foreigners, leads them to conceive a clash between acceptable, mild, moderate, Communists, often termed pragmatists, who forget ideology or only pay lip service to it and on the other hand young and fanatic ideologists who believe in proceeding to "socialism" without pause. These contradictory groups are held to be represented by Chou En-lai for the moderates; and the cultural revolutionaries, and anti-Party establishment for the ideologists. The logical outcome of this assessment, made by foreign observers, is to conclude that the Chinese Communists are moderating, and that they are endeavouring to sway back to a co-existence policy followed from 1954 to 1956, which they believe is the norm all statesmen act upon.

This viewpoint is not necessarily Chinese Communist. It could be Christian or Confucian. Chinese Communists do not moderate and temper their beliefs

to achieve harmony or to become more accepted. They hold true to their beliefs, if they are good Marxist-Leninists, both in periods of adversity and in periods of good fortune. Nor are they reactionaries. They conceive their policies according to their beliefs and according to circumstances and do not plan them as reactions to outside stimuli, made as if these stimuli occurred in a vacuum. Chinese Communists, whether they are classified as "moderates", "pragmatists", "extremists" or "cultural revolutionaries", all hold basic beliefs in common. When they have open differences, then these are about the strategies that need to be used to achieve the ends of ideology, and not the ideological beliefs themselves; this is particularly true since the Cultural Revolution which aimed at creating ideological unity. Their differences are also centred on the priorities they give to the contradictions conceived to exist in any given situation. So-called "radicals" at present hold true to the aims of class war and "proletarian liberation". So-called moderates give more prominence to contradictions that are not obviously concerned with the "class war". Yet they do not question the existence of these different contradictions. There is an essential unanimity of opinion among Marxist-Leninists, and about the process of the liberation of the proletariat, that is brought about as a result of the resolution of these. This liberation process is viewed as moving along at different rates in different places. This necessitates different diplomatic attitudes and actions on the part of Peking and the Chinese Communists. It is this eschatological concept that leads Chinese Communists to see no conflict in their different policies towards different places, and in their different policies towards a country where they recognize the Government and greet "liberation forces"; and to see themselves placed in no dilemma that basically requires them to readjust. They view it as natural to recognize and praise proletarian rebels, at the same time they recognize and seek to co-operate with established Governments opposing proletarian rebel movements in the same area. The only time they will basically readjust, and noticeably forsake proletarian rebels and accept co-existence, is when their dialectical analysis of the world situation leads them to conclude that the world is no longer in a state of chaos and disharmony suited to Marxist-Leninist advances, and that more paramount contradictions exist than those between existing governments and the "liberators of the proletariat".

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THE Chinese Communist concept of the process of liberation stems from the Marxist-Leninist beliefs and theories about historical materialism(16), which explains the course of man's progress, using the weapon of the dialectic, from the time he was alienated from his early Communist paradise and his natural Communist self, to the present stage where he is poised to regain this Communist paradise.

The overthrow of capitalism and its system of parliamentary democracies, and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat is believed to occur by definite stages of development(17). These stages of progress have been clearly portrayed in recent years in the Chinese Communist slogan, "countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution"(18), publicized in particular after the end of the Vietnam War and the tenth congress of the Chinese Communist Party. These outline the types of contradictions held to be particularly relevant, and the order in which the victories need to be achieved to secure "liberation" and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat by "people's" or proletarian revolution. The bourgeosie are not viewed as "people" but oppressors of "the people", and consequently, although they can struggle to achieve national independence, they cannot lead the people to true liberation after independence is achieved. That can be done only by Marxist-Leninist leaders who represent the proletariat or as these are referred to "the people".

The first stage in the process of liberation is an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist struggle by a national, united front force led by an ideologically united Communist Party which is knowledgeable about the types of contradictions they have to resolve and the strategies needed to resolve them in a favourable manner. The chief contradiction at this stage of revolution is between "true nationalist united front forces" on the one hand and "imperialists" "neo-colonialists" and their local "capitalist running dogs" on the other. (See Appendix). This stage of the struggle, evidenced recently in Vietnam and previously in the Congo and elsewhere, is thus a combination of foreign and civil war(19). With the defeat and the withdrawal of the "imperialists" and the isolation of their local "running dogs", the war is transformed into a basically civil one between "national and social liberators" on the one hand and domestic "reactionaries" who oppose socialism, and "imperialist puppets" on the other. The defeat of these "oppressors" of the "progressive" forces in society, who are believed to be few in number, but who dominate the press and the institutions of parliamentary democracies, and who use these to mislead the people and turn their minds, results in the act of "liberation" which is conceived to be a great turning point in history, offering a new future for man, like the prophesied second coming of Christ offers Christian millenarians.

Liberation is followed by a stage of reconstruction in which proletarian-democratic forces work in a united manner to rebuild the country after its independence and liberation war. The co-operative efforts at reconstruction are parallelled with a socialist education drive to pave the way for the dictatorship of the proletariat which Chinese Communists believe is not best achieved by a sudden act, like that envisaged by Jacobins and Bakunin who held that the

masses are always revolutionary, but by preparation and education, not unlike Peter Lavrov's Narodnik platforms for revolutionary struggle in Russia.

Class struggle is promoted during the democratic proletarian stage, in an effort to resolve class contradictions. When further developments are felt to be warranted a socialist stage is launched; a dictatorship of the proletariat is established and a full scale education programme in the form of a cultural revolution is launched to prepare for the transition to a Communist society.

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IT WAS in South-east Asia in particular that Peking's shift to new policies and tactics, in their assessed order of priority, and designed to resolve the newly detected major contradiction in the world, were highlighted. The withdrawal of American and allied forces showed up the need for the Chinese Communists to reassess the priorities given to contradictions that needed to be resolved, and to choose policies, some of which were likely to result in repercussions and confusion at home and abroad, because they could not be clearly identified with the aims and spirits of the Cultural Revolution then being stressed, nor with the spirit of victory in South-east Asia.

Three aspects of the situation especially provided the Chinese Communists with the need to realign their policies and strategies. Firstly, the victories achieved by the revolutionary forces in Indo-China, which had been prophesied by the Chinese Communists for some years, offered good reasons for continuing to support "people's liberation wars" and class struggles designed to establish "people's democracies" and the extension of the rule of the dictatorship of the proletariat(20).

This was a natural course to follow. The leaders of the Vietnamese, Khmer and Laotian people's "liberation forces" which scored victories in the manner of the "May 20th statement" of 1970(21), were regarded as model Maoist strategists. Their victories were consequently heralded in Peking as evidence of the invincibility of Maoist strategies(22). In the euphoria resulting from the defeat of the "imperialists" and the decline of "capitalism" which appeared to be increasingly beset with problems(23), it would appear logical for Peking to continue promoting "liberation forces" struggling to resolve national and class contradictions. In Indo-China this would mean approving, supporting and encouraging unification and the extension of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and then socialist, cultural revolution. Elsewhere in South-east Asia it would mean recognizing, approving, supporting and encouraging "people's liberation forces" struggling to overthrow existing governments to establish "people's democracies". The opportunities to do this are there. This year Peking has saluted "people's liberation forces" in Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, North Kalimantan and Thailand(24), and regards these as successful in their struggle to overthrow "bourgeois-feudal" rulers and "imperialist puppets"; while it also recognized the existence of a growing mass awareness and mass movement, and a strengthening Communist-led army in the Philippines(25). The prophesied victories of the "proletarian liberation" forces in Indo-China were hailed by the other "liberators" in South-east Asia, and these victories encouraged others to struggle harder along their own road to salvation. If Peking acted to dampen this enthusiasm, or if they denied them support and encouragement, then the Chinese Communists could be accused of forsaking their international Communist duties, and acting selectively to help only some revolutionaries, in particular in view of the fact that they continued to claim that the world was in a revolutionary state suited to the progress of Marxist-Leninist forces, and "people's liberation movements", thus declaring the way to be open for revolutionaries outside Indo-China.

Secondly, and in contrast to this confidence in the Maoist model for revolution in Indo-China, and the promise this offered in South-east Asia and other areas, the withdrawal of America resulted in political instability in the region. America did not leave a vacuum. It maintained a presence, although this proved to be more of a watching brief than a real and permanent military and diplomatic commitment. With the Soviet Union, the matter was different. It increasingly showed its flag in the region, and expanded its military and diplomatic links, and took initiatives. Of particular concern as far as the Chinese Communists were concerned, was the Soviet commitment to, and pressure for, the establishment of a South-east Asian collective security system designed to supersede SEATO(26), which was at the time being attacked by the Soviet Union and other States as being outmoded. South-east Asia, in the circumstances after the Vietnam war, appeared to be caught in a trap between the "American paper tiger and the Russian wolf". Most significantly the wars in Indo-China had been won by incoming liberators from the North, and not by means of spontaneous local rebellion. This meant that the outside proletarian liberation forces which achieved victory in Cambodia and South Vietnam, absorbed a large population of non-Communists with bourgeois values. These could prove to be as difficult to digest as Czechoslovaks who had lived under an advanced economy, and whom Moscow has had difficulty in absorbing into the Communist system. They could be susceptible to subversion from outside, or could serve to exploit the contradictions they create in a socialist-led society at home. Thus, although victories have been recognized and hailed in Indo-China, they are not viewed by Chinese Communists as final victories. Further strug-

gles lie ahead before final political unity in the area is achieved, and before socialism is established in a popular manner. Reverses unfavourable to Marxist-Leninists could occur in the circumstances of these struggles. Peking is aware this has happened elsewhere. Allende fell after his accession to power in Chile. The Portuguese revolutionary junta is confronted by troubles in Portugal. Castro's revolutionary regime in Cuba, Peking believes, fell before the wiles of the Soviet "social-imperialist revisionists". South-east Asia is thus viewed by Chinese Communists to be threatened on two sides, as far as Peking is concerned, by "imperialists and capitalists" led by America, and by "revisionist forces" led by the Soviet Union. Local revolutionaries there will thus need all their guile to secure their achievements and to proceed with their revolution for "true" socialism. The greatest immediate threat in this regard, for Peking, is that Washington and Moscow might produce a *modus vivendi,* affecting South-east Asia, that will suit both those Powers but will adversely affect the PRC, as part of their efforts at détente(27).

Thirdly, Peking has observed a strengthening of unity and a unification of aims among the "Third World countries" in South-east Asia and elsewhere, to preserve their integrity and interests as the big Powers expand their influence. This has been emphasized by Peking since the expansion of Soviet "revisionist" power(28). Peking has observed efforts by Lee Kuan Yew to provide for and strengthen collective security in the area(29). It has noticed growing economic and political co-operation in the area(30), and in particular an apparent rising antipathy to Soviet and other encroachments.

The natural course for Peking to take in these circumstances, is to support and encourage a united front of Third World Powers to oppose Russia and other types of hegemony likely to threaten newly emerged South-east Asia. This course of united front action on the international level has been a basic policy of Chinese Communists in the past. They endeavoured to create an anti-American united front of powers during the Vietnam war, although they were challenged in this by President Johnson's achievements in creating an allied united front which made the American cause seem more universally popular than the Marxist-Leninist cause; meanwhile Moscow continually acted to upset Peking's efforts to mobilize the Third World Powers.

Now, after Vietnam, the Third World Powers appear to think differently and are more likely to adopt a united stance, if only to secure and preserve their own independence, and they are not so likely to support "liberation" movements, as China previously insisted. The difficulty for Peking in this regard is that if it acts to support and encourage the countries of the Third World to adopt an "anti-imperialist" stance in order to thwart "expansionist, revisionist" Russia in particular, then it will have to work with existing rulers and governments it has been condemning as "bourgeois and feudal", and forsake the "liberation forces" struggling to overthrow them.

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PEKING'S policy since the end of the Vietnam war has appeared dualistic. China has continued to hail the achievements of "liberation forces" engaged in "people's wars" and has encouraged them by declaring that each of these forces is following a course that will inevitably lead to victory like that achieved in Indo-China. Recently it has sent the regular five-yearly greetings to the Indonesian Communist Party and the Malayan Communist Party(31), couched in the same terms, though the language and thoughts are less bellicose than the messages sent in 1970. Yet at the same time the PRC has opened diplomatic relations with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.

In actual fact Peking has not performed a *volte face,* and is not as dualistic as it appears to be. What the Chinese Communists have done is adjust the eschatological time table for "liberation". They accept the achievements in Vietnam. In the case of the other States with "liberation forces" engaged in "people's wars", they have indicated that the time is not yet ripe for the final action to be taken. But in their negotiations with non-Communist governments in South-east Asia, the Chinese have managed to avoid the inclusion of clauses in bi-lateral agreements which would have had the effect of suppressing Communist or "liberation" movements. This would have been "compromiseism", of the type condemned as a heresy in the Cultural Revolution(32).

Firstly, the present Peking policy has been achieved by having reappraisals of the priorities given to the contradictions existing in the present world, accepted as a general line by Marxist-Leninist-led "liberators". The Philippines Communist Party, for instance, has accepted the line laid down in the Ninth and Tenth Communist Party Congresses, that the unity of the Third World is important, and that the main enemy of Marxist-Leninism is Soviet "revisionism"(33). This approves local co-existence between nationalists and Communists, like that which existed in China during the Japanese war, when civil and class war was not emphasized by the Chinese Communists (while they concentrated on resolving "imperialist"-type contradictions). Cambodia has clearly not followed this line. It has stressed the need to resolve internal contradictions first, which lays the Khmers Rouges open to the charge of being called "left-wing adventurists". The Vietnamese Communists have not acted so precipitously. They appear to be aware of the more complex contradictions that exist, besides class confrontations.

Secondly, a close scrutiny of the messages sent and reports made about Communist-led "people's liberation forces" in South-east Asia, reveals not only a less bellicose tone than that which existed in reports made before the rise of the Soviet threat, but also, and more importantly, that Chinese Communists believe the various Marxist-Leninist parties in South-east Asia are suffering difficulties, and a lack of unity in particular. This means that these local parties, such as the Indonesian Party have a need to resolve their own internal contradictions before they lead the proletarian forces in their crusade to achieve "people's democracy". Ideological unity is regarded by Chinese Communists as an essential pre-requisite for Vietnam-style victories.

There are good reasons for Peking to believe that the Communist Parties in South-east Asia have serious troubles. The Burmese Communist Party has been adversely affected by the killing of Chairman Thakin Zin and Secretary Thakin Chit in March 1975. The "liberation forces" in North Kalimantan have been set back by members accepting amnesties offered by the Malaysian Government. And the Indonesian and Malaysian Communists are reported to be in conflict among themselves, so that they have no clear ideological unity.

The Chinese Communists have not forsaken the "liberation" movements in the area. They have merely indicated that, due to internal and external conditions these movements are not yet ready to take political power, and should help Peking stave off the threat of Soviet expansionism. That task, in Peking's view, should be undertaken by existing Third World Governments and leaders, some of whom have now been given official recognition in the formal documents signed in Peking. While these forces are being used to help resolve Peking's major contradiction, its duel with the expanding Soviet "revisionists", Chinese Communists continue to have strong links with Communist Parties and liberation forces in non-Communist South-east Asia in the belief that they will inevitably one day form the governments in the area; and because Peking is convinced from its assessment of the world situation, that the world is still in a state of revolutionary chaos suited to the advance of proletarians under leaders who stress self-reliance, but who must take their own independent course of action within the guidelines set by the Chinese Communists' appraisal of the most important contradictions needing resolution.

APPENDIX

Maoist Eschatological Concepts in the Period of Liberation*


Direction of Progress
Future Age of Eternal Communism — The Apotheosis of the Proletariat Led to Their Triumph by Scientific Utopian Communists
Socialist Construction
The Socialist Phase of the Communist Revolution
Resolution of Anti-Socialist Contradictions
Dictatorship of Proletarian Socialist Forces
Democratic Element of Front Eliminated; Proletarian Cultural Revolution Commenced
National Reconstruction
The Democratic — Proletarian Phase of the Communist Revolution
Selected Pro-Socialist Elements in the United Front Undertake Reconstruction
Liberation Achieved by Popular Front Led by Communists
National Bourgeoisie — Proletarian Contradictions Paramount
Liberation War
Anti-National Bourgeoisie Aspect
Civil War Emphasized
Domestic Reactionaries and Imperialist Puppets Form the Main Anti-Socialist Enemy
United Front Opposes the Anti-Socialist National Bourgeoisie
Defeat and Withdrawal of the Imperialist Forces
Anti-Imperialist Aspect
Liberation War Linked with Anti-Imperialist Struggle
Imperialists Form the Main Anti-Socialist Enemy
Imperialist — Proletarian Contradictions Paramount
United Front Opposes Imperialists and the Anti-Socialist Nationalist Bourgeoisie
Creation of Popular United Front for Liberation in Capitalist — Imperialist Period

*Based on a chart in Marchant, L.R., "The Turbulent Giant: Communist Theory and Practice in China". (Sydney, A.N.Z. Book Co., 1975).

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SOVIET UNION: *Three-quarters of the Soviet Union lies in Asia, and yet Russia is still often thought of as an essentially European Power. The author examines the prospects for increased Soviet influence in East Asia, which seems an inevitable corollary of the massive investment in and development of the Siberia region.*

Russia in East Asia: Perspectives of a Major Presence

E. Stuart Kirby

RUSSIA is one of the main magnitudes of Asia. The perspectives must be realistically judged. The Soviet Union is the largest State in the world — one sixth of the land surface of the globe, 2.4 times the area of the USA, 2.6 times that of Canada, 2.3 times that of China. It is the only Power straddling both the eastern and the western hemispheres. Three-quarters of Soviet territory is in Asia. Russia-in-Asia, 1.8 times the area of the USA or 1.7 times that of China, overhangs all Asia from the borders of Turkey to the North Pacific. Given this size and position, Russia must ultimately play a huge and direct part in Asian affairs. Future historians may wonder why preoccupations about Asia have until now centred so exclusively on the southern half of the continent, largely ignoring the biggest landlord of them all.

The true quality of the area is little realized. It is one of the most closed and secret regions of the earth; and is a very complex territory. Russia-in-Asia is a varied domain, far from being a blank expanse of snow and ice. A full view must include, besides Siberia — the main area of confrontation with China, — Soviet Central Asia, where the USSR has a strong presence in the Islamic world. Yet it must be emphasized that the Soviet Union forms a single unit, under the completely centralized control of Moscow. It is on that basis that the emergence and intrusion of the northern half of the Asian continent into the affairs of the southern half, as an internal rather than an external factor, now promises to become rapidly intensified.

Before 1955, Soviet policy was autarchic. Stalin prescribed "socialism in one country"; this did not preclude forays or adventures abroad, in China or elsewhere, but it centred on building up the Soviet Union as a self-contained world Power. Nor did this policy preclude seizing windfall gains from a surrendering Japan such as the taking of Sakhalin(1) and the Kuril Islands(2), the temporary occupation of Manchuria with establishment of bases there and removal of industrial equipment(3), and the consolidation of positions in Mongolia and Korea. But the concept was still of the Soviet Union as a separate Socialist World, until death relaxed the personal grip of Stalin. His successors developed a new world-role, with more diverse and flexible approaches.

Some preconceptions must be critically examined. Siberia is no longer remote: circles drawn with the radii of modern bombers based in Siberia take in the whole of Asia, those with the radii of modern rockets sweep far beyond. A large and up-to-date Soviet navy and merchant marine, recently constructed and developed, makes a strong presence in Asian and worldwide waters, from major bases in the Far East as well as Russia-in Europe. Soviets and Japanese now watch each other by telescope (apart from electronic and other more elaborate means of surveillance) in the southern Kurils, as do Soviets and Americans at the Diomede Islands in the Bering Strait; while Chinese and Soviets confront each other and have fought hand-to-hand on their disputed frontier(4).

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SIBERIA is commonly thought to be an empty land. This is true only in a relative sense. The total population and its density are certainly low by Asian norms. In 1969 there were 12.2 million persons in West Siberia, 7.3 in East Siberia and 5.7 in the Soviet Far East, a total of 25.2 million. Soviet planners expect

the following increase by 1980: West Siberia by 7% to 13.1 million, East Siberia by 12% to 8.2 million, the Soviet Far East by 10% to 6.3 million. There are far more people in Manchuria, the key neighbouring part of China (42 million in 1953, the only census taken; now perhaps 56 million), to say nothing of the hundreds of millions of Chinese further South. However, the overall density in Siberia of four persons per square mile is hardly lower than that of Australia (4.4) and Canada (5.7), or such modern and well-equipped areas as Iceland (5.25) and the northern parts of Norway, Sweden and Finland. In Soviet Central Asia, the density rises to 23.

These ratios are statistical abstractions; few Siberians live in extreme isolation. No less than 75% of the population of Siberia is classified as "urban"; in 1970 there were such cities as Novosibirsk (1.2 million inhabitants), Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Vladivostok and Khabarovsk (each exceeding half a million), and many others. A score of cities are larger and much more modern than anything for hundreds of miles further South in China. A Soviet journal rated the incidence of "urban housing shortage" high, that of "loneliness" low(5). The common impression that life is unbearably gloomy in Siberia is nowadays a travesty of the real conditions. Standards of living are higher than in European Russia, in many respects.

Few of the scattered towns are primitive. Apartment blocks and suburban housing having replaced log cabins, central heating and television are the norms. The construction of an atomic power plant in the Siberian Arctic (at Bilibino) and the microwave telephone network which now links every township in Siberia are indications of the level of devlopment which has been attained. Aeroplane and helicopter connections are comprehensively utilized. Nor is Siberia impossibly cold and inhospitable; the climatic and physical extremes are certainly matched in northernmost Europe and America, with natural conditions no worse than those described by Jack London (who, incidentally, is one of the most widely-read authors in Siberia today).

The Siberians are high-spirited people, and morale is visibly good among the general population. Some prison camps still exist, but that system has mainly been abolished. The outlanders of today (including many former prisoners who elected to remain in Siberia) consider themselves pioneers, frontiersmen, sharpshooters, "tough" and active. They boast that Siberian units carry more battle honours than any others in the Soviet Army. Russians in general and Siberians in particular are proud of their guerrilla ("Partisan") record; and riled by Maoist propaganda that the Chinese are better at that sort of thing(6).

Industrial development in Siberia, heavily promoted in the last fifty years, is massive and still gaining impetus. West Siberia, East Siberia and the Soviet Far East are Major National Economic Planning Regions, each now containing large, complex and modern industrial bases, which concentrate on producer goods, though the output of consumer goods is lower and poorer than in other parts of the world. The blunt fact is that in the basic sinews of development, Siberia ranks already as one of the giants of Asia — far below Japan, but comparing far from ignominiously with India or China. In the USSR, especially in Siberia, the future is discussed as often as the present. The development potential of Russia-in-Asia is prodigious. Siberia is much larger than Canada, a country which it notably resembles geographically, geologically and developmentally, and with which it shares a broadly similar resource pattern. Its economic development potential is proportionately greater than that of Canada. Its failure so far to achieve a corresponding level of development certainly reflects on the Soviet (and Tsarist) systems.

The Russians, under whatever system, have not been lacking in dynamism. Originally, they swept across Siberia and rapidly assimilated it (the Russian term is strikingly, *osvoyen*, they "made it their own") in the first half of the seventeenth century, in conflict already with China. In the next century their impetus carried them far into the American continent; they occupied Alaska and established trading posts as far South as California. This went temporarily beyond their strength, so they withdrew from America, selling Alaska to the United States for two cents an acre — to concentrate the more on developing their Asian territories. In the Soviet era they have maintained this impetus, but it has been expressed in terms of the eastward movement of industrialization. Many of the world's largest mining, hydro-electric power, metallurgical, oilfield, natural gas, pipeline and other developments having been established there — first in West Siberia, later in East Siberia, and now in the Soviet Far East. The industrial, economic and strategic centre of gravity of the USSR moves distinctly to the eastward. During World War II this stood the USSR in good stead; munitions flowed from Russia-in-Asia far beyond the reach of the German invaders. But all this development has been at high cost, which shows how determined is the Soviet Union to build up its economic strength in the East. Since 1965 development has been accelerated by the Economic Reform, giving high priority to managerial efficiency, and encouraging enterprises to make a profit.

Factories and installations mark the material progress; Soviet political aims and estimations are more subjective. In Marxist belief, ideological or political factors are a complicated "superstructure" deriving from fundamental material and economic conditions. The Russians rely first and foremost on their mighty physical base. Nevertheless, the Soviet model is not erected for the sake of Russia alone, but also to show the way forward for all developing countries, not least those in Asia. The purpose is chiefly to cause Asia and other parts of the world, by example, influence or any other

pressure that may be suitable or opportune, to adopt the Soviet system.

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FROM 1918 to 1945, the Moscow Government had full command over the World Communist movement. The collision between China and Russia greatly changed the practical situation, intensifying the Russian motivation to move more positively into Asian affairs. This means rebutting, in tangible forms as well as rhetorical terms, China's claims to be better placed, qualitatively if not quantitatively, to "show the way forward" for the Asians and other emergent peoples. It means active rivalry on every plane — politics, trade, aid, technical assistance, military, cultural, informational and educational. Everyone knows how embittered and all-pervading the conflict is; for historical analogies we must go back to the religious wars of Europe long ago. In such a strife, no holds are barred. On the Sino-Soviet frontier itself, the longest, and now the most heavily-armed in the world, blood had already been shed(7). The antagonists will seek to meet and counter each other not only there, but in any part of the world, in any way that each thinks that he can check, defeat or impede the interests of the other.

The industrial, technical and organizational confidence of the Russians is high. Increasing wealth has made life more comfortable, settled and orderly for Soviet citizens of all ranks (and ranks there are plenty, in that hierarchical society), engendering a notable degree of *embourgeoisement*. The frenetic mass turmoil in China appears extremely disorderly to the Russians: rabbles and cliques, deployed by an arbitrary dictator, mount a bewildering alternation of drives, purges and campaigns. China moves in great lurching zigzags. The people are confused; rural poverty is proclaimed a virtue, "thought" means parrotting the words of Mao. Mao is pathologically anxious about the survival of his system; successively, he personally designated two "inheritors of his throne", Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, but "liquidated" both in turn as "persons seeking to restore capitalism in China". It is interesting that nevertheless the Soviets consider that Maoism is not an "accidental" but an intrinsic feature of the Chinese structure, which will not disappear with the death of the personage who brought it to power(8).

Seeing turmoil as an endemic condition in China, the Soviet public and technocracy (including the military technocracy), if not the political leadership, discount the material power, organizing ability and effectiveness of China. They know that in nuclear and other modern armaments and the means of delivering them Russia is at present very distinctly ahead of China, and count on their general lead in the science and technology of the space age. Nevertheless China looms large in the human dimension. The political and worldly ingenuity of the Chinese must be respected. So, obviously, must their enormous numbers, seven or eight hundreds of millions of manpower. Nearby Siberia might offer *Lebensraum* for these hordes — living-space not so much in the terms appropriate to a bygone era, but of access to and command over large supplies of resources needed for China's industrialization. China makes territorial claims on specific parts of Russia-in-Asia, asserting they were seized by Russia.

If this pressure could be diverted to the southward, it would be a great relief to Russia-in-Asia. Yet the Soviet Union cannot give China a free hand to seek its livelihood overseas. This might allow China to grow too strong (and it is only a repentant China that Russia wishes to allow to become strong), while opening that area to the spread of Maoism (which to the Russians is an infamy that must be crushed). The USSR encircles China formidably by sea as well as by land (Table I). Inescapably, the rival Communist States must clash both along the Siberian frontier, and overseas in South-east Asia. It is not a case of "either, or"; relaxation on either flank means an intensification of the clash on the other. Consider, conversely, the Chinese viewpoint.

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THE might of Russia-in-Asia overhangs the Chinese homeland threatening military and nuclear destruction. Siberia is not, as is generally imagined, in itself an area unsuitable for Chinese emigration or Chinese-style development. Only half the Chinese are southerners and rice-eaters; the way of life of the other half is distinctly northerly and they thrive a millionfold in such areas as Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan. Chinese labourers and traders were ubiquitous in Siberia itself, in Tsarist times. Chinese, mainly from southern China, are however even more numerous in South-east Asia, where China has a large human and commercial presence. It would be "walking on one leg", as a Chinese phrase has it, not to keep one foot firmly in each of these areas.

Many Russians under Stalin had confidence in the working-class and "progressive" elements in East Asia. When, in 1949, the Communists took power in China, the prospects for World Revolution were exhilarating; half Europe had been "liberated", and now the biggest country in Asia. There was a period of substantial collaboration, economically and otherwise. Nevertheless the attitude of the Chinese to foreigners, including the Russian "Big Noses", was reserved; as was the attitude of the Russians to the "peasant mentality" of the Chinese. The honeymoon passed swiftly; and was followed by wranglings of divorce, made absolute and public by the end of the 1950s. The Russians, packing up blueprints and all, were accused by the Chinese of "taking away the dishes in the middle of the meal"(9) — which, incidentally, seems to show who provided the banquet and decided the menu. Ridiculous and dangerous, from the Soviet point of view, is Mao's teaching that Russia (as well as the USA) and the

hydrogen bomb are "paper tigers" and that the "rural areas" (peasant guerrilla forces) can "surround the cities" (the industrial areas). In practice, the Chinese are feverishly building air-raid shelters; and, it is not easy to imagine Mao's guerrillas "swimming like fish" in the frozen "sea" of Siberia, where they would find no dissatisfied populations to support them, and some very able forces opposing them.

Failing a pre-emptive attack by Russia on China or China on Siberia, South-east Asia remains the zone of fluidity, of maneuver. It is bounded, however, by two major areas of foothold where the two Communist Powers are already engaged and interlocked in comparative balance — Japan on one side of this zone and India on the other. Established positions in those two countries may be springboards for the penetration of South-east Asia, important to both Russia and China as a source of tropical and sub-tropical products. There, by an irony of history, the two largest Communist States must rival each other in what used to be defined as "colonialist" roles — competition for sources of raw materials and for markets, with a compulsion on each to gain influence and "contain" the expansion of the other. The USSR holds many cards and has many ways of playing them. Having the data-processing and decision-making machinery that pertains to the computer and space-age, the Soviet Union has the stature of a multi-national firm, while China is a medium-sized one, and the small nations of South-east Asia are in a very minor category.

The political and military ruthlessness of the USSR has been demonstrated in Czechoslovakia and Hungary; China's in Tibet, Korea and Himalayan India. The monolithic nature of the Communist politico-economic structure is illustrated, in the Soviet case, by the fact that all Siberia is included together with most of European Russia in one single administrative and planning unit, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) which extends all the way from the Baltic, White Russia and the Ukraine to the Pacific. Including such diversities as modern metropolitan centres like Moscow together with distant Asian tribes and settlements, the RSFSR comprises 76% of the whole Soviet Union and 53% of its population, or 133 million people. Moscow is the capital of the RSFSR and all decisions are centralized there, down to matters of administrative detail.

The other East Asian component of the Soviet Union, Soviet Central Asia, is a tract of one and a quarter million square miles (with over 35 million people, a population density four times that of East Siberia and the Soviet Far East, but similarly concentrated in urban and industrial areas). This important and relatively prosperous area is operationally integrated with Siberia and the rest of the Union. In this sense there is really no such thing as "East Asian" Russia existing in and of itself; just as, given modern strategic weapons, it is delusive to think of East Asia in and of itself. It is salutary to have firmly in mind that the trump card is in the Soviet hand, as well as many other leading cards that must be played in the short and middle run of the game, before China can possibly match the hardware holdings of the USSR. The ultimate sanction is nuclear deterrence, in which the Soviet Union has a fearful predominance over China. The military balance (the best available information on which is summarized in Table I) ought to be written in large letters on the wall of every planning room, as a constant reminder of the ultimate relation of forces at present.

The comprehensiveness of Soviet military planning must also be borne in mind. All possibilities are logged and programmed, by sophisticated methods involving modern techniques such as Systems Analysis, Games Theory and the use of computers. The aims or desiderata are tabulated, then quantified and statistically weighted. Simultaneously the availabilities, actual and within the plan period, are tabled against these objectives. Priorities are of course relative and variable in respect of both these sets of data. Numerous "balance equations" are derived, equalling the number of unknowns or outcomes to be effected. Specific sets of directives or "scenarios" are elaborated accordingly, under continuous revision in response to current feed-backs and results(10).

Large modern nations — or major international pact organizations like NATO and SEATO — can, with full support and at maximum efficiency, parallel this kind of "think-tank" work, but small nations like those of South-east Asia delude themselves if they believe they can, on their own or as a merely local group, match the kind of calculatedness that is the basis of Soviet policy. Whether China can match this is another question. It is clear that the Russians are confident that the Chinese cannot. In the Soviet estimation, Chinese planning is both simplistic and erroneous; but non-Communist South-east Asia is viewed as having no cohesion at all.

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DATA on trade give an interesting quantification of the structure of the worldwide interests of the Soviet Union and China. Neither is an important participant in international trade, considering its size and population. Both appear largely self-contained, economically. The USSR accounts for only about four per cent, by value, of all the world's international trade and China only a fraction of the Soviet share. But both depend qualitatively on foreign trade, even for basic foodstuffs, and for the machinery and capital goods necessary for their economic development. This must be paid for by exports. Moreover, both countries wish to use trade for political leverage. With them, trade and "the flag" certainly advance together, not least in South-east Asia.

United Nations' analysts divide the countries of

the world into three groups: "developed" (industrialized, advanced and capitalist), "developing" (ex-colonial or "Third World") and "centrally planned" (Communist). Both Russia and China trade first and foremost with the first group, the developed countries, — China especially, to the extent of 47% of all its trade in 1971, and 53% in 1973. The Soviet Union did proportionately less of its trade with the developed countries, 24% in 1971, and 29% in 1973. In 1973 China's trade with the developed countries was well under half that of the USSR, in total value.

Turning to the "developing" countries, 20% of China's total trade was with this group in 1971, 14% of Russia's. But, in 1971, Russia did more than four times the trade of China, with the developing countries, and still nearly three times in 1973.

For the third group of countries, the Communist countries, the picture is quite different. The USSR has a position of great strength in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), in which it is joined by the East European countries, Mongolia and Cuba, while China, North Korea and the Indo-China countries are not members. Just over half of the USSR's total world trade was with other Communist countries in 1973. China increased its trade with Communist countries by 70% from 1971-73, but their share in China's total trade fell to 17%. It must be stressed that Russia's trade in this group is very much larger than China's, in fact thirteen times as great in 1973.

In 1971 China ran a huge trade deficit of US$620 million with the developed countries, but came out in overall surplus to the extent of US$110 million by making surpluses of US$440 million with Hong Kong and Macao, US$205 million with the developing countries and US$85 million with the Communist countries. In 1973 China's deficit with the developed countries soared to US$1,650 million, but the overall deficit was only US$80 million, as the surplus with Hong Kong and Macao nearly doubled to US$815 million), that with the developing countries more than doubled (to US$465 million), and that with the Communist countries increased three and a half times (to US$290 million). Subsequently it became clear that China's overall deficit in the next year, 1974, would be spectacularly larger, and the preliminary calculations just recently available confirm that it will be over US$1,000 million. China will undoubtedly come into the international money market for credits and financial facilities (as Russia has).

The USSR has much less trade-debt with the capitalist countries, though it has received huge credits from them. A deficit of US$1,125 million was recorded with the developed countries in 1973. In the overall trade of the USSR, a surplus of US$1,326 million in 1971 was reduced to US$356 million in 1973; and a favourable balance of US$298 million with the developing countries was transformed into an unfavourable one of US$173 million in 1973, while the surplus in trade with the Communist countries (US$449 million in 1971) was converted into a US$479 million deficit in 1973. However, it is difficult to reach a convincing judgement on the basis of the United Nations figures, since they contained a huge "not identified" item of no less than US$2,133 million (nearly four times the alleged overall surplus) in 1973.

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THIS worldwide background has had to be presented rather fully, as the position and prospects in South-east Asia cannot be understood without it. The trade of the Soviet Union and China with that area is shown in Table II. Half of the total trade of each of the two Communist giants with this region is done with countries at the periphery of the area, i.e. Japan and India. The only other group within East Asia to have a major share of this trade is that of the other, much smaller, Communist countries. Less than ten per cent of the USSR's trade is with East Asia as a whole; China's dependence on it is much more marked, representing 30 to 40% of its imports and 50 to 60% of its exports. The comparisons inserted at (G) in Table II help to emphasize the extent to which trade is politically oriented in the Communist world, and also the rapidity with which it can be switched, increased or decreased, on political grounds. In 1973 the USSR did more trade with Cuba than with Japan, and China did more trade with Cuba than with Indonesia or Sri Lanka, or with the Soviet Union itself. The USSR traded more with North Korea or Mongolia than with South-east Asia. China's relations with India have been negligible since the war between the two countries in 1961, while the USSR has long extended massive assistance to New Delhi.

China has been extending its East Asian trade, which has a distinct export bias, much faster than the USSR. While the Soviet Union has clearly the dominant position in India, China has been extending its trade with Japan. The Soviet Union, it was emphasized above, is squarely based in the CMEA and Warsaw Pact countries. All these relationships and proportionalities could be greatly and rapidly changed, should South-east Asia become a more important area of Sino-Soviet conflict.

Statistical tables grossing results can be misleading: there will always be certain local leverages of special importance. The following are indicative instances. The USSR took 16 per cent of India's exports in 1973 (the United States 14 per cent and Japan 11 per cent). China took 12 per cent of the exports of Sri Lanka (a little less than the United Kingdom) and provided 13 per cent of its imports (against the UK's 8 per cent and India's 9 per cent) in 1972. This last instance indicates the vulnerability of producers to changes in prices and in demand; nations which could help in stabilizing these could acquire great local influence. This the Commu-

nist economic systems proclaim they can do; but prospective customers fear they may in return be committing themselves in advance to low prices, whereas the free market may well bring rises as well as falls.

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IN JUNE 1975, Chinese Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping warned Asians against "letting the tiger in at the back door whilst expelling the wolf at the back door"(11). He did not consider the Soviet Union as a "paper" tiger, but evidently regarded it as the more dangerous of the two predators. The occasion of Mr. Teng's remark was the successful conclusion of diplomatic negotiations in Peking with the Philippines, whose President made what the Russians call a "Chinese compliment", by hailing China as "the natural leader of the Third World"(12). This accolade was received with pleasure by the Chinese. There appears to have been a rejection by both the Chinese and other Asians, of the "hegemony" of either the USA or the USSR, in favour of the creation of a definitely "neutralist" group(13).

The USSR offers its proposal to create a "system of collective security in Asia". This was re-iterated recently by the Soviet Ambassador to Thailand(14). The Ambassador stated that the USSR has consistently advocated such an approach since the Bandung declaration of 1955. And later, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) proposal for the neutralization of the area was specifically endorsed by Mr. Brezhnev in 1972. The Soviet aim, the Soviet Ambassador added, was not to exclude China from this system, but to include it. In practice, everyone now agrees that China should not be "isolated". The point is precisely that China can only be influenced if it is within the apparatus of international relations. One might ask why the Soviet Union does not make a start by offering China membership of the CMEA.

The situation might change rapidly in key respects. Significantly, China is emerging as a producer of oil(15). This could enrich China, and be very important to all East Asia. Even then, Japan and India would still be the pillars of the East Asian edifice. South-east Asia, to change the metaphor, is a quotient in the larger sums that are done elsewhere. Mrs. Gandhi's dictatorial steps to maintain her version of socialist orientation of that country are more in the nature of true socialist government, in the Soviet view, than what is happening in China(16). Yet Chinese influence in the Indian sub-continent remains considerable; pro-Maoist factions are present and active.

In Japan, the struggle is more even. Subjectively, the Japanese are ready to go far to placate China; as instanced in the closure in May 1974 of Tokyo's air link with Taiwan (which took 5% of all Japanese exports in 1973, and is the location of large Japanese investments). Fifteen months later, this air link was however quietly re-established. Meanwhile negotiations for a peace treaty have proceeded. with Japan significantly demurring from the "hegemony" clause proposed by China. Commercially and technologically, Japan could do a great deal for the development of Siberia. Massive schemes for this have long been under discussion: Japan, joining with United States and other investors, would contribute pipeline, mining, forestry, harbour and other projects, providing machinery, know-how, equipment and consumer goods to the tune of US$5-6 billion over several years, receiving in return oil and natural gas, other minerals, lumber and fishery products. These plans have not yet fully materialized but are by no means off the agenda, and partial commitments have been made totalling one billion US dollars. This is a scale of operations that China cannot presently match, financially or technologically. It was contemplated that Japan might assist in the building of a second Trans-Siberian railway, North of the present line. In view of the grave strategic implications for China, the Japanese hesitated; so the Soviets are now rapidly proceeding with this project themselves(17).

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A systematic effort is certainly required for the economic and political consolidation of South-east Asia. Fine words cannot cover over the weakness of South-east Asia, in an arena overshadowed by the gigantic conflict between China and Russia. The contestants are experienced and astute, with many means at their disposal: it is unlikely that small nations can outwit them or balance one against the other, as in the oft-quoted historical instance of Thailand preserving its independence by "playing off" Britain and France against each other. Such balancing ended thirty-four years ago in Japanese occupation. The conditions are quite different today. The tactical options open to the intervening Powers in the old days, the era of the slow-moving gunboat and the local trader, were few and simple; today it is the age of technocratic assessment and electronic implementation.

Collective security is fervently desired; but countries like those of South-east Asia have no bargaining position, unless they have some positive outside support. A handful of small States cannot fully cope, either singly or in confederation, with such a complex situation. An organized compact must be maintained, like that provided by SEATO in the transitional period that has now ended. The gap that is now opening could perhaps be filled by ASEAN. It must be filled, if the smaller nations are not to be grievously damaged in the clash of two rival Communist Revolutions. This clash arises in Asia, where the Maoists' boasted prevalence of "the East wind over the West wind" is now replaced by a broader and more dangerous turbulence between the North wind and the South wind, which cannot be checked by the forces available in East Asia alone. The situation requires more, not less, co-operation and understanding between the nations of Asia and those of the West.

TABLE I BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES[a]

	U.S.S.R.					CHINA				
1. ARMY (Divisions)	**Europe**	**China border**	**Southern USSR**	**Central USSR**	**Total**	**North and N.E.**	**West and S.W.**	**Mid-West**	**East and S.**	**Total**
infantry	63	45	23	5	136	50	26	15	9	100
tank	22	8	3	1	34	—	—	—	—	—(b)
airborne	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	—(b)
2. AIR FORCE (nos. of planes)	**Europe**	**Sino-Soviet border**	**South**	**Central**	**Total**					**Total**
strategic	630	210	—	—	840	(55 medium bombers, 300 light)				355(c)
tactical	3,050	1,200	—	—	4,250	—				3,350(c)
air defence	(modern: personnel 500,000?)					("limited point defence")				
3. NAVY (nos. of vessels)	**Northern fleet**	**Black Sea**	**Pacific**	**Other [mobile]**	**Total**	No major ships: minor:-				
						Northern sea	**Eastern sea**	**Southern sea**		**Total**
Major surface combat ships	56	60	55	50	221	150	500	200		850(d)
Submarines (nuclear)	80	—	40	—	120	Submarines: No nuclear (e)				
Submarines (non-nuclear)	80	30	60	—	170					50(c)
4. MISSILES (nos.)										
IRBM and MRBM	(about 600, mostly in Europe)					(20-30 IRBM, about 50 MR)				
5. DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (estimated, US$)	**Total [1971]**	**% of GNP**		**per capita**	**GNP**	**Total [1973]**	**% of GNP**		**per capita**	**GNP**
	33 billion	5.4		134	547 billion	4-12 billion	3-10		5-15	100-140 billion(f)

Notes:

a. Based on The Military Balance, 1974-75, IISS, London; but interpretations are the present writer's.
b. Comparatively low mechanization. Both countries have large paramilitary, border guard and other forces in addition.
c. Many of old types originally provided by the USSR in the 1950s.
d. Many small; navy including "225 armed junks and motor launches". The USSR has a very much larger merchant marine.
e. One submarine has ballistic missile tubes, but "China is not known to have any missiles for this boat".
f. Only vague estimates are available for China.

USSR

Countries by groups:	1971 M	1971 X	1971 Total	1973 M	1973 X	1973 Total	Increase, 1973/71 M	Increase, 1973/71 X	Increase, 1973/71 Total
(A) Japan	395	419	734	506	845	1,351	28%	102%	84%
(B) India	284	129	413	497	303	800	75%	135%	94%
(C) Pakistan	39	29	68	32	17	49	—18%	—41%	—28%
Bangladesh	4	20	24	13	60	73	225%	200%	204%
Total (C)	43	59	102	45	77	122	5%	31%	20%
(D) Malaysia	86	2	88	131	1	132	52%	—	50%
Singapore	4	5	9	6	9	15	50%	80%	67%
Indonesia	11	11	22	6	4	10	—55%	—64%	—55%
Sri Lanka	16	9	25	9	9	18	—44%	0%	—28%
Total (D)	117	27	144	152	23	175	30%	—15%	22%
(E) North Korea	136	367	503	181	304	485	33%	—17%	— 4%
North Vietnam	24	155	179	50	194	244	108%	25%	36%
(F) China	76	78	154	137	137	274	80%	76%	78%
Total (E) and (F)	236	600	836	368	635	1,003	56%	6%	20%
Total East Asia	1,075	1,224	2,299	1,568	1,883	3,451	46%	54%	50%
As % of USSR's world trade (C)	9%	9%	8%	7%	9%	8%			
(G) Comparisons:									
Cuba	321	669	990	585	923	1,508	82%	38%	52%
Mongolia	79	182	261	119	340	459	51%	87%	75%
Chile	1	8	9	0	22	22	—	175%	244%

Notes:

a. USSR data from United Nations *International Trade Yearbook 1974.*

b. *Current Scene*, Hong Kong, Vol. XII No. 12, December 1974. China does not yet provide figures according to the general inter

c. The USSR's trade with Thailand and the Philippines, previously relatively insignificant, reached seven and four million dolla indications are that this trade is below the Soviet level.

HINA [b] WITH EAST ASIA
ports, both f.o.b.]

CHINA

Countries by groups:	1971			1973			Increase, 1973/71		
	M	X	Total	M	X	Total	M	X	Total
(A) Japan	607	322	929	1,093	928	2,021	80%	188%	118%
(B) India									
(C) Pakistan	32	31	63	14	46	60	—56%	50%	— 5%
(D) Malaysia and Singapore	35	170	205	135	325	460	286%	91%	124%
Indonesia	5	30	35	5	150	155	0%	400%	343%
Sri Lanka	32	26	58	39	31	70	22%	19%	21%
Total (D)	72	226	298	179	506	685	149%	124%	130%
(E) North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia	75	150	225	125	355	480	67%	137%	113%
Hong Kong and Macao	5	445	450	10	825	835	100%	85%	85%
(F) USSR	78	76	154	136	136	272	74%	158%	77%
Total East Asia	869	1,250	2,119	1,557	2,796	4,353	79%	124%	105%
As % of china's world trade:	38%	52%	45%	31%	57%	44%			
(G) Comparisons:									
Cuba	—	—	283	—	—	296	—	—	5%
Chile	20	0	20	105	16	121	425%	—	505%

they have to be derived from the trade returns of the countries trading with China.

in 1973; and this movement continued in 1974-75. Corresponding figures for China are not available, but present

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11. Widely reported in the world press, 7-8 June 1975.

12. *Ibid.*.

13. Second leader, *Times,* London, 9 June 1975.

14. Address by Soviet Ambassador Ilyichev to the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Thailand, Bangkok, 25 June, 1975.

15. China's oil output may have been 65 million tons in 1974, an increase of perhaps 30 per cent over 1973; it could possibly rise to 400 million tons by 1980, which is equal to the present output of Iran. (*Economist,* London, 18 January 1975).

16. *Izvestia* and *Pravda,* 28 June - 1 July 1975. Statement endorsed by the (pro-Soviet) Communist Party of India, denounced by the Chinese press (*Ta Kung Pao,* Hong Kong, 4 July 1975).

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ASEAN: *The rapid changes which have taken place in Indo-China during the past six months have caused the ASEAN nations to reassess their foreign policies, both individually and collectively.*

ASEAN and the Changing Power Balance in South-East Asia

Seah Chee Meow

OF paramount importance in the international politics of South-east Asia was the collapse of the non-Communist regimes in Cambodia and South Vietnam in quick succession in April of this year. That these regimes were unable to withstand the continuing pressures of the Communist forces was a foregone conclusion: the paralysis of will power on the part of their leaders despite defiant rhetoric to the contrary and the unwillingness on the part of the United States to salvage what was fast deteriorating into an untenable position, meant it was just a matter of time before these two States would come under the control of the Communists. For the rest of South-east Asia these events are instructive even though they may not be necessarily followed by a new wave of adverse developments. The fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam certainly accelerated the pace of the takeover of the Laotian Government by the pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces. With the latter event, the whole of Indo-China has finally come under the control of the Communists even though it remains an empirical question as to whether these Communist forces could override traditional inter-state and inter-ethnic fears and animosities to forge themselves into a strong Communist bloc. There is however no doubt that these events marked the end of a major chapter of American involvement in South-east Asia and more specifically in the Indo-China area, however much observers would like to question the reasons for American action or rather, inaction during those few months prior to the collapse of Saigon. Afterall, for Indo-China, old orders are buried thus giving way to new ones.

Of more immediate concern, however, is the impact such developments have for South-east Asia. This has been a trouble-prone region: it is the scene of big Power tussles and it is also afflicted by problems of state-building, nation-building, economic development and internecine inter-state hostilities. The strategic importance of this region — straddling the Indian and the Pacific Oceans — and the enormous variety and amount of natural resources ranging from crude oil to minerals(1), have only served to accentuate big Power rivalry as well as to heighten inter-state rivalry. South-east Asia is a region of new nations with boundaries largely fashioned by former imperial Powers. The Indo-China developments are likely to inject new elements of uncertainty into an already complex and fluid scene: the major Powers and the South-east Asian States have to reappraise their strategies while trying to read into the intentions of friends and foes alike. In this respect the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries are not spared from these agonies of uncertainties: either as a collective entity or as individual States, they must try to appraise these events and to accommodate to the changing factors that impinge on the South-east Asian scene.

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TO most observers the turn of events in Indo-China was not unexpected. Afterall, Indo-China was a testing ground where the major Powers vied for influence, and any change in the intentions of one of the actors was bound to affect the turn of events. Of considerable importance therefore was the intention of the United States. As a corollary of its policy of containment, the United States was moved to assist the non-Communist forces in a bid to stem the tide of Communist expansion in Indo-China. The decision to despatch its forces was an extension of this policy. This strategy did not prove to be a success. Coupled with growing domestic dissension over its involvement in Vietnam, there was by the end of the 1960s a strong anti-war feeling among the American public. The Nixon doctrine was a response to these pressures. Although Nixon pledged to honour American commitments overseas it was evident that the United States would reduce its military involvement in Indo-China

and avoid direct participation. The Nixon doctrine implicitly acknowledged the need for a reappraisal of the containment policy. Subsequent events reaffirmed this changed posture. The "historic journey" to Peking by Nixon in 1972 indicated the formal end to containment and the possibility of a *détente,* while the rundown of American military forces in Vietnam was officially ratified with the signing of the Paris Peace Accord of 1973 which enabled the United States to "withdraw" from Vietnam with honour. For the United States, its involvement in the Indo-China region was over and, in spite of military and other assistance to these non-Communist regimes, it had no legal obligation to these people as far as the struggle for power was concerned.

This "withdrawal" on the part of the United States was further aggravated by the series of domestic crises facing that country. The Watergate trial had effectively reduced Nixon's credibility while his resignation did not remove the crisis. The inquiries into various federal agencies and also into aspects of foreign policy opened new areas of controversy. These events, coupled with the differences between the executive and the legislature, have made it extremely difficult to ensure the formulation of a coherent policy especially in regard to countries like Cambodia or South Vietnam which were then about to collapse. As Kissinger, in an address to newspaper editors, commented:

> "Comity between the Executive and Legislative Branches is the only possible basis for national action...The recognition that the Congress is a co-equal branch of government is the dominant fact of national politics today. The Executive accepts that the Congress must have both the sense and the reality of participation; foreign policy must be a shared enterprise. The question is whether the Congress will go beyond the setting of guidelines to the conduct of tactics; whether it will deprive the Executive of discretion and authority in the conduct of diplomacy while at the same time remaining institutionally incapable of formulating or carrying out a clear national policy of its own".(2)

Together with economic crises (such as financial instability, the pressure on the US dollar, and the oil crisis), there was a further reluctance on the part of the American public to see the United States "over-stretch" its commitments or involve itself in extensive foreign policy ventures. A survey carried out by the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations in March 1975 reaffirmed what was then the prevailing feature, namely, while Americans wanted to maintain an active leadership role, they were reluctant to back it up with military muscle. This survey showed that only 11 per cent of the public and six per cent of leaders favoured further US military involvement even in the event of a major attack on Saigon while 72 per cent of the public and 87 per cent of the leaders opposed such a move(3). Client States or regimes, such as those battling it out in Indo-China, were thus never assured; on the contrary, the Communist forces were able to exploit this weakness by increasing the scale of onslaught on the demoralized non-Communist regimes. Kissinger's appeal for Congressional approval of US$800 million of military aid and the rhetoric that "we have a deep moral obligation rooted in the history of our involvement and sustained by the continuing efforts of our friends [and that] we cannot easily set it aside"(4) was thus the voice of a minority. Indeed, the tendency to dismiss the events in Indo-China prior to the fall of Saigon as "this was not our war"(5) and to talk of a "post-Vietnam" situation(6) has not helped to allay the fear of America's allies notwithstanding the Mayaguez incident(7).

What then are US intentions in the South-east Asian region in the new circumstances? A major factor affecting a further American role would undoubtedly depend on the type of *modus vivendi* arrived at between the Executive and Congress. The point was stressed by the Singapore premier, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, during his visit to the United States in May 1975, that "the world would see 'less adventurism' if the United States President and Congress could speak in one voice on basic issues of foreign policy and in clear and unmistakeable terms"(8). A major question mark undoubtedly hangs over future American involvement in South-east Asia and its relations with these countries.

It would seem that the United States' presence in this region is assured although there will be a redefinition of its zone of strategic interest. The Pentagon, for example, has been said to have redrawn these demarcations to include South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia; in short, the whole of peninsular South-east Asia would be excluded from this "sphere of influence"(9). The need for the United States to maintain its presence in South-east Asia is bolstered by three major considerations. First, it has to reassure Japan that its major sea-lanes would not be jeopardized. Any precipitated withdrawal from the region by the United States could only encourage Japan to resort to drastic measures such as stepping up its naval capabilities to protect vital sea routes. Secondly, the American presence would provide a counterweight against possible extension of Soviet influence. The Soviet Union has been trying to secure naval bases in this region and it is likely that some of the naval bases in Vietnam could be made available to them. In any case, expansion of Soviet influence would merely encourage China to adopt an aggressive foreign policy in South-east Asia(10). Thirdly, apart from the presence of substantial American investments and the raw materials in the region, many South-east Asian States too prefer a continued American presence, even though at an "equidistant level" with other big Powers. The importance of the American presence was made very explicit by the Singapore premier when he argued thus:

> "If America's naval presence and its economic contributions were to be diminished, more conflicts will take place, because China's answer to Soviet naval and economic power would be to intensify local insurgency."(11)

An American presence was thus needed to complete the "isosceles triangle" of the three major Powers with interests in the region, namely the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Soviet Union and the United States.

For the two major Communist Powers, the PRC and the Soviet Union, the events in Indo-China must have been a mixed blessing. For the PRC, there remains the task of dealing with the new regimes. It is unlikely that the Hanoi Government or the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in South Vietnam will placidly accede to the PRC's intentions. Apart from deep-rooted historical animosities between the Chinese and the Vietnamese, it would seem that the Vietnamese would prefer to forge their own form of Communist rule and to be independent of the PRC's influence. That the Vietnamese regime will in the future play an active role in the rest of Indo-China was indicated by the reported incursions of Hanoi forces into neighbouring Cambodia. The new situation in Indo-China is thus likely to accentuate Sino-Soviet rivalry in the region, as the Soviets could be used as a convenient counterweight to undue Chinese pressure on Indo-China. For the Soviet Union this would be a welcome move for, apart from diluting Chinese influence in South-east Asia, the PRC will now have another border area to contend with other than the unsettled northern and western borders with the Soviet Union.

From another angle, the triumph of the pro-Communist forces may force the PRC to adopt a two-prong strategy towards other States in South-east Asia. First, the conciliatory attitude towards other governments wishing to maintain diplomatic and other links will continue. This is necessary to reduce Soviet influence and footholds in the area. It would also facilitate the PRC's effort to be in the mainstream of the international politics of South-east Asia, now that its naval capabilities have been increased substantially(12). On the other hand, the success of the Vietnamese Communists will have a spillover effect on other insurgency movements in South-east Asia. While Vietnam will require a few years to recuperate from the effects of the war and strengthen its internal cohesion, there remains a likelihood that it will aspire to a leadership role *vis-à-vis* the other insurgent movements in South-east Asia. Afterall, while Hanoi's triumph against the Americans and American-supported military regimes might not be as important as the capture of political power by the Chinese Communist Party in China, Vietnam's proximity, its proficiency in guerrilla warfare techniques, and its huge supply of weapons captured from the retreating Saigon forces, could put the Vietnamese(13) in a very competitive position with the PRC for leadership status in South-east Asia. For China to maintain its leadership role it may have few options but to play an active part in inspiring the insurgent movements to step up their activities. Clandestine radios, such as the Voice of the Malayan Revolution, continue to operate from within China without restraints. More important was the strident message of the Chinese Communist Party to the proscribed Partai Kommunis Indonesia on the latter's 55th anniversary:

> "The Indonesian Revolution has suffered temporary setbacks and the Communist Party of Indonesia is in a difficult position. But no matter how frantic the counter-revolutionary forces may be, the Indonesian communists have neither been cowed nor subjugated. Your party has strengthened its unity and persevered in struggles under the most difficult and most complicated conditions."(14)

To the PRC this janus-faced approach to foreign policy can be rationalized by arguing that such relationships are being carried on at two levels, namely, the government-to-government level and the party-to-party level. Although the Chinese leaders have given assurances to those South-east Asian leaders that insurgent movements are basically their domestic problems and it is thus up to the latter to deal with them, the PRC will nevertheless support revolutionary forces even though it has not, at the moment, given large scale assistance in the form of arms or personnel(15).

Ostensibly the recent Indo-China developments should give the Soviet Union considerable opportunity to expand its influence. The desire on the part of the Vietnamese leadership to keep a proper distance from the PRC and the existence of unsettled issues with China (such as the seizure of the Paracel Islands by the PRC from the Thieu regime, a move which was not condoned by the Vietnamese Communists, who also claim the territory), the probabilities of maintaining cordial links with Vietnam have been enhanced. This factor has not escaped the attention of the PRC which has viewed Soviet moves in this region with suspicion and hostility. The PRC which had earlier criticized the intentions of the Soviet parliamentary delegation then on a tour of some South-east Asian countries (16), has, in the wake of the Vietnam debacle, viewed the Soviet moves in the region even more critically. Senior Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, at a banquet in honour of the visiting Thai premier, Kukrit Pramoj, referred to the Kremlin's "wild ambitions (which) had extended its tentacles far and wide". He went on to assert that:

> "It (the Soviet Union) insatiably seeks new military bases in South-east Asia and sends its naval vessels to ply the Indian and West Pacific Oceans, posing a menacing threat to

the peace and security of the South-east Asian countries."(17)

This fear that bases could be established, which could be used to the detriment of the PRC's national and security interests was no doubt prompted by the availability of excellent establishments such as the sprawling Cam Ranh Bay base in South Vietnam.

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APART from these three major Powers, a no less important Power with considerable interest in South-east Asia is Japan. As said, Japan is concerned with the safety of the sea-lanes so as to ensure that food and raw materials continue to be available. As one of Japan's major sea-lanes happens to pass through South-east Asia, and, as this region also provides Japan with a wide range of raw materials from crude oil to timber products, the Japanese Government has every intention of ensuring that its interests are adequately protected. So far there have been no concerted moves to bolster its naval capabilities, partly because of the "no-war" provision in the constitution, and partly because such a build-up may not necessarily create much confidence in South-east Asia(18). Japan has recently relied on an American military presence and it is likely that it will continue to press upon the American Government to maintain its military presence in this region. For despite the setback in Vietnam, the United States is still a major military Power in Asia in terms of fire power, aircraft and trained personnel(19).

However, there is a need on the part of Japan to give far more serious thought to the nature of its relationship with South-east Asian States. For although Japan has emerged as the major trading partner in many of these countries, much ill-will has been generated in these countries even though they are relying heavily on Japanese goods and markets(20). This need to readjust relationships and to be more attuned to local sensitivities is indicated in the Japanese foreign minister's recent statement which calls for "a new Japanese policy now that the United States has withdrawn from the region"(21). The new policy as envisaged would include *inter alia* a greater emphasis on aid to assist the developmental efforts of countries in the region, and not just trade and investments. Japan is thus expected to soften its "economic animal" image and to give more attention to the aspirations of South-east Asian nationalism.

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FOR the ASEAN countries, the developments in Indo-China did not come as a shock, although the sudden collapse (and the flight to safer havens of political leaders) must have had an unsettling effect on many of the ASEAN leaders. The earlier détente between the United States and the Communist Powers did not go unnoticed in the ASEAN countries; in fact, as a follow-up to this détente, the ASEAN countries, individually and collectively, have been making adjustments to allow the interplay of the other major Powers in the region, while careful reassessments have been made of how best their national interests could be served in the light of changing events. The increase in Soviet economic influence in the ASEAN region and the visits of various Soviet leaders are thus seen as a part of the process of détente. At the same time, moves are made to restore formal ties with the PRC, thus acknowledging the fact that the latter could no longer be isolated from the mainstream of South-east Asian international politics. Visits of semi-official teams from China of sportsmen (ping-pong, soccer and badminton) and visits to the PRC by numerous delegations, private and official, all herald a willingness on the part of the ASEAN leaders to adapt to a changing power structure. Pronouncements by some of these leaders have stressed the need to accommodate to the PRC presence. For example, in putting forward the neutralization proposal, the Malaysian Government hopes that guarantees can be received from the major Powers (including the PRC) which would enable the South-east Asian region to be free from big Power involvement and manipulation. As the Malaysian premier, Tun Abdul Razak, commented:

> "Malaysia accepts the fact that China has a right to play her part in international forums and to have an interest in the affairs of Asia. Our support for China's membership to the United Nations and, in particular, our proposal for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia are clear manifestations of this belief...".(22)

Nixon's visit to Peking further speeded up this process of adjustment. Malaysia became the first of the ASEAN countries to establish ties with the PRC, in May 1974(23).

For the ASEAN countries, the establishment of a continuing dialogue with the PRC and the willingness of the PRC to respect their legitimate interests and national integrity would thus seem to form an important cornerstone of their foreign policy. Unlike their relations with the United States or the Soviet Union, the ASEAN nations are particularly wary of the leadership role and influence which the PRC could exercise over their local insurgent groups and also over the Overseas Chinese community in the region. These two aspects have constantly cropped up in dialogues with the PRC and it is thus not surprising that the PRC on the State-to-State level maintains cordial links with South-east Asian countries (so as not to persuade them to move over to accept Soviet influence) and has always insisted that insurgency problems are domestic matters. Similarly, the Chinese Government claims no jurisdiction over those Chinese in South-east Asia who have accepted local nationality. For the ASEAN nations, their sensitivities over these two aspects are understand-

able: a considerable part of their resources has been diverted to weed out these insurgents while the wavering loyalty of the Chinese community could threaten the stability of the leadership(24).

The changes in Indo-China have probably accelerated the pace of accommodation with the PRC. Thailand and the Philippines have since agreed to set up formal links with the PRC. Even in the case of Singapore, which has shown reluctance to do so partly because of the presence of the large Chinese community(25), an official delegation headed by its foreign minister visited the PRC in March this year. For Indonesia, the question of resumption of ties however would prove to be a more awkward issue. Apart from the allegation that the PRC was involved in the 1965 coup, the Government has been conscious of the possible revival of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Its foreign minister, Adam Malik, warned the PRC that the Indonesian Government would curb any foreign intervention in its internal affairs(26). Resumption of ties would thus depend on such factors as the speed with which the people's welfare could be further improved since, to quote President Suharto, the "Indonesian experience had proved that improvement in the people's welfare could overcome communism".(27)

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APART from the establishment of ties or the opening of dialogues with the PRC, the ASEAN nations have also examined the various options which would maximize their freedom and maneuverability. Indeed, it is expected that there will be a flurry of diplomatic activities among the ASEAN nations as leaders confer with each other and with other allies on the choice of foreign policy strategies. Of major importance however is the future intention of the United States. Premier Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore made a visit to the United States in May to sound out the intentions of the Executive and of Congress, so as to have a more accurate assessment of American intentions. The question of American bases too is under close scrutiny in Thailand and the Philippines.

It is apparent that unanimity of interests among the ASEAN nations cannot for the moment be found. On the China issue for example, there is no consensus of opinion or action among the member-States. The Thais have insisted that the American bases be closed by March 1976, and were still sensitive over the failure of the Americans to consult them during the Mayaguez incident. Thailand, formerly a staunch ally of the United States, has felt that the Americans might not be able to fulfil their commitments(28), while the presence of such bases would provide excuses for hostilities from neighbouring Indo-Chinese States. The Thais are already extremely sensitive to the security problems posed by the influx of Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian refugees. Subversion and irredentism cannot be ruled out(29). A reduced American presence is thus sought by the Thais, who have since decided to adopt a policy of "equidistance" from the major Powers.

For Malaysia the neutralization proposal continues to hold much attraction. The proposal envisages a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality and an absence of big Power conflict. As with the Thais, the neutralization proposal contains the notion of equidistance from the major Powers.

For the other three ASEAN nations, responses are different. The Philippines, while assuming sovereignty over the American bases, nevertheless, allows the United States to station forces in the country. Singapore leaders believe that the American presence will be a stabilizing factor. Arguing that the events in Indo-China are unlikely to be repeated in other ASEAN countries because of the different cultural factors, high resource - to-population ratio, and strong leadership, the Singapore leaders believe that an American presence (if matched by willpower) will lessen the element of "adventurism" in the region. Therefore Singapore looks forward to a continued American presence. Indonesian leaders, on the other hand, reiterated the importance of "national resilience" to combat Communism, although it is reported that the United States is likely to give more military aid to the Indonesian Government(30).

Of major concern among the ASEAN leaders however is the problem of dealing with the new regimes in Indo-China. The knowledge that approximately US$2 billion worth of military hardware is in the hands of the Vietnamese is disturbing. Collectively, Vietnam has more combat aircraft, heavy guns and tanks than any other country in South-east Asia; its military forces are the largest in the region. The possibility that the Vietnamese may supply some of the more sophisticated weapons to insurgent groups in the ASEAN countries, where incalculable mischief could be done, is another of the worries confronting the ASEAN leaders. (This fear is not unfounded in view of the stepping up of Communist insurgent activities in Thailand and Malaysia and the secessionist activities of the Philippine Muslims in the southern Philippines.) In this respect, it is logical that these countries should stress the importance of ASEAN as a regional organization; most of the speeches of the ASEAN leaders have called for increased solidarity within the body.

While arguing the importance of greater regional solidarity, it is also clear that no common approaches have to be defined *vis-à-vis* the Indo-China States. Thailand's prime minister Kukrit, for example, has stressed that ASEAN should look to the future and not to the past (namely the old, American-dominated "order") and that Vietnam and Cambodia should be welcomed to join ASEAN(31).

This sentiment was also echoed by the Malaysian leader who felt that Indo-China should be part of ASEAN to "ensure real peace" and that the neutralization zone could not be confined to the five member States alone. It is interesting to note that Thailand and North Vietnam have entered into a discussion with a view to developing a relationship based on "sovereignty, national independence and non-interference"(32). Reports have been received that Manila has also sent a two-man team to Hanoi and Saigon to explore the possibilities of establishing diplomatic ties(33).

Undoubtedly, the establishment of diplomatic ties with the Indo-Chinese countries is only a matter of time for the ASEAN countries, although the speed and the manner in which this should be done remain unsettled. At the eighth ministerial meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in May this year these issues were again raised. It was reported that while senior ASEAN officials reached agreement on a draft treaty of friendship and co-operation as a prerequisite for a neutralization pact for South-east Asia, no unanimity of views was reached because of "outstanding problems". Apparently, the ASEAN member-States continued to look at regional problems mainly from the perspective of national interests. Some member-States felt that their security could be jeopardized if Thailand were to disengage itself from the American alliance and seek accommodation with the new regimes in Indo-China. Indonesia was reported to have argued that the vacuum created by an American withdrawal from the area would not have important consequences as long as countries such as the Soviet Union remained outside the region. On the other hand, the Thai delegate was anxious to propose a programme for the reconstruction of war-damaged Indo-China and urged for the expansion of ASEAN to include these States(34).

Whether ASEAN solidarity will be enhanced as a result of recent events in the region is still left to be seen. Indeed, the shifting of the focus of the regional organization to political issues may retard prospects for further economic co-operation. Many of the proposals suggested by the UN team, such as trade liberalization and a system of complementarity agreements, have as yet to be implemented, and much of the present co-operation remains piecemeal. Any further expansion of the ASEAN membership (especially if the Indo-Chinese States are included) may further delay the prospects for economic co-operation, more so as these States will have different economic systems from the existing member-States. Thus, the ASEAN nations are at a critical juncture in which they have to decided whether to place political objectives above the more practical aspects of economic co-operation; also, they have to decide to what extent a broad framework of regional objectives can be formulated, which will still be consonant with respective national interests.

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IT can be seen that ASEAN has been reacting and adapting to events in the region. This is because ASEAN has not developed the means for becoming an active parameter in international politics. This posture also indicates that, individually, the ASEAN member-States have not developed the degree of coherence and effectiveness necessary to enable them to play a more meaningful role in the region. Most of the member-States continue to suffer from problems of economic development, insurgency, state-building and nation-building, despite the abundant resources found in their territories. The collapse of the non-Communist forces certainly injected a new mood of urgency and removed whatever vestiges of complacency; it also highlighted the inadvisability of relying chiefly on military means for providing immunization against insurgency. Non-military factors such as strong leadership, rapid economic growth and social justice play as important a role in combating the incidence of insurgency.

ASEAN member-States have not developed a collective stand on issues, as perceptions of national interest among them do not always coincide. However, ASEAN has a meaningful role to play insofar as it is still a useful framework whereby mutual consultations on issues of common interest are carried out. The inability to arrive at a common strategy on some of the fundamental aspects of political and economic co-operation is thus not merely an indication of the weakness of this regional organization; but rather, this aspect merely serves to underline the complex range of problems which confront the member-States and also the keen involvement of major Powers in the South-east Asian region.

It is likely that the recent developments in Indo-China will impose additional strains on the regional organization since different perceptions of national interest will have a bearing on the effectiveness of the organization. The proposed summit will not remove many of these differences. However, the absence of a consensus on major political issues affecting the regional organization may not necessarily be a disability as it merely gives the member-States sufficient flexibility in securing their own foreign policy objectives in accordance with perceptions of their respective national interest. There is this need for member-States to find their own equilibrium in the changing power balance in South-east Asia before adjusting their policies to suit the collective interest of the regional organization.

Notes and References

1. The range of raw materials and mineral resources found in South-east Asia has been mentioned in many general books on the region. This economic potential has been enhanced by new discoveries of off-shore oil reserves and off-shore mineral deposits.

2. See *Official Text* issued by the U.S.I.S. (Singapore), dated 18 April 1975.

3. Reported in *The Guardian*, 8 March 1975.

4. *Official Text* by U.S.I.S. (Singapore) dated 16 April 1975.

5. The remark was reportedly made by the press secretary to the US President in April 1975.

6. Refer to headline "Ford looks to a post-Vietnam America" in *Official Text* dated 24 April 1975. Also note the remark of the President, "America can regain the sense of pride that existed before Vietnam, but it cannot be achieved by refighting a war that is finished — as far as America is concerned" in *ibid.*.

7. The capture of this container ship by a Cambodian gunboat resulted in the despatch of American marines and air support to recapture the ship and the release of its American crew. Many commentators have hailed this move as a demonstration of United States' firmness and willingness to resort to military power to achieve its objectives. Subsequent consultations between the American President and other world leaders did not remove the element of uncertainty over America's ability to honour its commitments.

8. *Straits Times*, 10 May 1975.

9. *Bangkok Post*, 2 July 1975.

10. Kissinger, when interviewed, said that China would prefer the United States to stay in Asia and this belief is based "on fairly hard evidence, — that is, on what Chinese leaders have told Asian leaders and some of our leaders". See *Official Text*, 17 June 1975.

11. This remark was made by the Singapore premier at a speech to the Asia Society in New York. See *Straits Times*, 15 May 1975.

12. *Straits Times*, 11 August 1975. This paper quoted from the New York Times and U.P.I. that China had what is now regarded as the world's third largest navy. Apart from 230,000 enlisted officers and men, the Chinese are reported to have more than 1,000 vessels in their fleet, some 60 submarines and 600 aircraft in their land-based naval arm. The Chinese navy is backed by a naval militia of about 5,000 vessels and a reserve of possibly a million men.

13. Vietnam has a combined population of 43 million, making it the second most populous country in South-east Asia. The weapons captured from the Americans have been variously valued at between US$2-5 billion, and this armoury (together with that of Hanoi) would put the two Vietnams as the third largest military power in Asia. See also article by Edward Cochran in *The Guardian*, 1 May 1975.

14. *Straits Times*, 27 May 1975. It is interesting to observe that insurgent clashes with security forces have also been stepped up in Thailand and Malaysia, including the assassination of Special Branch Officers in the latter country.

15. A senior minister from a South-east Asian country on a visit to China said that Premier Chou reiterated that the Communist revolution would eventually triumph in all of Asia and that the PRC had a moral obligation to support insurgent movements. From interview.

16. See also Dick Wilson, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia", *Problems of Communism* (September-October 1974) pp. 39-51.

17. *Straits Times*, 2 July 1975.

18. Apart from the memories of the Second World War, other powers, including China, would be unhappy to see a militarized Japan which could pose a threat to their security.

19. For an account of the size of American military power in Asia, see article by Steven Wilson as reprinted in *Straits Times*, 29 May 1975.

20. Many articles have been written on this aspect. See for example, Lee Soo Ann, *ed.*, *New Directions in the International Relations of Southeast Asia: Economic Relations* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973) and K.S. Sandhu and E. Tang, *eds.*, *Japan as an economic power and its implications for Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974).

21. *Straits Times*, 7 July 1975.

22. *Straits Times* [*Malaysia*], 16 January 1971. Also see Wilson, *op. cit.*.

23. Indonesia had ties with the PRC but these were broken off following the attempted overthrow of the Government by the PKI in 1965. The military authorities in Indonesia are particularly sensitive to any direct or indirect moves to revive the PKI.

24. See Wilson, *op. cit.* pp. 44-48.

25. Singapore is the only country in ASEAN where the Chinese form the majority community. Its leaders have been anxious to tone down the Chinese image as this could arouse anti-Chinese sentiments in the surrounding countries.

26. *Straits Times*, 27 May 1975.

27. *Ibid.*, 29 July 1975.

28. Premier Kukrit Pramoj, when interviewed, resorted to a sexual analogy to make his point that American combat presence would be more of an embarrassment than a safeguard when he said, "It's like being caught in a bedroom with a gentleman who can no longer operate...You find yourself compromised for nothing". See *New York Times* article by Joseph Lelyveld, reproduced in *Straits Times*, 1 July 1975.

29. There was considerable ill-feeling between the Thais and their Indo-Chinese neighbours. For example, many of the defeated Indo-Chinese leaders sought refuge in Thailand and there was and continues to be a controversy between Vietnam and Thailand over the ownership of aeroplanes which were brought out by fleeing Vietnamese. There were also differences of views between Thailand and Laos when the latter "requested" that Thailand withdrew its consular staff from three Laotian provincial towns "for security reasons". There are large minorities in Thailand, whose numbers have been swollen by recent waves of refugees. Thailand, for example, has more Laos living in its North-east provinces than there are in Laos.

30. Reported in *New Nation*, 11 August 1975. The military aid was apparently agreed upon at talks between Presidents Ford and Suharto held at Camp David at the beginning of August.

31. *Straits Times*, 14 June 1975.

32. *Ibid.*, 8 June 1975.

33. *Ibid.*, 21 July 1975.

34. *Ibid.*, 13 May 1975.

AREA DEFINITION: *The author poses the important question, What is South-east Asia?, and provides the necessary historical background to answer the question, and to assess the validity of the term.*

The Concept of Southeast Asia: Origins, Development, and Evaluation

*Russell H. Fifield

JUST what is the concept of Southeast Asia? How did it emerge? In what directions did it develop? Is it contrived or valid? The term Southeast Asia has become a standard expression in literature and diplomacy throughout much of the world only since the Second World War. Yet the regional or collective concept of Southeast Asia is still somewhat amorphous though it is in the process of crystallization. The late Lennox A. Mills in the first chapter of *The New World of Southeast Asia* published in 1949 called attention to the words of Claudius Caesar after he had been addressing the Roman Senate for three long and dreary hours: "And now, O Claudius Caesar, it is time you told the senators what on earth you have been talking about."(1) The Southeast Asia of Professor Mills still merits "talking about".

In this article the author will briefly trace the origins of the **term** and then concentrate on explaining the complex evolution of the **regional** or **collective concept** of Southeast Asia. The latter effort involves the identification and analysis of major developments contributing to the concept. In his conclusion he will assert that the validity of the concept of Southeast Asia rests in large part on past and present political perceptions of the area as a region. At the same time he will not downgrade the support for the concept that has come from those individuals of the academic community who have stressed in their disciplines the common rather than the diverse aspects of Southeast Asia. The value of the regional concept will be assessed from the perspective of the foregoing evidence.

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THE term Southeast Asia or a variation of it was used in scholarly literature, particularly geography and anthropology, for some time before the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. The usage of the term arose from convenience — the need to name a geographical entity on the map or what could be argued as constituting a geographical entity. Southeast Asia at the time did not denote the regional or collective concept increasingly associated with after the Second World War. In 1951 Victor Purcell pointedly criticized the term Southeast Asia as "cumbersome, inaccurate, and indefinite in its scope"(2) and offered for consideration in its place **Indosinesia.**

In classical and postclassical Southeast Asia prior to early European involvement, if the historical periodization of Harry J. Benda is followed(3), the elite in the area or neighbouring world perceived the territory in terms of a general sense of direction or location and in the light of various concepts of space and statecraft. There were many precolonial contacts — travel and communications, even the gathering of political intelligence — but no regionalism existed(4).

Although the Southeast Asians themselves had no common name for the region the early Indian navigators and merchants, followed in numbers by Chinese and later Japanese mariners and traders coined their own terminology. Notable among the Indian terms was the loose term **Suvarnadvipa**

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"land of gold"(5). The Chinese and the Japanese (the latter borrowing from the former) used respectively the expressions **Nanyang** and **Nanyo,** both translated as "southern seas", to indicate rather vaguely or nebulously their sense of direction or location. It should be stressed that these expressions reflected the roles of the sea-minded people who used them and focused on seas with their adjacent lands rather than on lands with their adjacent seas. **(Tung-nan Ya,** a direct Chinese translation of Southeast Asia, is more accurate).(6)

February 1839 was the noteworthy date Reverend Howard Malcom of Boston gave the preface of his *Travels in South-Eastern Asia,* the full title of which revealed his geographical scope(7). Amazingly he has a map of "South Eastern Asia" that in terms of the currently accepted definition of the region resembles the extent of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten's original Southeast Asia Command of 1943 (as far as Southeast Asia is concerned), the biggest exception being Indo-China. Malcom's "Farther India" was defined as "India beyond the Ganges", embracing "Burmah, Asam, Munnipore, Siam, Camboja, and Cochin-China; or, to speak more comprehensively, all the region between China and the Bay of Bengal, southward of the Thibet Mountains."(8)

It is not possible to identify beyond any question the first person who used the expression Southeast Asia or a variation of it. It might just have been an American, Reverend Howard Malcom! But there can be no doubt that the Europeans used the term much more extensively before it was widely employed in the United States.

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IN THE course of the Second World War (1939-1945) Southeast Asia became a fixed and practical term even in the United States. Moreover, the region was more and more perceived in collective dimensions having military, political, and other aspects. At the same time this perception should not be exaggerated, for subsequent developments would markedly sharpen it.

The Institute of Pacific Relations founded in Honolulu in 1925 played a significant role in the evolution of the concept of Southeast Asia before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, not to mention the establishment of Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command in August 1943(9). Prior to the American entrance in the Second World War, the Institute undertook a number of studies on the social, economic, and political problems of Southeast Asia. In 1940 William L. Holland arranged the series of research reports, and in 1941 and 1942 all of them used "Southeast Asia" in their titles.

Possibly the book which did most to popularize the use of Southeast Asia, along with making a major contribution to the concept, was K. M. Panikkar's *The Future of South-East Asia: An Indian View,* published in New York in 1943. This Indian writer on sea power, who later became a diplomat, may have chosen the term Southeast Asia instead of Further India in order to take into account the rising nationalism in the area and thus avoid the embarrassment to his country that the term Further India might bring. As it was, the subsequent leadership role of Prime Minister Nehru and the attitudes of some of his followers were often resented by leaders in Southeast Asia and contributed to the development of the concept there(10).

The creation of the Southeast Asia Command (S.E.A.C.) by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill at the First Quebec Conference in August 1943 was a major step in the military and political identification of the region(11). It was the British who urged the creation of a "Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia". The presumed discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill and certainly between American and British military leaders did not focus on the question of the creation of such a command but on its geographical extent, on command arrangements and relationships, and on associated matters. The British originally wanted French Indo-China in the Command, and Roosevelt at a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff specifically asked if Thailand was included in the China theatre. The appointment of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander was not debated but the role of General Joseph W. Stilwell, Chief of Staff of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, was controversial.

In the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Roosevelt and Churchill on 24 August, approved by the two leaders except for an item on Spain, the "Southeast Asia Command" was established embracing Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, and Sumatra. French Indo-China remained in the China theatre of Chiang Kai-shek and the rest of Southeast Asia was under the Southwest Pacific Area of General Douglas MacArthur. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would have "general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia theatre"(12) but command arrangements and relationships were outlined. It was pointed out in words originally chosen by the British that "the vigorous and effective prosecution of large-scale operations against Japan in Southeast Asia, and the rapid development of the air route through Burma to China, necessitate the reorganization of the High Command in the Indian theatre"(13). Here is found a reflection of British interests especially in Southeast Asia and of American in China.

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten years later

commented on the use of the term "South-East Asia" in the "South East Asia Command"(14). When he was Chief of Combined Operations and a member of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee he and his colleagues were faced with the problem of what to term the area being overrun by the Japanese with the collapse of the ABDACOM (American, British, Dutch, Australian Command). In the discussions the territory came to be geographically referred to as "South-East Asia". Later, Admiral Mountbatten pointed out, the selection of the title South East Asia Command was natural(15).

At the Potsdam Conference of President Harry S. Truman, Marshal Josef Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill (later replaced by Prime Minister Clement Attlee), 17 July-2 August 1945(16), the changing of the boundaries of the Southeast Command was considered by the British and Americans. The United States Chiefs of Staff on 17 July recommended altering Mountbatten's S.E.A.C. to include Borneo, the Celebes, and Java (with the territory to the East an Australian Command under the British Chiefs of Staff) and to include Indo-China South of the fifteenth parallel. At a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the next day General George C. Marshall asked the British Chiefs about their reaction to dividing Indo-China. After studying the proposal they indicated on 22 July that the division between S.E.A.C. and the China theatre should be at the sixteenth parallel in view of the "run of communications in Indo-China"(17). Two days later, at a meeting of the Combined Chiefs, Marshall urged Mountbatten to take over "at the earliest possible moment" his expanded area of command(18).

President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill approved a report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 24 July formally defining the new area of the Southeast Asia Command. They noted the division of Indo-China; Washington and London in the arrangement would approach Chiang Kai-shek for his approval; and Mountbatten would take over the expanded territory of his command "as soon as practicable" after 15 August. The Generalissimo subsequently agreed providing the sixteenth parallel was extended across Thailand, a step that was never taken.

It is significant that the new boundaries of S.E.A.C. included all Southeast Asia except the Philippines, northern Indo-China, and the island of Timor. They had military implications for the war and political for the peace. Thus the concept of Southeast Asia was further advanced.

The celebrated Pentagon Papers appearing in 1971 throw more light on the development of the concept during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath in 1945 and 1946(19). Especially from 1941 many officials in Washington perceived Southeast Asia as being more than a collection of colonial territories, dependencies overrun after Pea Harbour by the Japanese. This perception was mor marked toward the end of US involvement in the wa than toward the beginning. At the same tim American officials had no standard terminology the could use to express their perception.

American blueprints during the Second Worl War for Southeast Asia after the defeat of Japa focused on the individual countries but did nc exclude broader considerations. President Roosevel himself was particularly concerned about the future c Indo-China — he opposed its restoration to Franc and favoured a trusteeship. On occasion he used th term Southeast Asia but his perception of it as regional entity appears nebulous.

The State Department as well as the War an Navy Departments was involved in 1944 in civil affai planning in Southeast Asia, planning which concern ed political and policy questions(20). In anothe direction Secretary of State Cordell Hull forwarded t President Roosevelt on 8 September a far-reachin memorandum on the future of dependencies in th area. It called upon the colonial powers to announc "specific dates when independence or complet (dominion) self-government will be accorded" and t make "a pledge to establish a regional commi sion"(21). The reference to "a regional commissio should not pass unnoticed, for it was a farsighte recommendation. According to Hull, Roosevel "warmly approved" the suggestions. Prime Ministe Churchill did not!

Shortly after the President's death in 1945 lively row erupted within the Department of Stat over American policy toward Indo-China. A battle o memoranda between 20 April and 9 May between th Division of European Affairs and the Division of Fa Eastern Affairs revealed that the latter had a rea concept of the emerging dimensions of Southeast Asi while the former thought of the area in terms o European dependencies(22). In the end the effort t send a memorandum on US policy toward Indo-Chin to President Truman embracing observations an recommendations as well as a cable to the America embassy in Paris failed. The drafts of the memorand battle make fascinating reading today! The Depart ment of State, however, did issue a policy paper on 2 June estimating conditions in Asia and the Pacifi (excluding Burma and the Philippines in Southeas Asia) when the war ended and citing policies th United States planned to pursue(23).

On 26 May a shift in the State Departmen changed the name of the Division of Southwest Pacifi Affairs to Division of Southeast Asian Affairs. I reflected a more accurate designation and greate concern over Southeast Asian matters. (The Philip pines was a separate division.) As far as jurisdiction i the Department was concerned, there was no change

Until the spring of 1944 the Office of Far Eastern Affairs had no jurisdiction over European dependencies in Southeast Asia since the area was handled by the Office of European Affairs. When the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs was set up in Far Eastern Affairs in 1944 it had primary jurisdiction for only Thailand and concurrent jurisdiction for the European dependencies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific with European Affairs. This arrangement was highly significant in the formulation of policy in the Department of State. The spelling of "Southeast" in the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs in May 1945, it might be noted, was not an accident. "Southeast Asia" was chosen in place of "South-East Asia" in order not to copy the British(24).

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THE role of the British in the development of the concept of Southeast Asia should not be minimized. The existence of Admiral Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command, 1943-1945, with post surrender tasks extending into 1946, caused London to consider more carefully than otherwise the problems of territories in the area outside Burma, Malaya, and British Borneo. Mountbatten found that waging war against the Japanese involved one set of considerations but administering occupied areas brought economic and political problems to the forefront.

On 16 March 1946, Lord Killearn arrived in Singapore as British Special Commissioner in South-East Asia and on May 21 Malcolm MacDonald came as Governor-General of Malaya and British Borneo. A British Defence Committee in South-East Asia was established consisting of the Supreme Commander, Governor-General, and Special Commissioner. This early postwar organization reflected a British concern for the region. MacDonald later indicated that the concept of Southeast Asia grew rapidly after the Second World War(25).

Lord Killearn as Special Commissioner played a key role in the economic field(26). An Economic Organization was created with an Economic Department; Liaison Meetings were held each month at first consisting of representatives from British dependencies and then of additional ones from outside areas. Special regional conferences were convened on topics like nutrition, fisheries, social welfare, and statistics. The organization of rice distribution through a Liaison Conference was one of Lord Killearn's most important tasks. In fact, valuable experience was gained in economic co-operation along regional lines and precedents were set for the future.

On 1 May 1948, MacDonald took over the functions of Governor-General and Special Commissioner with the title of Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia. From his headquarters in Phoenix Park, Singapore, he reported to the Foreign Office relative to independent countries and to the Colonial Office on British dependencies. Many of his responsibilities related to advice on the co-ordination of British regional policy in Southeast Asia. He also had co-ordinating and advisory functions for the policy of the United Kingdom from Japan to Afghanistan, including Australia and New Zealand. It seems certain that British military and civilian representatives during and after the Second World War made a major contribution toward the regional concept of Southeast Asia.

Would the concept have emerged without the Second World War and its early aftermath? It has become conventional wisdom for scholars to pinpoint Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command. Certainly the emerging perception of Southeast Asia as a region in military and political terms in connection with the Second World War should not be underestimated. Indeed, the Japanese conquest of the entire area contributed to the regional concept, for it destroyed the colonial partition of Southeast Asia among the Western powers and necessitated under the circumstances an allied approach toward the expulsion of the Japanese and to a lesser degree toward early postwar problems. Yet it is quite likely that the regional concept of Southeast Asia would have emerged, though much more slowly, without the benefit of the highly stressed Southeast Asia Command.

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ALSO to have a bearing on the development of the concept were the two wars in Indo-China. The first one began in December 1946 and ended in July 1954 while the second can be dated from 1965 and extended until 1975. In the case of the First Indo-Chinese War the domino premise was articulated and in that of the Second Indo-Chinese War Southeast Asia became a household expression in the United States. These observations are related directly or indirectly to the concept of Southeast Asia.

As the First Indo-Chinese War mounted in intensity and the United States became increasingly concerned and involved, the domino premise rose more and more to the forefront. Its origins probably go back to the fall of mainland China to Mao Tse-tung, but the National Security Council documentation of the Pentagon Papers establishes presidential approval of the domino principle of multiple repercussions in April 1950 before the outbreak of the conflict in Korea the following June. Throughout the rest of the First Indo-Chinese War both Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower nourished the plant until it was well on the way to becoming a eucalyptus.

Exactly what the two chief executives of the

United States approved merits attention. In April 1950 President Truman accepted the following conclusions of the National Security Council:

> "Indo-China is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat.
>
> The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indo-China were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard."(27)

In January 1954 President Eisenhower accepted a National Security Council policy statement which said:

> "Such is the interrelation of the countries of the area (Southeast Asia) that effective counteraction would be immediately necessary to prevent the loss of any single country from leading to submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of Southeast Asia and Indonesia."(28)

Although attention in the cited quotations focuses on Southeast Asia the estimated repercussions extended far beyond the area. Europe, the Middle East, India, Australia, and Japan were mentioned in the National Security Council statements or related documents.

The decisions of the National Security Council approved by the Presidents were highly classified, but Eisenhower in his famous news conference on 7 April 1954, was very explicit about the "'falling domino' principle" in Southeast Asia. "You have a row of dominoes set up," he said, "you knock over the first one (Indo-China), and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly"(29). On 12 May, a few days after the fall of the French fortress of Dien Bien Phu to the Viet Minh, Eisenhower in another news conference modified his previous statement. He spoke of building "that row of dominoes so they can stand the fall of one, if necessary"(30). He also referred to "the cork and the bottle". It is interesting to note that the modification of 12 May and the reference to "the cork and the bottle" never caught the public eye. The "'falling domino' principle" retained the automatic image of 7 April. The British did not accept the domino premise but the French went along with it toward the end of the First Indo-Chinese War.

The dramatic sequence of events — the Geneva Conference on Indo-China opening in early May, the Geneva Accords of late July, and the conclusion of the Manila Pact or South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty with its Protocol in early September — strengthened the concept of Southeast Asia i Washington. From the fall of 1954 to 1965 th concept (including its domino dimension) was furthe supported. President John F. Kennedy during his fe years in office accepted the domino theory that i South Vietnam fell the rest of Southeast Asia woul follow. For instance, shortly before his assassinatio he replied to a question on whether he had any doub by David Brinkley on 9 September 1963. "No, Kennedy said, "I believe it. I believe it"(31). Hi successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, also accepte the domino premise. In *The Vantage Point* he note that attempts had been made to repeal it but the were not based on reality(32). (President Richar Nixon for his part noted that critics had not talked t the dominoes.)

The Gulf of Tonkin episode in early Augus 1964 accentuated American concern for Southeas Asia. President Johnson on 2 June in a statement at news conference had already stressed the theme tha the "issue is the future of Southeast Asia as whole"(33). The text of the Gulf of Tonkin o Southeast Asia Resolution, passed by Congress on August, asserted that the "United States regards a vital to its national interest and to world peace th maintenance of international peace and security i Southeast Asia"(34). The actual term was used fou times in the joint resolution!

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THE Second Indo-Chinese War brought Sout east Asia into the American home. It was th first war of the United States ever televized. The ma in the street heard over and over again in the new media the words Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Bu the war was not just a struggle on the television scree — American battle deaths came to approximatel 46,000; US servicemen numbered over 540,000 i South Vietnam at one time; and Americans who sa service in that country totalled over 2.5 million. I 1968 alone the war was costing the America taxpayer an estimated $22 billion. It was the longes conflict in US history, a bloody, drawn out struggl directing public attention year after year to Southeas Asia.

Probably a definitive study of the Secon Indo-Chinese War can only be written in the nex generation. Even then how the United States got int the war and how it got out, the complex patterns o escalation and de-escalation, will challenge th analyst. It does seem certain, however, that Southea Asia emerged in the public mind as something mor than just another area on the map. But what thi "something more" actually constituted, the man i the street would find it difficult to define.

The First and Second Indo-Chinese Wars, wit the development of Southeast Asian studies in th United States and abroad essentially coinciding wit

hem, thus strengthened the concept of Southeast Asia n Washington and in the academic community hough it remained nebulous in the public mind. Where strengthened, the emphasis was different: Washington stressed the domino theory as a key omponent of the concept while academics generally riticized the premise and stressed Southeast Asian tudies *per se*.

Just what significance should be attached in the nd to the highly publicized domino dimension of the oncept? Whether or not its premise was valid, the act that policy makers at the highest level believed in was a matter of prime importance. Their decisions nfluenced the course of history in the United States nd in Southeast Asia. A given decision can be based n faulty grounds, but if it is made by the top policy nakers, the rationale behind the decision is not a major consideration. The validity of the domino heory was challenged in most academic circles on the rounds of simplicity, of failure to take into onsideration the complex nature of Southeast Asia nd of international Communism. At the same time oth government supporters and academic critics ended to view the domino premise as a constant espite the existence of an international environment f changing variables.

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THE concept of Southeast Asia was given a marked impetus in the long run by the ecolonization of the area between 1946 and 1963. xactly what is meant by "decolonization" is difficult o determine. As in this article, it can be narrowly nterpreted as the actual termination of dependency ike the formal independence of Burma or the joining f Sarawak with Malaya in Malaysia. It can also be roadly interpreted as a process having political, conomic, psychological, and other dimensions.

The colonial powers viewed Southeast Asia ssentially in terms of their own possessions. For nstance, the United States thought of the Philippines s the geographic area of primary concern. Southeast sia, apart from independent Siam or Thailand, ctually consisted of separate compartments directly elated politically, economically, and psychologically o the metropolitan power. Telegrams from one ountry to another were known to be sent via Europe. olicy for Southeast Asia was made in London, Paris, he Hague, and Washington while even Bangkok was reatly influenced by the Western Powers. It follows hat the peoples of the Southeast Asian countries had o ties to the region and no concept of it.

The achievement of sovereignty spanned less han twenty years. Washington carried out its prewar ledge to the Philippines, and in July 1946 the ommonwealth became the Republic. London after ome hesitation and under the impetus of the Labour Government of Prime Minister Attlee gave independence to the Union of Burma in January 1948. The Hague following considerable pressure toward the end from the United States and the United Nations transferred sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia in December 1949. (Indonesian nationalists had proclaimed the independence of the country on 17 August 1945.) Through the Geneva settlement of July 1954 the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Kingdom of Laos, the State of Vietnam, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam achieved much greater international recognition. (Ho Chi Minh had proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 2 September 1945). London gladly transferred sovereignty to the Federation of Malaya in August 1957. It became Malaysia in September 1963 with the addition of Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah (formerly North Borneo). In August 1965 Singapore was separated ("kicked out" in the words of its Prime Minister), and became independent as the Republic of Singapore. The only dependencies left in Southeast Asia were the British protected sultanate of Brunei in Borneo and Portuguese Timor. Thus nine independent countries, if one accepts the concept of two Vietnams, had joined Thailand in the new Southeast Asia.

Decolonization was a prerequisite for the development of genuine indigenous regionalism in the area. Herein lies the significance of decolonization in the evolution of the concept. Colonial tutelage obviously did not provide a favourable environment where it could take hold. It should be stressed, however, that the momentum in regional co-operation came only some years after decolonization when domestic and foreign developments proved more auspicious. This observation *per se* does not weaken in any way the importance of the actual prerequisite of decolonization in the development of the regional concept.

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THE most significant input in the concept of the region was acceptance and development by the Southeast Asians themselves. Just as nationalism and Marxism came to the area by way of the West(35) so did the concept of Southeast Asia. Its acceptance was by certain elites in influential circles; the concept in 1975 certainly does not have deep roots among the people in the countryside or the city. Nevertheless, how indigenous leaders in various responsible activities perceived the past, present, and future of Southeast Asia became increasingly important. This is not to state that these individuals would automatically claim they were Southeast Asians — they would assert they were Filipinos or Thai, or of other nationality — but some at least would show a tendency to later identify themselves as Southeast Asian(36).

An empirical approach to Southeast Asia as a current indigenous concept in official circles is merited. An examination of the table of organization in the ministries of foreign affairs for the ten countries, a check for each of the diplomatic missions to and from the States of Southeast Asia, an analysis of regional organizations and the participation of Southeast Asian States in them, a consideration of the key speeches and votes of the eight members from Southeast Asia in the United Nations, and interviews with all nine ambassadors from the countries in Washington provide empirical data upon which the following succinct conclusions can be based:

1. The table of organization in a foreign office is important, for its geographical branches often reflect degrees of emphasis in international relations(37). Between 1946 and 1965 nine new foreign offices were fully set up in Southeast Asia. Without any attempt to outline the chain of command or to go into detail the definite conclusion emerges that most of the ten foreign offices give specific attention to Southeast Asia.

2. The diplomatic representation of a country often reflects primary interests. Almost all the States of the region established and received diplomatic missions only since 1946. Where were the priorities placed? The over-all pattern of diplomatic representation indicates a clear-cut concern in the foreign offices of the area about the affairs of Southeast Asia.

3. The role of Southeast Asian nations in regional organizations is an important index of ties(38). The spectrum varies from major participation to none as in the case of North Vietnam. The record in general indicates a genuine interest in the capitals of Southeast Asia in regional organizations. It also reveals that economic, technical, and cultural efforts are more productive under current conditions than those in the security field. At the same time it is a fact that regional cooperation achieved a dynamism in the late 1960s and early 1970s that possibly indicates much broader dimensions in the years ahead. For instance, the potential of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), consisting of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, is considerable.

4. The key speeches and votes of the delegates of the United Nations members from Southeast Asia provide a broad index to regional attitudes. All the countries there belong to the world organization but North and South Vietnam. In the general debate at the beginning of a regular session of the General Assembly each member of the United Nations has a chance to present its views on international affairs. Regional co-operation in Southeast Asia is not forgotten in the comments as well as votes although it does not dominate them. It cannot be said that a Southeast Asian bloc exists in the United Nations.

5. In interviews with the nine ambassadors in Washington from the countries of the region (39) the author discerned a pattern of response on the concept of Southeast Asia. First, there was no doubt of the existence of Southeast Asia as distinct from other areas of the world. Second, there was stress on regional co-operation although it varied from the envoys of ASEAN members (and among them) to those from the three Indo-Chinese countries (and among them) and Burma. Finally there was a realization of the impediments to effective regionalism in Southeast Asia. But the spirit of regionalism was present, and the concept was now indigenous.

Outside official circles in Southeast Asia th indigenous aspect of the concept has also receive attention. A number of professors and scholars i different universities and institutes of the region a active in advancing the concept(40). ASEAN itself h called for the promotion of "South-East Asia studies". In the field of cultural exchange progress occurring, and sports at the international level a significant(41).

No definitive conclusions, however, can b drawn about the scholarship of Southeast Asians o Southeast Asia or in other words the indigenou component of research and publication on the area Historian D. G. E. Hall in 1961 noted that "it ha regretfully to be stated that at present far too fe South East Asian scholars of academic distinction a at work in the field, notwithstanding the efforts tha the new states are making to rewrite their ow histories."(42) Fourteen years later, 1975, the pictur was complex. Foreign scholars still tend to dominat the research on regionalism while they are very activ in various disciplines. At the same time the researc of Southeast Asians should not be minimized. Some i excellent, some is poor whether age groups o disciplines are considered. Finally it is hard to defin indigenous scholarship, given the education of scho lars at home and abroad.

Southeast Asia as an indigenous concept is strengthened by the growing perception of the area in the 1970s as being greatly influenced by two major developments at the international level. Regionalism is one and multipolarity(43) the other. Indeed, some Southeast Asian diplomats consider them two sides of the same coin. As is clear, Southeast Asian regionalism is now based on local elites' concept of their own region while multipolarity — the United States, the People's Republic of China, Japan, and the Soviet Union, each being active but balancing one another in the area — reflects the perception of the four major outside Powers that Southeast Asia is more than just a collection of countries. The "value"(44) of the region to them has changed with time and circumstance but the multipolarity now existing reveals that none of them is paramount in the area and none has left it to the others. Multipolarity coupled with regionalism may contribute to making the area less of an international storm centre.

What is the significance of Southeast Asia as a current indigenous concept? The answer is not difficult to find. Unless the concept had taken roots among influential Southeast Asians after decolonization its foundations would have been more subject to question and its momentum possibly brought to a halt. Now the concept is buttressed by the relatively new development of a Western concept becoming an indigenous Southeast Asian one. How indigenous leaders in different walks of life perceive the region should not be underestimated — their common definition of its geographical scope, their identification of similar problems, and the importance they assign to various interactions among the elites of the area. Not without feeling do the ASEAN powers call for "a strong and resilient Southeast Asia". The momentum now existing in the regional concept is found to a large extent in the viewpoints of the current and emerging elites about the future of their part of the world.

The intellectual criteria for defining or identifying a region are debatable(45). Cross-regional comparisons add to the complexity. Moreover, scholars in different academic disciplines, sometimes varying in focus and methodology over the years, approach Southeast Asia from the viewpoints of their respective intellectual backgrounds. For instance, historians and geographers are more likely to accept the validity of Southeast Asian history and geography than economists and sociologists are to champion Southeast Asian economics and sociology(46). The passage of time, furthermore, has not resolved in academic circles the controversy about the existence of the region. Peter Lyon of the University of London flatly asserted as late as 1969: "For present purposes... South-east Asia is a category of convenience, which has achieved a certain modest utility and recognition"(47). In marked contrast, as far back as April 1944, Jan O. M. Broek, a Dutch geographer in the United States, published a discerning article on "Diversity and Unity in Southeast Asia" where he foresaw the area as a "regional unit" of states after decolonization(48). The quotations "category of convenience" and "regional unit" characterize the spectrum of the controversy.

Although the often stated arguments in academic circles in support of the concept of Southeast Asia should not be down-graded the author of this article has added and explained a new dimension. He is convinced that the validity of the concept of Southeast Asia rests in large part on past and present political perceptions of the area as a region, perceptions well evidenced in major international developments. In this frame of reference three wars have been a catalyst in the evolution of the concept — the Second World War, the First Indo-Chinese War, and the Second Indo-Chinese War. Decolonization in Southeast Asia was a major development, for it was necessary before the concept could become indigenous. Furthermore, regionalism and multipolarity in the area in the 1970s, each in its own way, are helping to fortify the concept. It thus appears here to stay although new dimensions are possible.

The value of the regional concept of Southeast Asia arises from both intellectual and political considerations. Without such a concept the intellectual foundations for Southeast Asia as a region for study would vanish. Although critics would approve the demise of programmes related to the area it is likely that knowledge about Southeast Asia would suffer. At the political level the regional concept is providing an international framework where governments in the area can try to cope together with problems that cut across national boundaries. The spirit of regionalism — the perception of Southeast Asia in collective terms — should not be underestimated.

Claudius Caesar — to go back to Professor Mills and his quotation from the classics — might possibly now be able to speak more precisely.

Notes and References

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2. Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. xv. For a perceptive article published twenty years later see Charles A. Fisher, "A View of Southeast Asia", *Southeast Asia: An International Quarterly*, I: 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1971), pp. 5-40.

3. Harry J. Benda, "The Structure of Southeast Asian History: Some Preliminary Observations", *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, III:1 (March, 1962), pp. 106-138.

4. The author has benefited from interviews on the subject with O. W. Wolters and John K. Whitmore.

5. Paul Wheatley, *The Golden Khersonese: Studies in the Historical Geography of the Malay Peninsula before A.D. 1500* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1961), p. 285.

6. Correspondence with Albert Feuerwerker, John W. Hall, and Wang Gungwu.

7. *Travels in South-Eastern Asia embracing Hindustan, Malaya, Siam, and China; with notices of Numerous Missionary Stations and a full account of the Burman Empire*, 2 vols. in 1 book (London: George Routledge and Company, 1848).

8. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 152.

9. Correspondence with William L. Holland.

10. Correspondence with Kenneth P. Landon and interview with Evelyn S. Colbert.

11. For documentation see *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970).

12. *Ibid.*, p. 1130.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 1128.

14. Correspondence with Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.

15. It is interesting to note that General R. A. Wheeler who succeeded Stilwell as the senior American in S.E.A.C. knew of no particular reason for calling the Command, the Southeast Asia Command. He believed it was associated with opposition to the Japanese in Southeast Asia. General A. C. Wedemeyer who followed Stilwell in China later called attention to the role of General MacArthur in island-hopping operations from the area of Southeast Asia aimed eventually at the Japanese homeland, operations that stood in contrast to those of Admiral Chester Nimitz across the Pacific. Correspondence with General R. A. Wheeler and General A. C. Wedemeyer.

16. For documentation see *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin [The Potsdam Conference], 1945*, 2 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960).

17. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 1319.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 377. The step was taken on 15 August.

19. The Pentagon Papers of 1971 collectively refer to Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations*, 1945-1967, 12 books (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), T Senator Gravel Edition, *The Pentagon Papers: The Defen Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vie nam*, 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), and *The Pentag Papers* (New York: Bantam, 1971) or *The New York Time* 13-15 June, 1-5 July, 1971. For the Second World War an the immediate aftermath through 1964 the Department Defense edition is the best.

20. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944*, Vol. V, T *Near East, South Asia, and Africa; The Far East* (Washingto Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 1186-1198, 1261-126

21. Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. II (New Yo The Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 1600.

22. For documentation see *United States-Vietnam Relations, 194 1967*, Book 8, pp. 5-25.

23. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, Vol. VI, T *British Commonwealth; The Far East* (Washington: Gover ment Printing Office, 1969), pp. 556-580.

24. Interview with Lauriston Sharp. Correspondence with John Cady. The spelling of Southeast Asia is still a matter of choi The British generally but not always write South-East Asia South East Asia and the Americans Southeast Asia. Other riations have been used.

25. Correspondence with Malcolm MacDonald in his later ca city as Commissioner-General. The author has also had co respondence with his successors, Sir Robert Scott and Lo Selkirk.

26. Lord Killearn, died in 1964. The author is indebted to his so Lord Killearn, for correspondence.

27. See *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Book p. 285 and p. 341.

28. *Ibid.*, Book 9, p. 221.

29. *Ibid.*, Book 7, V, A, I, p. BII.

30. *Ibid.*, p. B18.

31. *Ibid.*, p. C42.

32. Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives the Presidency, 1963-1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart a Winston, 1971), p. 151. For his over-all chapter on regio lism, see *ibid.*, pp. 347-364.

33. *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Book 7, V, A, p. D11.

34. Public Law 88-408, 78 Stat. 384, approved 10 August, 19 The Southeast Asia Resolution was repealed in January 19

35. Cora DuBois states that nationalism and Marxism along w social humanism were "brought from Europe by the nat upper class". See her *Social Forces in Southeast Asia* (Minn polis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 42. The th lectures delivered by Professor DuBois in April 1947 as publi ed in 1949 are filled with insights.

36. Correspondence on the subject with A. H. Johns.

37. The author in 1971-1972 secured the data on the tables of organization as well as on the diplomatic missions to and from a Southeast Asian country in the region by means of considerable correspondence with foreign ministries, with permanent offices at the United Nations, and with American embassies in Southeast Asia. For North Vietnam the data were furnished by the US Department of State in correspondence with Stephen T. Johnson.

38. Over a period of five years — early 1968, late 1971, and early 1973 — the author got from the Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, a list of regional organizations in East Asia and the Pacific with the memberships in each organization. Correspondence with Edward E. Masters, 5 November 1971, and Robert W. Moore, 5 March 1973, for the last two instances. The author also had an interview on the Nixon Doctrine and regionalism with Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 12 May 1972.

39. Ambassador Eduardo Z. Romualdez of the Philippines, Ambassador Sjarif Thajeb of Indonesia, Ambassador Ernest Steven Monteiro of Singapore, Ambassador Tan Sri Yoke Lin Ong of Malaysia, Ambassador U San Maung of Burma, Ambassador Sunthorn Hongladarom of Thailand, Ambassador Sonn Voeunsai of the Khmer Republic, Ambassador Bui Diem of Vietnam, and His Royal Highness, Prince Khammao, Ambassador of Laos: all interviewed in February 1972.

40. The author has had correspondence with Josefa M. Saniel of the University of the Philippines on Asian Studies Centres in Southeast Asia.

41. Correspondence with Josef Silverstein and interview with Roger M. Smith.

42. D. G. E. Hall, ed., *Historians of South East Asia* (London: Oxford Uniersity Press, 1961), p. 1. The author of this article has corresponded or talked with a number of people on the broad subject of indigenous scholarship — all but one of the authors in David Joel Steinberg *et al., In Search of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), namely, David K. Wyatt, Alexander Woodside, William R. Roff, David P. Chandler, and David Joel Steinberg, as well as Ruth T. McVey, James C. Scott, David R. Sturtevant, John Badgley, Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, and Wilhelm G. Solheim II.

43. For some perceptive viewpoints relative to multipolarity see Hedley Bull, "The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific", *Foreign Affairs,* XLIX:4 (July, 1971), pp. 669-681, and Alastair Buchan, *Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger Publishers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1973).

44. The subject of "value" is challenging. For a thoughtful article see Charles Wolf, Jr., "Some Aspects of the 'Value' of Southeast Asia to the United States", in William Henderson, ed., *Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy* (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1963), pp. 27-44.

45. For significant research see Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967). Also helpful is Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., *Regional Integration: Theory and Research* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). Relatively few scholars on Southeast Asia have devoted considerable time to regionalism in it. Professor Bernard K. Gordon has published and contributed more on the subject than any other Southeast Asianist. The author has had correspondence with him on it.

46. For the latter two, correspondence with economist Charles Wolf, Jr. and interview with sociologist Gayl D. Ness.

47. Peter Lyon, *War and peace in South-East Asia* (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1969), p. 3.

48. Jan O. M. Broek, "Diversity and Unity in Southeast Asia", *Geographical Review,* XXXIV:2 (April, 1944), pp. 175-195.

PHILIPPINES: *Internal migration in the Philippines follows a pattern familiar in many developin nations, with a general tendency for people to leave rura areas for the employment and educational opportunities o the big cities. Professor Castillo analyzes these migratio patterns devoting considerable attention to the condition of life and the expectations of slum dwellers, whose way o life she sees as more viable than many advocates of slur clearance would suggest.*

The Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow: Patterns of Internal Migration in the Philippines

Gelia T. Castill

ALTHOUGH the Philippines is reputed to have a rigid social structure with a few families controlling the bulk of the nation's wealth, this has not prevented the Filipino from looking for his own pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. He sends his children to school so that their future might be better than his present. He also moves from the land of his birth in search of greener pastures elsewhere. Whether or not he finds his "gold" with the help of his family and relatives, he cannot be faulted for not trying. This paper reviews migration patterns in terms of direction and magnitude and examines the experiences which accompanied these moves, particularly from the countryside to the city. Examples of movement towards frontier areas are also presented. Given the migration trends and experiences which migrants have had, certain policy issues are raised.

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PASCUAL in her analysis of internal migration from 1948 to 1960 used the differential between the national average percentage increase in population and the per cent provincial increase, as her indicator of provincial growth or decline due to in-migration or out-migration. For the period 1960-1970, Yun Kim used the census survival ratio method as a measure for net migration by taking the difference between net population change and natural population change.

Comparing the 1948-1960 to the 1960-1970 period, Table 1 shows that certain provinces hav shifted in their role as "gainers" or "losers". Of the 2 provinces listed by Pascual as high gainers in 196 five became losers in 1970. These are Lanao d Norte, Lanao del Sur, Camarines Norte, M (Mountain) Province, and Camarines Sur. On th other hand, among the 30 low gainers in 1960, all c them are net losers in 1970 except for the provinces c Bulacan, Batangas, and Nueva Ecija. Looking at th net losers by region, they are: Region I, City c Manila; Region II, Ilocos and Mt. Province; Regio VI, Bicol and Masbate; Region VII, Western Visaya Region VIII, Eastern Visayas; Region III, Batan and Cagayan; Pangasinan and Tarlac in Centra Luzon; Marinduque in Southern Luzon; two Lanao and two Misamis provinces in Northern Mindanao and Sulu in Southern Mindanao. There are 31 lose provinces and 21 gainers (Table 1).

The Ilocos Region, and Eastern and Wester Visayas have persisted as out-migration provinces, a has the Bicol area in a substantial way, except fo Masbate which has registered only a minimal ne gain. On the other hand, Bukidnon, Davao, Cotaba to, Agusan, Nueva Vizcaya and Rizal have continue to be recipients of in-migrants. Of these gainers however, the province of Rizal has registered a ne influx of 784,662 which is 43 per cent of the total ne gain by 21 provinces which amounts to 1,703,805 When one considers that Bulacan, Laguna, Cavit and Batangas (all net gainers) are very much withi the expanded orbit of the Greater Manila area — du to the North Diversion Road leading to Central an

Northern Luzon and the South Superhighway leading to Southern Luzon provinces, the most dominant migration trend in the country is towards the urbanizing or more accurately, the **suburbanizing** of areas adjacent to Metropolitan Manila. If the net in-migration gains of Bulacan, Laguna, Batangas and Cavite were added to the net gains of Rizal, the total would be about 50 per cent of all the gains made by 21 provinces.

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WHAT makes people move out from certain provinces and into others? In attempting to find explanations for migratory behaviour, all the provinces were classified (see Table 2) into four categories based on density of population and net inter-provincial migration as follows:

(I) Low density provinces which registered net in-migration in 1970.
(II) Low density provinces which registered net out-migration in 1970.
(III) High density provinces which registered net in-migration.
(IV) High density provinces which registered net out-migration.

The Group I provinces all registered increases in number of farms with slight decline in the larger farms. This plus relatively low density serve as the major pull factors. In the case however of Palawan, Isabela, and the two Zamboangas, in-migration is of a low order despite the relative availability of farms. Palawan is the most sparsely populated province in the entire country but it has failed to attract as many in-migrants. Movement into these areas represents a rural in-migration. Although data do not specify where the migrants come from, the nature of the loser provinces suggests a rural to rural move.

The Group II provinces are low density with net out-migration and closing or closed opportunities for farm land. Samar is particularly depleted not only in terms of population but in terms of farming potentials. This state of affairs is probably accompanied by minimal infrastructure facilities which make life harsher than it is in other places.

The Group III provinces are already of relatively high density and farming opportunities are poor but people are coming in great numbers particularly to Rizal, Bulacan and Laguna. Here, the attraction is closely related to the urbanization process which is rapidly engulfing the environs of the Greater Manila area. Furthermore, many of the "good things" in life are concentrated in these areas, such as roads, transportation, communication, good schools, electricity, non-farm professional and service-related jobs. In general it is the "hub of civilization". Movement into these provinces is towards an urbanizing area, except for Mindoro which registered an increase in number of farms.

The Group IV provinces have high density, low farming potential and high out-migration The out-migration regions of Ilocos, Cagayan, Bicol, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, and Northern Mindanao show lower income levels than the in-migration regions of Central and Southern Luzon and Southern Mindanao. The in-migration regions are of two kinds: Northern and Southern Mindanao, which are more agricultural in terms of employment, and Central and Southern Luzon which are the most non-agricultural among the regions except for Manila and suburbs. The move to the former two regions is definitely more towards the rural areas and the move to the two latter regions is more towards the urban areas. In order to examine the notion that people tend to move towards more developed places, where amenities and services are available, the index of total development is also included in Table 2. This index is composed of the following factors: percentage of population which is urban, population density, index of developed area, non-agricultural employment, proportion of college students, power consumption, government revenue, family income, and transportation facilities (air, land and water). As expected, low population density areas also have a low index of total development as in the case of Group I provinces, but they have net in-migration which seems to suggest that the prospect of farm land is a more potent pull factor than the low index of development is a push factor. For the Group II provinces, however, the net out-migration may be explained by a double negative factor of low index of development and little or no opportunity for farm land. The Group III provinces have high population density, a high index of development, closed farm land (except for Mindoro), but also a high influx of migrants. These areas deserve attention as they are the rapidly growing urban centres. The Group IV provinces have a medium index of total development, high density, high net out-migration, and diminishing opportunities for farm land.

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ANOTHER interesting observation is the migratory pattern by sex. Females move as much as males do with the relative magnitudes differing slightly with regions. The greatest single influx of females is into Rizal. This could be partly explained by the fact that 54 per cent of large scale manufacturing establishments are located in Manila and suburbs. These establishments employ about 61 per cent of the females in large scale manufacturing and only 43.4 per cent of the males. The total number of establishments in Greater Manila, Southern and Central Luzon make up 79 per cent of all the large scale manufacturing establishments

in 1969. They employ almost 75 per cent of workers in this category — which means a concentration in Luzon.

The other related attractions in the Metropolitan Manila area and its environs are the presence of 116 colleges and universities out of a total of 601 in the country. It is also noteworthy to mention that although only 22.5 per cent of Filipinos enjoy the benefits of electricity, about 51 per cent of the population served are in the Greater Manila area. They account for 73.5 per cent of the country's total energy consumption(1). High family income is also found in this area with 8.3 per cent of the families earning 17.2 per cent of the country's total family income.

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BECAUSE slums and squatter areas are the most visible evidences of "exploding" city populations they are simultaneously the objects of sympathy, legislation, prevention, and relocation. Illustrative of the expressed sympathy for squatters and the rationale for relocation is as follows:

> "Everytime the sledge hammer rains its blow or the crowbars tear to pieces the squatter dwellings in the slums and *estero*(2) colonies, we are moved, in the deepest recesses of our hearts, by feelings of sympathy by the grim prospects for unwanted humans left to the chilling cold or uprooted of [*sic*] earning a living. But for the general welfare, prodded by the disastrous floods, fires and other multiplying social evils that have taken root in the squatter colonies, the sad duty must be done. The squatters must be relocated."(3)

Government relocation programmes have two general approaches, one of which is to "return the rural folks to their farm communities" and the second is to "export the others *en masse* to the social resettlement laboratories" of Sapang Palay, San Pedro Tunasan and Carmona. In practice, the stress has been on eviction and relocation to designated sites. Hardly anything has been done to return the rural folks to their farm communities. In some cases such as in Baguio City, a policy of positive accommodation has been pursued by setting aside through Presidential Proclamation No. 232 (14 July 1967) some 18.9 hectares of public lands close to the centre of the city for subdivision and allocation to people who are squatting on the land. They also set up a "Squatters Committee" to control and supervise the awarding of lots to individuals, and *barrio*(4) councils were also involved in efforts to do something about squatters and slums. In Iligan City, a presidential directive to the Bureau of Lands in 1969 ordered the survey, subdivision and distribution of land to *bona fide* tenants. Legal measures have also been resorted to in Iloilo City, where the city engineers brought court complaints against squatters occupying public properties. To do this they invoked Republic Act No. 2056 which prohibits taking possession of public navigable rivers and obstructing natural waterways. The squatters claim that they were too poor to build houses on decent lots became a social justice issue which was played up by the mass media. Subsequently the cases were "forgotten".(5)

Despite all the measures which have been taken the trek towards the city and its environs continues and will probably continue indefinitely. The complaints about the squatters, their "unsightliness" and "sad" state, are obviously not coming from the squatters themselves. One therefore needs to look at how squatters and slum dwellers view their own situation.

Laquian's studies in six cities give us some insights into six such communities: City Camp — Rock Quarry, Baguio City; Pasil, Cebu City; Bolton Riverside, Davao City; Saray, Iligan City; Barrio Concepcion, Iloilo City; and Isla de Kokomo in Manila. From Table 3 one can see that squatting and slum dwelling is a widespread phenomenon in cities as indicated by the number of places affected, and the estimated proportions of the city population which live under these conditions.

Further scrutiny of the data reveals the following characteristics of squatters and slum dwellers.

- They tend to live near their place of work in the community or within walking distance. If they have to ride to go to work, the cost of transportation is minimal and travel time is about half an hour or less.

- Although there is a high proportion of one-room houses, some families enjoy two or three rooms. A new galvanized iron roof is a sign of being relatively well-off. Of the six communities, Baguio City squatters appear to have the best housing. The high percentage of home ownership suggests the relative ease with which these residents were able to put up their own houses and, when one considers that land is practically rent-free except in Manila, a major item of expense is taken care of. If any house or land rentals are paid, they are more token than real.

- Although the physical conditions in the slum and squatter areas look miserable to the outsider, they in fact have more access to certain amenities and services than the average Filipino household. For example, the National Demographic Survey of 1968 indicated that only 10 per cent of households had piped-in water. The proportions of households with this facility in the six squatter communities was much higher. In Davao City, where more than half the

ouseholds rely on rain water, artesian wells etc., the ater problem is experienced by the whole city and is t peculiar to the squatter areas. In Iloilo City, ater is also a scarcity for everyone. At the national vel, only 22.5 per cent of the population have ectricity in the house. In the six cities studied, more an 80 per cent of the squatters in Baguio, Davao d Manila had electricity. For Cebu, Iligan and oilo, it was more than 40 per cent. Access to edical services either government or private was parent in all six communities. Except for Cebu, ilets of some kind were also available. As far as oking fuel is concerned, the national figures show per cent of the households use wood. Again the uatter communities show a higher proportion using rosene.

• In terms of educational attainment and mily income the squatters do not differ much from e average Filipino in the urban area. The monthly mily income is the same as the lower income level r the country, to which 59 per cent of families long. Many of the respondents from the Cebu, oilo and Iligan communities received less than 150 sos (approximately 7 pesos per US dollar) a month. hey are therefore far from being well-off.

• The most striking and most positive aspect of uatter communities is the solidarity and strong sense community which their residents feel. They have e co-operative spirit and indulge in mutual assist- nce activities. People living in these communities joy the company of many friends, particularly from e same ethnic and dialect group. They like the ace so much that they do not want to move out and uld not conceive living anywhere else. On this latter oint, Manila squatters were less positive than the her five communites. Although the majority of them cept for those in Baguio said that the Government as doing nothing to help them in their communities, e majority of the residents have a sense of political wer or at least an access to a Government official or politician via someone from the community who n help them. Laquian attributes this community lidarity to the need for organization in order to nfront external threats particularly because of their squatter" status.

Examples of formal organizations, precisely for is purpose, are: the Home Defenders Association of gan City which was lobbying for the subdivision and le of the land squatted upon to *bona fide* tenants; n organization of three communities was also formed nen there was an attempt in some of the squatter eas to turn over parts of the community in Cebu to ivate businessmen; in Davao, an association for the or was organized to fight the private claims of big ndowners. Another organization was called the avao Riverside Landseekers' Association. Despite the sitive feelings for their communities, they are not ind to the realities, for only 12 to 36 per cent of them said they saw nothing wrong with their communities. The Baguio and Cebu residents were more favourable about their communities than those in the four other places. At any rate, the notion of squatter and slum communities as places of alienation and social disorganization does not seem to be borne out in these studies. Again college education is viewed as the key to a better life.

• If people migrate in search of a better life, do they find it? The majority of the respondents indicate that their present situation is better than the past. They likewise see improved prospects for their children because of better economic opportunities. Many of them expect their children to become professionals because of the better opportunities offered through education. Jobs are more available in the new community; they would prefer to stay there if given a choice and the majority are unwilling to return to their place of origin. Of the six communities, however, Manila squatters have the lowest assessment of their life situation, whether it be in comparison with the past, prospects for their children, availability of jobs, or desire to stay in their community.

A lower percentage of them were unwilling to return to their place of origin. In other words, they seemed to be more amenable to returning home. This less favourable assessment could be due to the tougher competition in Manila on the one hand and the higher levels of living against which they might be comparing their own. Furthermore, the pressures to get the slums and squatters cleared away could be a greater threat in Manila than in the other five cities. Despite the lower degree of endorsement for squatters living among the Manila respondents, in general the assessment is still a positive one.

• True to the general observation that the family is the most important single institution in the Filipino's life, the migrant makes the journey to the city with the help of his family and relatives. Thirty to about 50 per cent of them heard about the availability of land for housing from relatives, and 23 to 45 per cent from friends. The patterns of initial movement are as follows:

(1) Unmarried migrant moves by himself and stays with relatives in the city.
(2) Married migrant, head of the family moves first and stays with relatives in the city. The rest of the family follows later.
(3) Married migrant moves with his family as a group.
(4) Married migrant lives by himself in the city.

The first two patterns seem to be the most common because adjustment in the city is much easier with the assistance of relatives. In the meantime they look for jobs and suitable accommodation for the rest

of the family when they arrive. Among those who are already employed (whether partially, or regularly, or sporadically) about 20 to 43 per cent of the households have one or more other family members gainfully employed.

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AN inevitable question asked about squatters is: "Where do they come from?". Laquian's study found an intra- as well as an inter-provincial rural to urban movement as in the case of Cebu City, where Pasil, the squatter community, is made up of 75 per cent Cebuanos who came from the province itself. Only seven and six per cent are from Leyte and Bohol, respectively. The rest are from Misamis, Samar, Panay and Luzon. In Iligan, 28.6 per cent of the squatters are natives of Iligan; 25.6 per cent from Leyte; 8.8 per cent from Misamis Oriental; 5.4 from Camiguin; 4.7 from Misamis Occidental and less than three per cent from Luzon. More than 70 per cent of the Iligan squatters moved to the community within the last five years indicating the recency of the migration. Davao City's population is reported to have 67.1 per cent who speak Cebuano as their mother tongue. Only about 18.5 per cent used a language originally spoken by natives of Davao.

In Iloilo city, the squatters tend to come from other areas of Iloilo province and other provinces in Panay Island, although Iloilo and Cebu are points of out-migration from their respective rural areas. Besides the intra- and inter-provincial rural to urban movement there is also an intra-city transfer of residence among the squatters, because of displacements due to floods, typhoons, and fires which destroy their residences and force them to move to other areas from the central city. The Hackenbergs describe another emerging pattern which they termed "squatter suburbanization", characterized by an outward movement from the central city by a more middle class group of squatters, made up of skilled industrial and sub-professional workers who have steady and relatively adequate incomes and where about half of the adults have high school or college education. They found such a community in the Lapu-Lapu Extension where the squatters had worked their way out of other neighbourhoods in which they had resided for some time. This is shown by the fact that 71 per cent of the Lapu-Lapu Extension residents had previous addresses in other places in the city, 61 per cent of them being in the *barrios* within the vicinity. 66 per cent of these migrants had parents born in the Visayas. Only 17 per cent came from Davao province.

The first influx into the area came in 1964-65, when timber processing and exporting firms were established, bringing employees and labourers to the area. Unlike other squatter areas, the residents in this area have high hopes of owning the land for which claims have been filed, and therefore more money has been invested in their homes. 76 per cent of t homes are owner-occupied. About a quarter of t squatters rent houses from others, who in t meantime have built larger, more expensive hom To push their petition for the release of the land the nucleus of squatter families occupying the are a Lanang Homeless Association was created in 196 In the meantime, about 67 per cent of the names the list of petitioners do not even live in t Lapu-Lapu settlement(6).

By all indications the quest for a piece of lan on which to build a house is universal. Incom distribution measures should therefore include this one of its major objectives.

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A second question always asked about squatte concerns their source of livelihood. How they survive or even thrive? Laquian's study observ that squatter communities tend to emerge near pie open markets, river banks, city dumps and the centr business districts. In these places the household head their wives and children find unskilled jobs such labourers, stevedores at the pier, load carrie transport workers, petty traders and hawkers. Wiv do some buying and selling, or take in laundry, wh the children sell cigarettes, shine shoes, sell newsp pers and do all kinds of odd jobs. In Iligan, th engage in small-scale farming along the fringes of city and some off-shore fishing. It is significant th 73 per cent of the respondents from the Iloilo C had fathers who were in agriculture and fishin Hence for so many of them, migration to the ci meant a shift from farming and fishing to unskill labour and for others such as those in Iligan Cit some little fishing and farming remained. Althoug the nature of their jobs suggests self-employmen more than 50 per cent of the respondents fro Baguio City, Davao city and Iligan City had regul jobs. The conditions which mitigate the adve consequences of low income and under-employmen etc. are: no house rents, or minimal rents whi represent considerable savings; nearness to place work; multiple bread winners in the family, althoug they may all be under-employed or sporadical employed; relative availability of basic services such light and water; purchase of food in small quantiti several times a day because they are near the mark and *sari-sari*(7) stores which cater for basic foo necessities. Despite all these, their greatest expectatio from government is land. Some say they wa employment opportunities, but they believe that land were available for their housing, they could tak care of other needs.

Other studies done by Hollnsteiner(8), Laya(9 Guerrero and Jurado(10) have basically the sam findings as Laquian's. For example, Hollnsteiner study of Vitas, Tondo shows that only 33 per cent

e respondents were born in Vitas, Tondo and etropolitan Manila; 45 per cent came from a ovincial town or city and 21 per cent came from ovincial *barrios*. This suggests (a) a within-city ovement of just a change in city neighbourhood, (b) "medium leap" from provincial town or city to anila, and (c) a "big leap" from provincial *barrio* to anila. Comparing four types of residential communities (the squatter area, the city block, the row partments, and the tenement), the squatters who ere the most recent residents also included the ighest proportion coming from provincial town or ty. The oldest residents in the city area were those row apartments and in the city block. There are so more Tagalogs among these longer established sidences. Squatters included more of the long stance migrants from Visayas, northern Luzon and col.

Employment in Vitas was 5 per cent professional technical; 4 per cent proprietor/manager/administrator; 11 per cent clerical and office workers; 22 r cent salesmen and related workers; three per cent rmers, fishermen; eight per cent transport and mmunications; 33 per cent craftsmen, factory perators; 8 per cent manual labourers and five per nt domestic workers. The squatter area reported the ighest proportion of the three lower level occupaonal categories. Residents of row apartments had the ghest proportion in the three higher level categories. hey also had the highest income levels and more overnment employees in their midst, while squatters d the highest proportion of privately employed. In e four residential communities, 55 per cent were ivately employed, 32 per cent self-employed and 12 r cent government employed. 46 per cent of the ouseholds have one or more children employed. In e Laya study there were 53 per cent, and in the uerrero-Jurado study in Grace Park, Maypajo and alic-Balic, 31.4 per cent of the respondents had ildren who were employed. The longer and older tablished residents in the row apartments have 33 r cent reporting three or more of their children ployed. This is followed by 20 per cent of those om the city block. Hollnsteiner points out that "if e continuum from 'affluence' to poverty by actual tas low-income norms is examined in terms of ousehold possessions and tenure, the row apartment vellers stand out as the most affluent in the ighbourhood. City block residents generally come xt, followed closely by tenement dwellers. Far hind come those living in the squatter area."

Just as in Laquian's study, 59 per cent of the spondents in Vitas work in household premises thin Vitas and Tondo, and 41 per cent walk to rk. Another 41 per cent take the *jeepney*(11). 73 r cent take 30 minutes or less to get to work. ooking back at the migrants' initial experiences on arrival in Manila, 39 per cent acquired their first jobs by applying by themselves; 40 per cent were helped by relatives and 17 per cent by friends. More encouraging is the fact that 42 per cent of them found a job immediately, in less than a week; and 80 per cent found a steady regular first job. Among those who quit their first job, 32 per cent did so for a better job and 30 per cent due to a change in their circumstances such as old age, poor health, marriage, etc. Unfavourable job circumstances were mentioned by 24 per cent. In assessing their opportunities in Vitas, 71 per cent indicated more opportunities in Tondo than in their hometown with the squatters reporting a higher percentage than the three other communities. Those who said there were fewer opportunities in Tondo were 17 per cent; 9 per cent said opportunities were the same as in their hometown. In comparing life in Tondo with previous places of residence, 41 per cent said "better" in Tondo; three per cent "same" and 16 per cent "better in previous place". The rest could not say. When asked about their desire to return to their hometown, 64 per cent said "No"; 14 per cent said "Yes" and 20 per cent "it depends". 30 per cent of those in the squatter area endorsed the conditional response, which means that if sources of livelihood were available or if their children had finished schooling, they would favour returning to their hometown. For the moment, however, 84 per cent of them did not expect to move out of Vitas in 1971; 56 per cent preferred to stay there; 46 per cent gave Vitas a high rating as a neighbourhood; 76 per cent thought their chances of achieving their aspirations for their families were fair or very good. Again, the aspiration for the children is to educate them for a good career. This aspiration is higher among squatters than other residents.

From this study one can infer that, if a migrant perseveres long enough in the city, he succeeds in moving up the socio-economic scale. Better opportunities for children's education is considered an important way of achieving this.

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REGARDLESS of how favourable the squatters and slum dwellers are about their communities of residence, policy-makers still look at theirs as a miserable life and one which should be changed for the better. As Abesamis puts it: "Relocation becomes democracy's enlightened and directed change — a means for providing the relocated families new worlds, new frontiers, new powers of self-fulfilment and fresher resolutions and opportunities for the men, women and children to start rebuilding their lives again."(12)

Several efforts have been made to improve squatters' lives by relocation(13). In Baguio, Executive Order No. 75 of 17 July 1967 set aside 100 hectares

located in five parcels in the city for relocation sites. In those places located one or two kilometres from the city centre, *bona fide* squatters were given the option of buying the land they were squatting on at liberal terms (down payment of 10 per cent of purchase price; prices ranged from 3.50 pesos to 12.00 pesos per square metre while the commercial value was as high as 25 pesos; ten years to pay full cost). The long term housing loans offered to residents of one relocation site were used by middle income people because the poorer families could not afford the repayment schedules.

In Cebu City after the 1962 fire which rendered 600 families homeless, the Government offered to resettle squatters to villages about five, eight, or 19 kilometres away but the squatters refused and instead the Government provided 200 houses in a place only one and a half kilometres North of the pier zone. Others were moved to a site two kilometres away.

The experience in Davao City with respect to two relocation sites of 34 and five hectares have not been very encouraging either, despite the fact that residential lots purchased at 1.00 pesos per square metre by the Government were being sold at the same price. Because the relocation sites have not been fully developed, many of those who originally had a right to own lots have since sold them. It is estimated that only 20 per cent of the original receivers actually moved to the relocation sites. On the other hand, residential subdivisions financed by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) suited the pocket books of middle and upper income families but not the squatters. Another 14 kilometres away new prospects are offered. Although transport costs are high, the selling price is low and, being located in a satellite town, facilities are available. Perhaps this represents a more promising relocation site. But Davao City has the tremendous advantage of having more government land available.

In Iligan City, the squatters themselves are pressuring for the subdivision and distribution of the public lands being squatted upon, but the problem does not seem to be a critical one, because the growth of the slums and squatters relative to the population is not as serious as it is in other cities. Only 10 per cent of the city's population are estimated to be squatters or slum dwellers. The estimated proportions in the five other cities range from 14 to 33 per cent.

In Manila and its environs, programmes for squatters have focused on eviction and relocation to Bago Bantay, Novaliches, Sapang Palay, Carmona and San Pedro Tunasan. A 1969 Family Survey in Sapang Palay showed that of the original 5,975 families relocated since 1960, only 2,996 remained in 1968. In 1972, there were estimated to be 3,400 families(14).

The Carmona Resettlement Area is a 411-h tare lot in Carmona, Cavite. As of 1971, t Philippine Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitati Agency (PAHRA) reported that the resettlement a had 4,326 families or a total of 26,268 residents. study conducted by the Philippine Psychologi Corporation(15) in 1971 indicated that 62.2 per c of the employed household heads were working in t Greater Manila area; 30.1 per cent were working Cavite; and a few were working in Laguna, Pampa ga and Bulacan. Of those who were not working Cavite or Carmona, 39.1 per cent went home o once a week; 29.5 per cent commuted daily. The r went home every other day, twice or three times week. About 74 per cent of them were willing to g up their work outside Carmona and receive at leas minimum wage. Proximity to the family and savi on transportation expenses were the major reasons wanting to work in Carmona. As in the squat areas, 48 per cent of the households had more th one member employed. In order to help provi employment to the resettled families, an industr centre was set up to house income-generati establishments which would create job opportuni for the residents.

A survey conducted in 1972(16) in San Gabri Carmona found that 86 per cent of the hou sampled were family occupied; 12 per cent w watcher occupied and nine per cent were abando and four per cent were skeleton houses. Only 32 cent of the respondents were fulltime residents; 38 cent visited at the week-ends; two per cent went ho twice a month, one per cent once a month, nine cent seldom went home and 18 per cent came once four or five months. Despite the partial occupancy the houses, 81 per cent of the respondents intended stay in the area permanently. One per cent wanted move out and 18 per cent were reported as having unknown current address. The major reason for t relative scarcity of residents in Carmona is th employment outside the area, mostly in Greater Mani The industrial centre has provided employm for only 10 per cent of the resident household hea interviewed. Therefore, the advantages offered by t slum and squatter areas in Greater Manila in terms proximity to work site are not present in Carmon Recently, with more families relocated, a commu train has been provided. Needless to say, relocati has yet to prove itself as a solution to the squatter a slum problem. In the meantime, the situati multiplies. As *Bulletin Today* of 1 July 19 reported: "Some 800 families squatting in t compound of the National Grains Authority Cabanatuan City have appealed to the authorities either sell or lease to them the lots instead relocating them."

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QUITE a contrast to the high density problem the city is the relatively sparse population

ontier areas like Palawan and Davao during their ars of "internal colonization". Resettlement or land ttlement, which Fernandez defines as "large-scale ternal transfer of population to vacant and frontier nds under the sponsorship and assistance of overnment or private agencies"(17), is viewed po- ively. It is regarded as a desirable process which ould be promoted. On the other hand, city-ward ovements particularly to the Greater Manila area and e resulting "ugly" concentrations of population in ms and squatter communities are viewed very gatively and the tendency is towards a policy of moval (called relocation) and prevention ("keep them the countryside"). For both types of migrants, the pectation and promise is of a new life better than the d. As we have seen in the previous discussion, uatters and slum dwellers have very positive sessments of their present lives and future opportuni- s in the city. It would therefore be of interest to see at happens to those who make the "positive" move wards sparsely populated areas. Do they also find eir "pot of gold"?

A case study of the now-defunct National gricultural and Rural Resettlement Administration IARRA) settlement in Central Palawan which was ne by Fernandez provides us with some insights into oblems and prospects of land settlement. NARRA has ,300 hectares divided into five agricultural sectors ich are in turn subdivided into 6 hectare farm lots. e original plan was to administer the project for 20 ars at the end of which the settlers were expected to come economically self-sufficient. Since 1954, about 666 families have been admitted. Four types of settlers ve been identified:

- **pioneer settlers** — those who settled and resided the area before the opening of the NARRA project. 7 families)

- **local settlers** — those who came to NARRA on eir own and applied at the local office of the Agency r land allocation. (800 families)

- **moved-in settlers** — those who applied at the ational Agency and came to NARRA with full overnment assistance. (Approximately 1649 families)

- **self-propelled settlers** — those who applied at e National Agency, paid their own transportation to ARRA and, upon arrival, were accorded partial bsidy and assistance (about 200 families). The oved-in settlers had the barest provisions and sources and had to be provided housing, transporta- n, subsistence, clothes, seeds, farm implements, edical services, etc.. The Agency's blueprint estimates at the whole process of resettlement from the cruiting and screening of settlers, transfer to Palawan, cushioning and stabilizing the settlers and final land vnership would take 10 years.

The Agency also estimated that about 60 per cent of all farmlands allocated to settlers was grass-infested wasteland which could be reclaimed only by proper irrigation methods; 20 per cent was still forest and only 20 per cent could be considered productive. Less than half of the productive land was irrigated. Because most of the settlers are rice-oriented, irrigation was necessary. In August 1967, about 815 settlers out of 2,666 were reported to have abandoned their farms (meaning non-cultivation of farms for 2 cropping seasons). Five hundred of these reported cases were found to be still living in the settlement but temporarily engaged in work other than the cultivation of their own farms. In such situations they may borrow lands from other settlers, perform non-agricultural work in town or be a share tenant in already productive agricultural lands. As of 1971 the Agency had awarded titles to only 117 out of 2,666 recipients of land. Of these 117, 13 have already lost ownership.

Applying the following indicators, Fernandez analyzed the ingredients of success among the NARRA settlers: extent of land development; general style of living; ownership of agricultural production equipment; ability to send children to school; and participation in community affairs. Based on these criteria, successful settlers were identified as a "well-demarcated social group in matters of formal education, exposure to media, travel, managerial skills, and employment experience". As a group, their average formal education amounted to three years at school. Two have attended graduate schools and another currently attends law school. In contrast, the average settler has spent some time in the city, either to study or gain employment, holding jobs which call for managerial skills. Five of them take pride in having been trained by American employers, and four others in having been assigned overseas (Guam and Okinawa). The key to their success, they claim, is "managerial know-how rather than technical skills". Fernandez says that: "The successful settlers in NARRA are farmers, but only nominally. They are more aptly called *entrepreneurs*. Social talent and business sense are the major elements of their code."

The majority of settlers, who are not on the farms are most likely in the nearby town, because the growth of NARRA is increasingly being focused on its urban elements — such as the bureaucratic sector, the market, and non-agricultural labour. By way of policy alternatives, Fernandez suggests that the settlers be recruited from the bottom of the economic ladder from where there is not much choice other than resettlement, or from those who are able and can afford to take the risks in a frontier area. For the former, large of government assistance are needed and for the latter, little or moderate assistance. In other words, the settlers should not be treated equally by the Agency because they differ in initial resources and characteristics at the time of recruitment. To this day Palawan remains the most sparsely populated province in the country.

For a more "successful" land settlement pro-

gramme in terms of ability to bring in settlers who stay and farm the land, the story of the migration to the Digos-Padada Valley of Davao is illustrative(18). Simkins and Wernstedt say that from 1948 to 1965 about 180,000 persons (migrants and their dependents) came into the Digos-Padada Valley and that there is now almost no land in the valley proper that is not under private ownership and under cultivation, except for the poor drainage areas. The large holdings in lowland rice-irrigated areas are owned by the original settlers. With the increasing scarcity of public land for homesteads, some of the more recent migrants had to work as tenants to the more established settlers. Unlike the migration to Palawan, the settlers in the Digos-Padada Valley mostly came on their own. Their journeys were self-financed from sale of land, livestock or crops, personal savings, family contributions, borrowing, or payment of passage by prospective employers. Some of the settlers were brought as *sacadas*(19) to work on the big coconut and *abaca*(20) plantations and their earnings from these jobs helped them get started. Despite the closing of the farm land frontier and the relatively high population density in the area, 58 out of 136 *barrios* inhabited by 44,000 people have no regular public transport. Only 10 per cent of the population live in *barrios* or *poblaciones*(21) near the provincial road. The coastal *barrios* depend on boats for transport. This lack of an extensive road network was seen as an obstacle, hindering the efficient marketing of farm produce, and rational economic development.

Simkin's and Wernstedt's analysis of the migration process indicates the following patterns.

• There was a concentration of migrants from Cebu and the highest contributors to the first 10 per cent of the migrants came from the municipalities of Argao and Sibonga. The origins of the first 10 per cent anticipate the origin of successive migrations.

• The selection of specific destinations by the migrants was very much influenced by the following factors: availability to markets by road, presence of water, and location of friends and relatives.

• The migrants made an average of two stops over an average of six years before arriving at Digos. The median age group at the time of the first move was 20-24, but the median age of migrants on arrival at Digos was 25-29.

• As in the studies of slum and squatter communities previously cited, relatives and friends played a very significant role in the migration process. More specifically, they encouraged migration of those who were still in their provinces of origin, and allowed relatives and friends to stay with them upon arrival in the valley. Home visits by the migrants have also been instrumental in attracting them to the new place. Relatives and friends have also influenced t destination of new migrants. A very clear indicati of this is the fact that almost half of the migran brothers and sisters live in the same valley and abo 40 per cent in the same municipality. The arrangements certainly contribute to smoother socia economic and psychological adjustments for the ne arrivals.

• There is a higher proportion of marri couples among migrants to the Digos-Padada Valle than among migrants to the city slums and squatt areas. They tend to have a higher average level education (grade V) than the population in t province of origin (Grade III), higher too than t national average (Grade IV). About two-thirds those from Cebu and Bohol were born in *barra* rather than *poblaciones*. About 59 per cent ca from *barrios* and only 41 per cent from *poblacione* This suggests a definite rural-to-rural movement.

• If the reason for migration is to find land farm, the migrants have succeeded. The first indic tion of this is the increase in the proportion migrants engaged in agricultural employment fro 57.5 per cent before migration to 77.5 per cent aft migration. There was a definite shift away fro blue-collar and white-collar jobs to agriculture. T second indication is the increase in the size of la being farmed per family. Prior to migration, t median size was between two and 2.9 hectares. Af migration this became 3 — 3.9. What is even mo significant is the fact that 40 per cent of the farm holdings farmed after migration are of more th four hectares. Prior to migration only 14.5 per ce had this farm size. These two indicators suggest th there has been a definite improvement in the situati of the migrants as far as farming is concerned.

• For those concerned with the push and p factors in migration, when the migrants were asked to their reasons for moving to Digos, about thr quarters of them mentioned better economic oppo tunities but hardly anyone pointed to "econom distress" factors in their place of origin. In oth words it is a conscious "pull" rather than "pus which induced them to move.

• Simkins and Wernstedt introduced the thre **hold concept** in migration which is very much a pu factor. They argue that the reluctance to migrate general even in the face of rather severe economic social distress. But once some persons for some reaso or another have moved and sufficient numbers them have done so, information and aid links a established which make it easier for friends an relatives to migrate. Once this threshold has bee reached in certain places, a tradition of migration established and such places tend to be noted for the out-migration. The authors offer this as an addition explanation for migration behaviour.

* * * * * * *

CERTAIN policy issues emerge from this analysis of internal migration and its effects:

• Should government policy be one of bringing people to where economic opportunities lie or should the opportunities be brought to where people are? Because of the infrastructure of facilities, services, employment and educational opportunities, the move towards the urban areas has been predominant. Studies of city-ward movement have concentrated on slums and squatter areas and might have therefore contributed to a biased picture of migration. One remedy is relocation, but relocation often leads to job dislocation and so the result is far from satisfactory. So far, there are no studies available of the other side of the migration coin — that of the white-collar, college graduate, professional, managerial, clerical, business, commercial and skilled worker classes who migrate to the city at the upper-lower, middle or at the upper level of urban society. Housing estates and apartment buildings within the city or in the suburbs of the city's environs are clearly indicative of this development. The geographical, social and economic origins of this upwardly mobile group and the occupational and educational routes they have taken in order to arrive at their present position and status should tell us how to find the "pot of gold at the end of the rainbow". But so far we can only go by superficial observation since no studies are available. One thing which should be recognized is that urbanization is an inevitable and irreversible process and therefore it seems wiser to prepare and plan for it rather than fight it. The burgeoning of slums and squatter areas and the emergence of housing estates for the middle and upper class are twin results of the same process. Why do we welcome and encourage the latter and push aside the former? Where is the equity in this policy? Relocation means taking the migrants further away from their places of work, unless employment and services can be provided adequately at the relocation sites. So far, this has not materialized to such a degree as to substitute for opportunities available in the city, even in the slums. What should be done about this?

• If we have agrarian reform why not urban or residential land reform? The National Demographic Survey of 1968 showed the following figures on home and lot ownership:

Lot ownership		House ownership	
Owned	49.4%	Owned	79.6%
Rented	15.3%	Rented	6.7%
Rent-free	28.1%	Rent-free	6.5%
No response	7.2%	No response	7.1%

• Although we have reason to worry about urban squatters we also have the phenomenon of rural squatters. With the transfer of ownership from the landlord to the tenant, these tenants are assured of a plot of land on which to put up their house. The landless, hired farm labourer, the rural non-farm worker and the urban poor are not as fortunate. Would the new land-owning, *bourgeoisie* be inclined to allow landless farm labour and rural non-farm people to use a part of their land for a home site? What is their chance of ever having such a plot of land? It seems so inconsistent and even unfair that a man who owns two hectares of rice or corn land but is not cultivating it himself has been asked to give it up in favour of his tenant while the urban or residential land owner in town is allowed to hold all his real estate, whether or not he is using it himself or whether or not he is using it at all? This state of affairs is nowhere more dramatically illustrated than in the pieces of real estate in Makati and Davao. One wonders how much the Makati real estate development has contributed to the country's economic growth; but there is no question that large gaps in income distribution have been given full expression in Makati, which is the preserve of the upper-upper class whose characteristic jet-set life style is more akin to the affluent West than to the rest of the Philippines. The detrimental effects created by the flaunting of this life style cannot be ignored.

The upper and landed class, whose holdings are located in the urban areas have not been touched at all by land reform. If there is to be any sacrifice involved there should be equality of sacrifice between the rural and the urban landowner. If there are any benefits to be received, there should also be some equality between the farmer, the urban poor and the rural non-farm low-income groups.

How concentrated is urban or residential land ownership? The price of these pieces of real estate goes up whether or not the owner does anything with them. A redistribution of this land could go a long way to complement agrarian reform. A ceiling on residential land ownership is also another possibility. Another wild suggestion is that every subdivision owner should be required to set aside a certain portion of his land for sale at a much lower price than the rest of his property (a kind of socialized pricing for residential land). The declarations of ownership, market value, and size of real estate properties (deadline 30 September 1973) would be a valuable source of information on the concentration of real estate ownership.

• The third issue relates to whether or not land is still available for cultivation. If it is available, should resettlement to these places be promoted or should we allocate resources by making the cultivated or presently available cultivable land more productive through irrigation? The Palawan and Digos-Padada experience shows us that the issue is not one of resettlement or irrigation but rather resettlement plus irrigation which is a much more expensive proposition. Therefore the question of who owns the still uncultivated land is also very pertinent, if sizeable investments are going to be made towards their cultivation. Given growth, employment and income distribution objectives, which path should be taken — intensification or "extensification"?

TABLE 1. PATTERNS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION [1948-60] TO 1970

Province	Differential Average % Increase in Population and % Provincial Increase [1948-1960]	Density 1960	Density 1970	Net Inter-Provincial Migration [+Gain or —Los [1970]
20 Points or more Above Average				
PHILIPPINES	(40.8)	90.3	122.3	
Bukidnon	65.4	23.4	50.0	+106,100
Davao	104.0			+191,088
Del Norte		32.3	54.4)	
Del Sur		78.0	123.1)	
Oriental		25.7	48.0)	
Cotabato	83.3	45.0	69.6	+127,533
Rizal	75.6	783.2	1,529.7	+784,662
Agusan	73.5			+ 60,291
Del Norte		68.5	107.3)	
Del Sur		10.4	19.5)	
Zamboanga del Sur	68.8	47.8	104.2	+ 2,009
Lanao del Norte	64.8	87.5	113.2	— 21,899
Occidental Mindoro	54.6	128.0	164.9	+ 20,615
Oriental Mindoro	43.1	96.3	132.4	+ 8,938
Camarines Norte	40.6	89.0	124.1	— 4,392
Lanao del Sur	37.4	97.7	117.6	— 80,128
Zamboanga del Norte	27.0	46.3	67.4	+ 9,739
Isabela	26.3	41.5	60.8	+ 7,922
Nueva Vizcaya	26.1	19.8	31.9	+ 28,619
Less than 20 Points Above Average				
Masbate	18.3	83.0	121.8	+ 7,740
Quezon	16.0	54.7	82.3	+ 77,412
Mt. Province	15.9	40.9	44.4	— 11,100
Bataan	15.6	106.9	157.5	+ 14,693
Zambales	13.3	57.5	92.4	+ 49,980
Palawan	12.3	10.9	15.9	+ 7,179
Pampanga	7.4	283.1	416.1	+ 38,097
Camarines Sur	7.2	155.6	180.1	—164,363
Laguna	6.1	268.3	397.6	+ 60,355
Cavite	3.2	293.7	404.0	+ 23,045
Less than 20 Points Below Average				
Catanduanes	— 1.4	103.4	107.4	— 45,162
Cagayan	— 2.3	49.5	64.6	— 19,025
Surigao	— 4.8			— 188
del Norte		71.2	87.2	
del Sur		36.2	56.8	
Sulu	— 5.1	121.6	158.4	— 16,098
Bulacan	— 5.7	208.0	313.0	+ 88,787
Negros Oriental	— 6.0	104.0	124.5	— 72,609

BLE 1. [Continued]

Province	Differential Average % Increase in Population and % Provincial Increase [1948-1960]	Density 1960	Density 1970	Net Inter-Provincial Migration [+Gain or —Loss] [1970]
Less than 20 Points Below Average				
Batangas	— 7.2	215.2	292.6	+ 31,740
Marinduque	— 7.3	119.5	150.2	— 11,262
Albay	—10.3	201.7	264.0	— 37,035
Tarlac	—10.3	139.7	183.3	— 3,828
Nueva Ecija	—10.7	115.1	161.1	+ 13,261
Capiz	—11.9	119.7	149.6	— 25,817
Negros Occidental	—12.5	168.1	189.7	—258,396
La Union	—17.2	196.5	250.3	— 7,527
Ilocos Sur	—18.4	131.1	149.3	— 34,453
Pangasinan	—18.7	209.4	258.2	— 92,787
Romblon	—19.8	97.1	123.2	— 12,738
20 Points or More Below Average				
Misamis Occidental	—21.1	128.0	164.9	— 13,178
Sorsogon	—21.3	162.4	199.4	— 57,556
Manila	—25.1	29,744.3	34,764.6	— 85,708
Aklan	—26.0	124.4	144.9	— 30,351
Samar	—26.2			—157,545
Eastern		54.8	62.4	
Northern		74.7	87.5	
Ilocos Norte	—26.5	84.5	101.0	— 14,028
Cebu	—32.1	261.9	321.2	— 97,243
Iloilo	—32.4	181.5	219.4	— 89,249
Bohol	—33.8	143.8	166.0	— 69,965
Leyte	—34.3	153.7	177.2	—200,428
Misamis Oriental	—35.7	96.3	132.4	— 6,814
Antique	—38.7	94.5	114.7	— 21,833
Batanes	—44.5	49.3	54.5	— 1,849

Sources of Data:

1. Elvira M. Pascual, "Internal Migration in the Philippines," *1st Conference on Population, 1965*, Population Institute U.P. Press, 1966, pp. 315-353.
2. Tito A. Mijares, "Population Trends and Statistics", *The Ambassador*, Vol. 3, No. 4, May 1973, pp. 14-41.
3. Yun Kim, "Net Internal Migration in the Philippines, 1960-1970", *Journal of Philippine Statistics*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1972, pp. IX to XXVII.

TABLE 2. PROVINCES BY DENSITY [1970][1] NET INTER-PROVINCIAL MIGRATION [1960-1970][2] PER CENT CHANGE IN NUMBER OF FARMS AND FARM SIZE [1960-1971][3] AND INDEX OF TOTAL DEVELOPMENT[4]

Province	Density 1970	Net Inter-Provincial Migration 1960-1970 +Gain —Loss	Per cent Change in			Index of Total Development	% Urban
			Number of Farms	Less than 5 Hectares	5 Hectares or more		
PHILIPPINES	122.3		9	3	—11		
A. Low Density Provinces which Registered In — Migration [Group I]							
Palawan	15.9	+ 7,179	27	26	29	15	19.7
Nueva Vizcaya	31.9	+ 28,619	25	25	25	16	23.0
Agusan (Ave.)	39.0	+ 60,291				17	
del Norte	(107.3)		21	32	—14		36.4
del Sur	(19.5)		90	185	25		18.9
Bukidnon	50.0	+106,100	111	209	19	12	13.2
Isabela	60.8	+ 7,922	23	33	—17	13	13.3
Zamboanga del Norte	67.4	+ 9,739	45	60	10	15	14.5
Cotabato	69.6	+127,533	31	89	—35	23	14.6
Davao (Ave.)	75.0	+191,088				21	
del Norte	(54.4)		27	58	—13		20.0
del Sur	(123.1)		9	7	14		30.7
Oriental	(48.0)		62	91	21		19.1
Quezon	82.3	+ 77,412	14	20	2	27	28.3
Zambales	92.4	+ 49,980	1	1	2	28	50.6
Zamboanga del Sur	104.2	+ 2,009	41	66	—10	17	15.5
B. Low Density Provinces which Registered Net Out-Migration [Group II]							
Mt. Province	44.4	— 11,100	13	13	18	14	3.1
Bataan	54.5	— 1,849	—18	—20	3	20	22.0
Cagayan	64.6	— 19,025	6	7	— 9	14	14.7
Surigao (Ave.)	68.0	— 188					
del Norte	(87.2)		9	16	—12	18	22.7
del Sur	(56.8)		11	7	20	12	26.6
Samar (Ave.)	74.0	—157,545					
Northern	(87.5)		—16	—17	—13	15	20.2
Eastern	(62.4)		—11	—12	— 7	17	24.6
C. High Density Provinces which Registered Net In-Migration [Group III]							
Rizal	1529.7	+784,662	—19	—20	— 4	100	85.5
Pampanga	416.1	+ 38,097	— 9	—11	1	33	31.7
Cavite	404.0	+ 32,945	— 10	—10	—16	33	50.2

Province	Density 1970	cial Migration 1960-1970 +Gain —Loss	Number of Farms	Less than 5 Hectares	5 Hectares or more	Index of Total Development	% Urban
Bulacan	313.0	+ 88,787	—10	— 9	—22	31	47.9
Batangas	292.6	+ 31,740	6	8	—19	32	14.7
Mindoro Occidental	164.9	+ 20,615	69	100	9	19	24.1
Mindoro Oriental	132.4	+ 8,938	23	30	4	19	17.8
Bataan	157.5	+ 14,693	19	26	— 4	26	22.0
Nueva Ecija	161.1	+ 13,261	3	4	— 8	24	21.9
D. High Density Provinces which Registered Net Out — Migration [Group IV]							
Manila	34,764.0	— 85,708					100.0
Cebu	321.2	— 97,243	—11	—10	—25	40	39.9
Albay	264.0	— 37,035	16	21	—12	30	37.7
Pangasinan	258.2	— 92,787	2	3	—11	30	19.7
La Union	250.3	— 7,527	12	14	—41	23	12.4
Iloilo	219.4	— 89,249	1	4	21	30	28.7
Sorsogon	199.4	— 57,556	1	6	—19	21	23.8
Negros Occidental	189.7	—258,396	—31	—33	—26	29	33.4
Tarlac	183.3	— 3,828	— 1	2	—16	25	16.7
Camarines Sur	180.1	—164,363	11	20	—15	24	21.3
Leyte	177.2	—200,428	8	12	—14	24	21.6
Bohol	166.0	— 69,965	4	6	—33	27	14.1
Misamis Occidental	164.9	— 13,178	6	9	— 8	26	15.9
Sulu	158.4	— 16,098	— 2	4	—20	19	17.5
Marinduque	150.2	— 11,262	— 9	— 5	—24	23	12.5
Capiz	149.6	— 25,817	1	— 1	3	25	15.1
Ilocos Sur	149.3	— 34,453	1	1	5	24	16.7
Aklan	144.9	— 30,351	—15	—13	—27	21	10.5
Misamis Occidental	132.4	— 6,814	7	15	—17	28	15.9
Negros Oriental	124.5	— 72,609	— 6	— 5	—10	21	13.7
Camarines Norte	124.1	— 4,392	6	15	— 2	25	26.0
Romblon	123.2	12,738	—10	— 9	—13	19	12.5
Lanao del Sur	117.6	— 80,128	39	73	—39	18	23.4
Antique	114.7	— 21,833	2	5	—36	21	13.9
Lanao del Norte	113.2	— 21,899	15	22	—17	27	8.7
Catanduanes	107.4	— 45,162	1	7	—19	23	17.6
Ilocos Norte	101.0	— 14,028	—14	—14	—24	24	24.2

Sources of Data:

1. Tito A. Mijares, *op. cit.*.
2. Yun Kim, *op. cit.*.
3. Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1960 and 1971 Censuses of Agriculture.
4. Department of Public Works and Communication, Institute of Planning, U.P., Physical Planning Strategy for the Philippines: Population Trends and Existing Growth Areas, 1971.

TABLE 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF SQUATTERS AND SLUM DWELLERS IN 6 PHILIPPINE CITIES, 1971

	Baguio	Cebu	Davao	Iligan	Iloilo	Manila
1. Estimated % of city's population who are squatters and slum dwellers	14.2	25.0	22.3	10.0	32.0	33.0
2. Number of places affected by slum and squatters in the city	36	13	9	6	142 out of 162 barrios	43.8% in city proper; 17.8% in Quezon City; 13.1% in Caloocan
3. Place of Work						
(a) In the community or within walking distance	53.9% (within City)	37.7%	42.6%	50.0%	39.1%	31.9% within Metro. Manila
(b) Length of time to get from home to place of work less than 20 minutes	59.2%	76.1%	59.2%	85.6%	49.7%	38.0%
(c) Cost of transportation (0.30 pesos or less)	36.2%	21.2%	39.4%	19.8%	12.2%	25.0%
4. Housing and Household Arrangements						
(a) Building materials used:						
new galvanized iron roof	72.3%	18.6%	56.8%	3.4%	33.9%	40.5%
old galvanized iron roof or *nipa**	26.4%	65.1% *nipa*	36.8%	68.4% *nipa*	43.5% *nipa*	54.1%
(b) Number of rooms in the house	22.5% (Three)	46.5% (Two)	39.8% (Two)	61.4% (One)	33.3% (Two)	44.7% (One)
(c) Average household size	6	5	5	5	6	6
(d) Home ownership	54.5%	85.4%	55.7%	65.4%	86.0%	47.2%
(e) Renting homes	32.0%	10.9%	40.2%	29.4%	12.4%	45.4%
(f) Not paying rent in land	82.0%	99.5%	73.2%	79.6%	97.2%	55.1%
(g) Number of families living in household (more than one family)	4.9%	11.5%	11.4%	3.8%	10.2%	17.7%
(h) Value of house, if they were sold:						
500 pesos or less		55.6%		45.2%	36.1%	
501 pesos — 1,000 pesos		27.0%		20.0%	24.4%	
More than 5,000 pesos	23.8%		16.0%			8.9%
5. Services and Amenities						
(a) Have electricity in the house	80.1%	44.0%	89.6%	43.6%	47.9%	95.2%
(b) Piped-in water	68.6%	90.4%	54.5% Rely on rain water or Artesian well	71.8%	20.0%	64.5%
(c) Fuel for cooking	86.1% (Kerosene)	77.7% (Wood)	46.0% (Wood)	87.6% (Wood)		66.1% (Kerosene)
(d) Who is consulted when someone is sick:						
Government hospital or clinic	74.0%	14.2%	21.3%	32.0%	28.3%	18.11%
Private doctor		64.7%	32.1%	38.6%	28.1%	23.21%
(e) Presence of toilet facilities of some kind	94.9%	6.8%	96.4%	44.0%	89.0%	59.7%
6. Educational of household heads (finished elementary schooling)	25.4%	24.6%	12.6%	34.4%	30.7%	31.7%

	Baguio	Cebu	Davao	Iligan	Iloilo	Zamboanga
7. Family Income:						
201 pesos to 300 pesos monthly	39.8%	25.0%	35.5%	20.0%	25.0%	36.7%
Less than 150 pesos a month		30.0%		45.8%	30.0%	
8. Community Organization						
(a) Respondents who feel that people in the community are co-operative	86.7%	95.6%	70.4%	76.0%	87.4%	89.8%
(b) Respondents who say that people in the community engage in mutual assistance activities	53.7%	91.1%	55.5%	74.8%	64.9%	81.4%
(c) Respondents who say they have many friends in the community	94.9%	99.3%	95.3%	96.6%	96.2%	97.7%
(d) Respondents who say their friends speak the same dialect	67.6%	95.8%	68.9%	87.0%	77.6%	75.0%
(e) Respondents who saw nothing they did not like in their community	36.5%	35.6%	18.3%	15.2%	13.6%	12.5%
(f) Respondents who do not want to move and could not conceive of any other place to live	75.8%	77.5%	74.7%	86.6%	60.3%	35.5%
(g) Respondents who said that, if they need a favour from a Government official or a politician, there is someone in the community who can help them	70.5%	69.1%	56.2%	36.0%	53.9%	45.5%
(h) Respondents who said the Government was doing nothing to help them in their communities	27.3%	61.4%	61.1%	67.4%	55.1%	66.1%
9. Assessments of their life situation						
(a) Present life situation better than past	85.7%	89.5%	82.1%	80.8%	68.3%	51.2%
(b) Improved prospects for children because of better economic opportunities	95.1%	70.9%	84.9%	86.0%	51.7%	47.9%
(c) Jobs more available in new place		67.7%	47.9%	61.4%	31.1%	25.0%
(d) Would stay in the community if given a choice	75.8%	77.5%	74.7%	86.6%	60.3%	38.3%
(e) Expect their children to become professionals	35.7%	29.5%	61.7%		45.5%	33.4%
(f) Unwilling to return to place of origin	88.1%	59.3%	73.8%	75.6%	65.3%	53.3%
10. Role of the family in migration						
(a) Unmarried at time of final move	42.3%	68.9%	49.4%	58.2%	54.3%	54.8%
(b) Among married migrants head of the family moved first	48.3%	15.8%	60.2%	66.2%	59.2%	49.7%
(c) Among married migrants family moved as a group	37.9%	35.4%	17.6%	15.8%	18.4%	23.4%
(d) Married migrants who lived by themselves in city	72.0%	55.5%	44.4%	72.8%	63.7%	58.4%
(e) Unmarried migrants who lived by themselves in city	14.7%	21.5%	18.0%	33.2%	9.5%	7.5%
(f) Unmarried migrants who lived with relatives upon moving to the city	75.4%	44.2%	68.4%	60.1%	48.1%	69.2%
(g) Heard from friends about availability of land in the city	27.7%	22.6%	45.3%	36.4%	37.9%	32.6%
(h) Heard from relatives about availability of land in the city	37.5%	31.2%	42.8%	48.2%	36.5%	40.5%
(i) Other family members besides household head are gainfully employed	20.7%	43.3%	30.5%	17.4%	21.6%	31.1%

Source: Aprodicio A. Laquian, *Slums and Squatters in Six Philippine Cities*, SEADAG; Asia Society, New York, 23 March 1972.

**Nipa:* A species of palm, whose leaves are used for thatching.

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2. *Estero* — a type of stream; in the Philippines, slum dwellers often construct shacks on the banks of such streams.

3. Felix D. Abesamis, *Relocation and Employment;* paper prepared for the Workshop on Manpower and Human Resources, Los Baños, Laguna, Oct. 13-15, 1972.

4. *Barrio* — a village; or, in the urban context, a satellite slum community.

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6. B. N. Hackenberg and R. A. Hackenberg, *A Squatter Barrio in Davao City.* The Lapu-Lapu Extension Settlement, Institute of Behavioural Science, University of Colorado.

7. *Sari-sari* store — local shop.

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11. *Jeepney* — small passenger vehicle.

12. Felix D. Abesamis, *op. cit.*.

13. A. Laquian, *op. cit.*.

14. Felix D. Abesamis, *op. cit.*.

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19. *Sacadas* — migrant agricultural labourers.

20. *Abaca* — hemp.

21. *Poblacion* — market town.

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